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ABSTRACT 
 
THE NORMATIVE APPROACH OF THE CATHOLIC TRADITION IN THE 
ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR RESOLVING ETHICAL 
DILEMMAS REGARDING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
By 
Deacon David Garvis 
December 2017 
 
Dissertation supervised by Gerard Magill, PhD 
The dissertation engages the Catholic Tradition enunciated in the Ethical and 
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services to provide a normative approach 
for resolving ethical dilemmas regarding pivotal breakthroughs in medical technology. 
This normative ethical approach has two components: a normative framework for 
Catholic health care ethics that adopts practical ethical principles as enunciated in the 
Ethical and Religious Directives (Chapter 2) and secular decision-making models in 
organizational and clinical ethics that are consistent with the Catholic Tradition (Chapter 
3). 
At the end of the theoretical analysis in these chapters, the conclusion to Chapter 
3 explains how this normative approach reflects the Catholic Tradition on Natural Law. 
This normative approach is then applied to significant ethical dilemmas regarding a 
 v 
variety of pivotal issues that deal with medical technology: reproductive technologies 
(Chapter 4), regenerative technologies (Chapter 5), and end-of-life technologies (Chapter 
6). The conclusion of each of these practical chapters applies the Natural law approach of 
the Catholic Tradition to offer an ethical critique of each topic based on the Ethical and 
Religious Directives. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Technological Imperative in Health Care. 
The thesis of the dissertation is that the Catholic Tradition enunciated in the 
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services provides a normative 
approach for resolving ethical dilemmas regarding pivotal breakthroughs in medical 
technology. 
The dissertation analyses the normative approach of the Catholic Tradition for 
resolving ethical dilemmas regarding medical technology. Specifically, the normative 
approach focuses upon the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services, published by the United States Bishops (5th edition, 2009). The normative 
ethical approach has two components: a normative framework for Catholic health care 
ethics that adopts practical ethical principles as enunciated in the Ethical and Religious 
Directives (Chapter 2); and secular decision-making models in organizational and clinical 
ethics that are consistent the Catholic Tradition (Chapter 3). 
This normative approach in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services is then applied to resolve significant ethical dilemmas regarding a 
variety of pivotal issues that deal with medical technology. Chapter 4 applies the 
normative approach to discuss reproductive technologies that deal with the status of the 
human embryo regarding personhood, stem cells, in vitro fertilization, prenatal testing, 
and newborn screening. Chapter 5 applies the normative approach to discuss regenerative 
technologies that deal with genetic enhancement, germline genetic modification, 
mitochondrial DNA interventions, and gene editing using clustered-interspaced short 
palindromic repeats protocol (CRISPR). Chapter 6 applies the normative approach to 
discuss end-of-life technologies that deal with changing attitudes to death and dying, the 
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debate over medical futility, and the controversies around the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment. 
 The concluding chapter summarizes the analysis to highlight the contribution of 
the Ethical and Religious Directives as a normative approach for resolving ethical 
dilemmas regarding pivotal breakthroughs in medical technology. 
With the rapid advancement in medical technology, significant ethical dilemmas 
emerge that challenge the established norms. Due to accelerated medical technology 
advancements, ethics is pressured to keep pace. 
The distinctive contribution of the dissertation is to analyze the normative 
approach of the Catholic Tradition for resolving ethical dilemmas regarding medical 
technology. 
The significance of this dissertation is to engage the ever-accelerating pace of new 
medical technology and its impact on patient care; there is a need for normative guidance 
that the Ethical and Religious Directives offer to those in Catholic health care, 
recognizing that the analysis also could be helpful for non-Catholic health care. The 
outcome is to provide normative guidance offered by the Ethical and Religious Directives 
that can systematically be applied to new technology. 
Chapter 2. Normative Framework of Catholic Health Care Ethics. 
I. The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services.  
The normative framework of Catholic health care ethics is presented in the Ethical 
and Religious Directives. The Ethical and Religious Directives are a body of moral 
principles that introduce Catholic Church teaching on ethical standards for behavior to 
provide authoritative and normative guidance on moral issues in health care. The Ethical 
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and Religious Directives are grounded on three leading concepts: social responsibility, 
pastoral responsibility, and professional responsibility. 
A. Social Responsibility. 
The first foundational concept in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services is that of social responsibility. Here, the Ethical and Religious 
Directives present a biblical foundation that is integrated with moral responsibility in 
health care.1 On the one hand, regarding the issue of the biblical foundation with moral 
responsibility, recognition of and attention to the spiritual dimensions and spiritual 
struggles of patients are imperative to those charged with their care. With regard to 
spiritual dimensions, a community of healing and compassion incorporates not only the 
treatment of the malady but encompasses the psychosocial and the spiritual dimension of 
the human person.2  Without health of the spirit, little hope for healing the whole person 
can be achieved through focused technology alone.3 The spiritual dimension, “the search 
for the sacred” or spirituality, must be nurtured for us to become communities of healing 
and compassion. With regard to spiritual struggles, they may emerge in this quest for the 
sacred when patients are very sick.4 Stressful life events can throw a pall over the view 
that God is a loving, all-powerful being who seeks only good things for us.5 
B. Pastoral Responsibility. 
On the other hand, to expand on the concept of pastoral responsibility, the concept 
of pastoral care accompanies that of spiritual responsibility. The concept of pastoral care 
involves two related features: to minister and to shepherd the patient. With regard to 
ministering to patients, we must maintain an attitude of protectiveness and solicitude.6 
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With regard to shepherding, empathy, genuineness, humility, and hope, tempered with 
realism are essential. Hope can foster healing.7 
C. Professional Responsibility. 
In addition to foundational concepts of social and pastoral responsibility, the 
Ethical and Religious Directives also address the basic concept of professional 
responsibility. In the concept of professional responsibility that addresses the patient-
physician relationship, three areas stand out: informed consent, surrogate decision-
making, and the need for a conscience clause that protects physicians. Each is considered 
briefly. 
On the one hand, regarding informed consent, there are two constituent parts: the 
purpose and the components of consent. With regard to the purpose of informed consent, 
it is to provide a safeguard for a patient’s dignity and autonomy.8 With regard to the 
standard components of informed consent, they are competency, disclosure, 
understanding, and voluntariness.9 To accomplish an effective process, five more specific 
elements are needed for informed consent: (1) the diagnosis, (2) the treatment plan, (3) 
the risk and benefits of treatment, (4) any alternative treatments, and (5) the risk and 
benefits of declining treatment.10 
On the other hand, the topic of professional responsibility addresses the role of 
surrogate decision-making. With regard to the function of the surrogate, it is to serve as 
the patient’s representative making health care decisions based upon substituted judgment 
for patients who no longer have decisional capacity.11 With regard to naming and 
advising surrogate decision-makers are critical in making the patient’s wishes known.12  
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Furthermore, professional responsibility typically involves the need for a 
conscience clause to protect clinicians. Three topics shed light on the conscience clause: 
the historical perspective, consent paradigms, and physician perspectives. With regard to 
the historical perspective, with the advent of secularism and the effect of patient 
autonomy, a need arose for the protection of physicians.13 With regard to consent 
paradigms, they exist to critique the just distribution of medical services.14 With regard to 
the physician’s perspective about the patient, a variety of topics arise for discussions, 
such as physician refusal, disclosure, discrimination, and abuse of power.15 
II. Practical Ethical Principles for Catholic Health Care. 
The above basic concepts of social, pastoral, and professional responsibility led 
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services to develop 
practical ethical principles for Catholic health care. These principles are based on the 
premise that man is not the master of his life; God is and has dominion over it.16 The 
practical ethical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives address the following: 
the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of treatment, the principle of 
double effect, and the principle of cooperation. These are discussed in turn. 
A. Ordinary and Extraordinary Means. 
First, the focus on practical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives 
deals with the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means. On the one hand, 
historically two perspectives emerged, the pivotal distinction made by early theologians 
and concerns over subjectivism and vitalism. With regard to early theologians, a stance 
emerged that is explained in the Ethical and Religious Directives in this way, “A person 
has a moral obligation to use ordinary or proportionate means to preserve his or her 
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life.”17 The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means can be traced back to 
St. Thomas Aquinas (1274 d.). With regard to concerns arose over subjectivism and 
vitalism these points are pivotal. Subjectivism tends to focus only on the self, ignoring 
other relevant aspects of proper patient treatment. And the concern over the concept of 
vitalism is that it can seek to maintain life at all cost, again ignoring other relevant 
aspects of proper patient treatment.18 
On the other hand, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means 
sheds light on decision-making foundations. Two points need to be addressed here: 
defining elements and moral assessment. With regard to ordinary means, there are four 
major defining elements for making distinctions: (1) reasonable hope of benefit, (2) 
common means, (3) proportionate according to status, and (4) undemanding means.19 On 
the other hand, there are four aspects in helping to determine extraordinary means: (1) 
great effort, (2) enormous pain, (3) significant expense, and (4) severe dread.20 With 
regard to moral assessment, each case must be considered on its own merits. The criteria 
for decision-making need to relate primarily to the patient, not the remedy.21 
B. The Principle of Double Effect. 
The second focus of practical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives 
deals with the principle of double effect. Here the distinction between ordinary and 
extraordinary means is applied to provide practical distinctions to resolve moral 
dilemmas. To discuss the principle of double effect, it is helpful to look at its historical 
perspective before considering its implementation. 
On the one hand, the historical perspective of the principle of double effect has 
two related aspects, the formulation of the principle and the debate-shaping standard. 
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With regard to the formation of the principle, St. Thomas Aquinas (1274 d.) was the first 
to formulate the principle. Aquinas was the first to explicitly develop the principle 
regarding self-defense where there are two effects, one good and one bad. With regard to 
the debate-shaping standard, in developing the principle, the concepts of dual effects, 
intentions, and proportionality were adopted. 
On the other hand, in the implementation of the principle of double effect, two 
aspects are highlighted: the conditions and application. With regard to the conditions, 
there are four that must be satisfied: 
1. The action and its effects must not be morally evil. 
2. The good effect must not be caused by the bad effect. 
3. There must be no intention of the bad effect. 
4. The good effect must outweigh the bad effect. 
If an action meets all four conditions, then it is considered legitimate and acceptable.22 
With regard to the application of the principle of double effect, it was adopted to 
distinguish between killing and allowing to die. The principle of double effect is one of 
the most useful normative tools of Catholic moral theology in general and health care 
ethics in particular.23 
C. Principle of Cooperation and Complicity. 
The third focus of practical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives 
deals with the principle of cooperation to address issues of complicity. The principle of 
cooperation was developed to analyze a person’s moral action and to help determine 
whether one’s action contributes to the wrongdoing of another.24 
  8 
On the one hand, from a historical perspective, the purpose and theological 
development of the principle are pivotal. With regard to the purpose of the principle, it 
was originally formulated with the goal of helping confessors clarify how to act morally 
when individuals came in contact with the actions of others involved in wrongdoings.  
With regard to theological development, St. Thomas Aquinas (1274 d.) was one of the 
first theologians to give direction for the principle. The principle can be seen as an 
application of the principle of double effect. Cooperation involves two agents with 
distinct moral actions while the principle of double effect involves a single moral agent 
with good and bad effects related to the action.25 
On the other hand, the historical development of the principle has led to these two 
basic distinctions: formal and material cooperation. With regard to formal cooperation, it 
addresses actions that are wrong in all circumstances and distinguishes the action of a 
person cooperating. Intentionality is critical in assessing formal cooperation.26 With 
regard to material cooperation, in some way, one is involved with the wrongdoer but does 
not share in the intentionality of the wrongdoing. Prudence must guide those involved in 
regards to questions of intention, duress, distance, and gravity.27 
The practical ethical principles of Catholic health care including ordinary and 
extraordinary means, double effect, cooperation, and complicity have given us basic 
principles to better implement the Ethical and Religious Directives. All of this provides a 
normative framework for Catholic health care ethics, thus providing a foundation for the 
ethical decision-making models to be dealt with in the following chapter.  
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III. Conclusion. 
The final section of the chapter presents a critique of the ethical analysis from the 
normative perspective of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services. 
Chapter 3. Ethical Decision-Making Models Consistent with Catholic Ethics. 
To discuss ethical decision-making models consistent with Catholic ethics 
requires examining three related topics: moral agency and organizational ethics, the 
competence of patients for making end-of-life decisions, and the role of clinical ethics 
consultation services. 
I. Organizational Ethics and Moral Agency. 
Moral agency in organizations means that organizations, as well as individuals 
within them, are accountable for making right or wrong decisions. Both the organization 
as an institution and its employees must be morally responsible for the performance of 
assigned duties.28 The significance of moral agency here can be understood by examining 
its characteristics and their connection with moral theories. 
A. Characteristics. 
First, the characteristics of organizational moral agency engage two foundational 
issues: the purpose of moral agency and the role of ethics in the organization. 
On the one hand, organizational moral agency highlights ethical aims and 
accountability. With regard to ethical aims, they are manifested as organizational goals 
related to mission statements, strategic plans, and budgets.29 With regard to ethical 
accountability, this involves creating an ‘ethical climate’ and evaluating whether actions 
fit within that climate.30 
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On the other hand, the role of ethics in the health care organization engages 
clinical and organizational ethics. With regard to clinical ethics, there are organizational 
ramifications.31 With regard to organizational ethics, the health care organization can 
negatively impact the clinical environment by not giving appropriate ethical 
considerations to organizational as well as clinical decisions.32 
B. Ethical Theories and the Ethical Climate in Health Care Organizations. 
Second, in addition to the above characteristics, ethical theories impact the health 
care organization in two ways: relating business ethics with the ethical climate of the 
organization. 
On the one hand, business ethics raises issues about stakeholder theory and 
professional ethics. With regard to stakeholder theory, it is defined as a framework for 
discerning conflicts of value, loyalty, commitment, and interest of the affected group of 
individuals.33 With regard to professional ethics, there can be conflict among the 
organization’s various interests.34 
On the other hand, fostering an ethical climate in the organization is 
indispensable, requiring a focus on managed care organizations and organizational ethics 
programs. With regard to health maintenance organizations, they are designed to slow 
health care costs while simultaneously providing enhanced health care to a defined 
group.35 With regard to organizational ethics programs, they have emerged because of the 
prodding and insistence of the Justice Department and Organizations that deal with health 
care standards, i.e. The Joint Commission. 
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II. Clinical Ethics and Competency. 
The challenges mentioned above of organizational ethics and moral agency has 
often led to the compromise of patient’s rights. The Catholic Church asserts patients have 
a right to make their health care decisions.36 “The decision should be made by the patient 
if he is competent and able or, if not, by those legally entitled to act for the patient, whose 
reasonable will and legitimate interest must always be respected.”37 To discuss clinical 
ethics and competency consists of examining two related topics: competency of the 
patient and advanced directives. 
A. Competency. 
First, the fundamental concept in bringing decision-making of the patient to 
fruition is that of determining competency. Competency engages two foundational issues: 
decisions by competent patients and decisions for incompetent patients. 
On the one hand, the competencies of patients are highlighted by paternalism and 
treatment decisions. With regard to paternalism, it is when another decides on behalf of 
the patient; as a result, the patient's autonomy is limited.38 With regard to treatment 
decisions, when they are contextual, only the patient knows what is most important.39 
On the other hand, another challenging aspect of competency is dealing with 
incompetent patients. With regard to determining capacity, it is one of the most vexing 
and crucial problems for physicians; performance of capacity assessment is the only 
means to offer protection to both patient and physician.40 Assessing decision-making 
capacity falls into four categories: ability to articulate a choice, capacity to understand 
information, ability to appreciate consequences, and capacity to manage information.41 
With regard to guidance standards, once incapacity has been determined, three clear 
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guidance standards apply to decision-making: substituted judgment, substituted judgment 
combined with best interests, and best interest offering guidance to the surrogate and the 
health care providers.42 
B. Advance Directives. 
Second, these competency-determining challenges reveal the crucial need for 
advance directives. The advance directives are impacted in two ways: advance care 
planning and end-of-life care planning. 
On the one hand, advance care planning raises issues about both a definitive 
process and clear communication. With regard to the process, patients must explore, 
discuss, articulate, and then document their preferences for medical treatment reflecting 
their values and goals. With regard to clear communication, once values and goals are 
determined, clear communication of these must be made to appropriate stakeholders.43 
On the other hand, care planning at the end-of-life involves choosing a surrogate 
and the Patient Self-Determination Act. With regard to selecting a surrogate decision-
maker, it is a critical decision.44 With regard to the Patient Self-Determination Act 
(1990), it is a federal statute passed to ensure patient preferences guide medical care in 
the event of their incapacity assuring the desired medical care the patient wishes.45 
III. Clinical Ethics Consultation. 
An inherent relationship exists between clinical and organizational ethics. Thus an 
ethics infrastructure is an essential component of an organization's ethics integration and 
strategy. The ethics infrastructure links fundamental processes in clinical practice to the 
mission and core values of the organization. To accomplish effective clinical ethics 
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consultations require examining three related topics: the ethics approach, the quality and 
professionalism, and case analysis. 
A. Ethics Approaches. 
First, the focus of ethics approaches engages two foundational issues: ethics 
consultation system and the Veterans Health Administration. 
On the one hand, the ethics consultation system highlights ethical dilemma 
analysis and various models. With regard to ethical dilemmas they can be analyzed using 
the following four topics: (1) medical indications, (2) patient preferences, (3) quality of 
life, and (4) contextual features.46 With regard to models, three distinct models exist to 
accomplish ethics consultations: an individual consultant, an entire ethics committee, and 
the ethics consultation team.47 
On the other hand, the Veterans Health Administration System has two models, 
the IntegratedEthics model, and the CASES approach. With regard to the 
IntegratedEthics model, it is an innovative and comprehensive design impacting multiple 
areas of health care by changing the focus of ethics from a reactive, case-based encounter 
to one that adopts a proactive and comprehensive model.48 With regard to the CASES 
approach, it is the Veterans Health Administration system’s five-step approach to ethical 
consultation: (1) clarify, (2) assemble, (3) synthesize, (4) explain, and (5) support.49 
B. Quality and Professionalism. 
Second, accomplishing quality and professionalism is a key to success of the 
ethics consultation. To that end, process standards and certification and attestation are 
two fundamental elements in achieving quality and professionalism. 
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On the one hand, process standards raise issues about goals of the health care 
ethics committee and knowledge and evaluation areas. With regard to the health care 
ethics committee, quality and professionalism in health care are overreaching goals of the 
health care ethics committee.50 With regard to knowledge and evaluation areas, the 
American Society of Bioethics and Humanities has established six areas necessary for 
operating a successful health care ethics service.51  
On the other hand, to achieve professionalism in the health care ethics, 
certification and attestation are comprised of certification requirements and the evaluation 
process. With regard to the certification requirements, they would entail a formal training 
program and supervised apprenticeship.52 With regard to the evaluation process, a 
collection of written work and an oral exam would demonstrate the consultant’s skills, 
experience, and ability to express ideas; this is the model currently being implemented.53 
C. Case Analysis. 
Third, a final integral part of an ethics consultation is the creation of a patient case 
analysis. For clinical ethics and case analysis to be useful, one must start with as clear a 
perspective as possible. Integral to case analysis are constituents features and value 
judgments. 
On the one hand, constituent features raise issues about medical indicators and 
patient preferences. With regard to medical indicators, they help properly document the 
patient’s condition to facilitate the appropriate treatment.54 With regard to patient 
preferences, the fundamental principle of all morality is respect for persons and that every 
person has value and dignity. 
  15 
On the other hand, an additional area in an effective case analysis is determining 
the value judgments of the patient. Comprising value judgments are quality of life and 
contextual features. With regard to quality of life, it is an aspect of determining patient 
satisfaction.55 While satisfaction is a value judgment, it is important to provide empirical 
basis using such measures as mobility, daily living activities, pain, social interaction, and 
mental acuity.56 With regard to contextual features, they are prerequisites for a successful 
case analysis. Contextual features include proximal factors such as family, financial, 
security, education, employment, leisure, and social support. The elements included are a 
community, culture, economics, healthcare system, historical, social factors, media, 
geography, and the ecosystem.57 
IV. Conclusion of Chapters 2 and 3: Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious 
Directives. 
Discussed here are the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services whereby Catholic teaching is applied to dilemmas in health care. This involves 
an alignment of the two main approaches of Natural Law, the nature-oriented and the 
person-oriented approaches. The final section of the chapter presents a critique of the 
ethical analysis from the normative perspective of the Ethical and Religious Directives. 
Chapter 4. Reproductive Technology. 
Reproductive technology raises fundamental questions about the normative 
framework of propagation. To adequately discuss reproductive technology requires 
examining four related topics: embryo and personhood, stem cell technologies, prenatal 
testing, and newborn screening. 
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I. Embryo and Personhood. 
The relation between embryo and personhood integrates prenatal status, and 
personhood, with an accompanying ethical framework. 
A. Embryo: Prenatal Status. 
First, a consideration of the prenatal status of the embryo engages two 
foundational issues: the meaning of essence and the problem of dualism. 
On the one hand, the meaning of the essence of the prenatal embryo highlights 
debates on essentialism and personhood. With regard to essentialism, humans are deemed 
to be persons who could not exist without being a person at the time of being an 
embryo.58 With regard to personhood, the embryo has qualities that give rise to its moral 
worth. The core biological similarity is the first argument for moral equivalency; each 
embryo has a human genome.59 
On the other hand, the debate on dualism connects dualism with animalism each 
focusing on what exists. With regard to dualism, it has a variety of forms, including 
ontological and metaphysical, soul-body, mind-body, constitutionalism, and moral.60 
With regard to animalism, it highlights the biological life of the vast majority of 
individual humans (except twinning) because human DNA is established at conception.61 
Animalism highlights the biological life of human nature; thus humans, the argument 
claims, are entitled to moral respect.62 
B. Personhood. 
Second, the debate on personhood revolves around two opposing views, the 
secular and religious. 
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On the one hand, the secular view raises issues about fertilization and potentiality. 
With regard to fertilization, when it occurs a unique genotype is established that 
determines the organization and development of the embryo.63 With regard to 
potentiality, proponents of this view contend that the zygote is not yet an individual but 
does have the potential to become one.64 
On the other hand, the religious view focuses on the Catholic Tradition and 
contemporary religious traditions. With regard to the Catholic Tradition, varying views of 
the status of the embryo and fetus existed.65 With regard to other contemporary religious 
traditions, they have varying views of the moral significance of the early embryo.66  
C. Ethical Framework. 
Third, an ethical framework has developed around the above discussions on the 
prenatal status and human personhood. This framework revolves around theological-
based frameworks and discussion on spirituality and humanity. 
On the one hand, theologically based frameworks raise questions about embryo 
protection and respect for wholeness. With regard to embryo protection, the bioethical 
principle of non-malfeasance frames the debate.67 With regard to respect for wholeness, 
the argument is driven by the potential for medical benefits and a vision of what 
humanity could become.68 
On the other hand, discussions on spirituality and humanity engage two normative 
aspects about the spiritual soul and human dignity. With regard to the spiritual soul, it 
refers to the innermost essence of an individual in relationship with God. The soul is the 
seat of both self and moral agency.69 With regard to human dignity, it refers to the 
inherent value that cannot be reduced to one’s instrumental worth.70 
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II. Stem Cell Technologies and In Vitro Fertilization. 
The previous section on the personal or “ensouled” status of the human embryo 
raises significant ethical issues for human embryonic stem cells and in vitro fertilization. 
The most intense debates engage three related topics: the relevance of personhood, the 
resourcing stem cells, and in vitro fertilization used for embryo health. 
A. Relevance of Personhood. 
First, the relevance of personhood in the debate on stem cell technology engages 
two foundational issues: the secular view and the Catholic view. 
On the one hand, the secular view highlights discord in definitions and the 
contribution of a utilitarian view. With regard to the discord in definitions, an agreed 
stance on personhood has not been achieved.71 With regard to the utilitarian view, the 
focus tends to be more on when an individual can contribute to social life.72 
On the other hand, the Catholic view of personhood considers the beginning of 
life and the protection of life. With regard to beginning of life, the above discussion has 
indicated that semantic issues, biological issues, philosophical and theological issues 
have to be taken into account when answering the question: When does life begin?73 In 
Catholic teaching, ensouled human life begins at the moment of conception thus must be 
respected and protected. In this tradition, every innocent being has an inalienable right to 
life. With regard to the protection of life, because a fertilized egg (zygote) is a human 
person, a moral obligation exists to protect that person.74 
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B. Resourcing Stem Cells. 
Second, the debate on personhood clarifies when stem cell can be resourced. In 
the debate on resourcing stem cells, two primary sources should be considered: 
embryonic and adult stem cells. 
On the one hand, embryonic stem cells highlight the debate on moral status with 
accompanying ethical dilemmas. With regard to the moral status of stem cells, it revolves 
around the ethical debate on the beginning of human life and its moral value.75 With 
regard to accompanying ethical dilemmas, embryonic stem cell research, even if it 
involves the destruction of embryos, offers potential benefits of new medical treatments. 
The argument contends that a moral middle ground is needed.76 
On the other hand, adult stem cells have two unique characteristics that need to be 
considered in the ethical debate: telomeres and the differentiation potential. With regard 
to telomeres, they are protective coverings at the end of chromosomes that keep them 
from unraveling. Efforts are now underway to reverse adult stem cells to their original 
state called ‘induced pluripotency,’ which could eliminate the need for the utilization of 
highly contentious embryonic stem cells.77 With regard to differentiation potential, stem 
cells are cells that self-renew and can also give several differentiated cell types such as 
muscle, heart, and brain cells.78 
C. In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Health. 
Third, the connection between the personhood debate and resourcing stem cells 
raises significant implications for the use of in vitro fertilization for embryo health. 
Hence, it is necessary to engage each point separately: in vitro fertilization and embryo 
health. 
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On the one hand, in vitro fertilization needs to be understood ethically from a 
historical view and a Catholic view. With regard to a historical view, prior to 1978 
infertile women were without an option other than adoption. The success of in vitro 
fertilization has unleashed a barrage of social, ethical, and legal concerns.79 With regard 
to Catholic teaching that prohibits in vitro fertilization, the Church states that a child has 
a right to be conceived in the marital embrace of its parents. Human intercourse has two 
components, unitive and procreative. In vitro fertilization separates these components, 
thus the Catholic Church forbids it.80 
On the other hand, in vitro fertilization can be used to foster embryo health (rather 
than for fertility purposes as discussed above). When in vitro fertilization is adopted for 
the health of the embryo, it engages two issues, the regulation of in vitro fertilization and 
the development of the Catholic view. With regard to regulations, significant progress has 
been achieved in the promotion of quality management, risk management, and safety.81 
With regard to the development of Catholic Church’s view, it is feasible that using this 
technology to foster the life of the embryo or to use unwanted and frozen in vitro 
fertilization embryos for research might be acceptable.82 
III. Prenatal Testing. 
The above discussion on the personal status of the embryo and its relevance for 
stem cell technology connects with the ethical debate on prenatal testing as a crucial 
aspect of the ethics of reproductive technology. To discuss prenatal testing requires 
examining two related topics: the availability of testing and interventions and what may 
be in store for tomorrow’s children. 
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A. Availability of Testing and Interventions. 
First, the availability of testing and interventions raises two issues: options for 
prenatal testing and prenatal genetic interventions. 
On the one hand, prenatal testing deals with issues related to non-invasive 
prenatal testing and expanded carrier screening. With regard to non-invasive prenatal 
testing, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology concluded that this testing 
should be offered to patients who may be high risk for fetal aneuploidy (abnormal 
number of chromosomes).83 With regard to expanded carrier screening, which contributes 
to next-generation sequencing, it is shifting from ancestry based to one that screens for 
disorders to decrease inherited genetic diseases.84 
On the other hand, prenatal genetic interventions deal with the prenatal genetic 
diagnosis, prenatal genetic therapy, and prenatal genetic enhancement. With regard to 
prenatal genetic diagnosis, which has been used for adverse selection and targeting 
genetic diseases, ethical dilemmas need to be considered including: devaluing the 
disabled and discrimination of people with disabilities.85 With regard to prenatal genetic 
therapy, there are three types: therapy on the gametes before fertilization, therapy on 
embryos before implantation, and therapy on fetuses by injecting genetic material. Each 
can be problematic.86 With regard to prenatal genetic enhancement, a primary concern is 
the best interests of the child-to-be as well as the effects on society.87 
B. Tomorrow’s Children. 
Second, the availability of prenatal testing has significant implications for 
tomorrow’s children. Here, two issues must be addressed, the selection of characteristics 
and savior babies. 
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On the one hand, the selection of characteristics of embryos raises issues about 
disabilities and sex selection. With regard to disabilities, the welfare of the child is of 
primary ethical concern, raising many ethical concerns such as in cases of that deal with 
the debate on wrongful life or on life not worth living.88 With regard to sex selection, 
bioethics, public policy, and law intersect.89 
On the other hand, in addition to the debate about selection characteristics of the 
embryo, there is an extensive debate on creating what is known as savior babies. The 
debate on savior babies raises ethical issues about instrumentalization and 
commodification. With regard to instrumentalization (treating a child as a means) is 
defined as the child being used for other’s well being or the other’s satisfaction.90 With 
regard to commodification, there are different concerns to be addressed including price, 
interchangeable with other goods, and value. From the perspective of normative morality, 
commodification of the embryo should be denounced as wrong.91 
IV. Newborn Genetic Screening. 
Closely related to the ethical debate on prenatal screening is the debate on 
newborn screening, which requires examining two related topics: screening programs and 
screening consequences. 
A. Screening Programs. 
First, to understand screening programs, it is important to engage two pivotal 
issues: the national research framework and the future of genetic screening. 
On the one hand, the national research framework for newborn screening deals 
with two essential elements: an overview of genetic testing and challenges of research for 
newborn screening. With regard to an overview of genetic screening, in the 1960s, a 
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simple blood test to detect a genetic metabolic disorder was developed; this was used to 
detect phenylketonuria a genetic disorder that can lead to retardation.92 With regard to 
challenges of research, crucial issues deal with whether morbidity and mortality are 
reduced as a result of screening.93 
On the other hand, the future of genetic screening needs to focus on expanded 
newborn screening and whole genome sequencing. With regard to expanded newborn 
screening, the emergence of new technology, tandem mass spectrometry, has created 
pressure to add numerous tests to the newborn screening.94 With regard to the prospect of 
whole gene sequencing, the potential exists for integration with the newborn screening 
programs that could lead to unsought information and questions of meaningful informed 
consent.95 
B. Screening Consequences. 
Second, programs for newborn screening inevitably create concern about 
screening consequences. To discuss concerns about screening consequences, there are 
two areas of consideration, an overview of the problem and a consideration of disease 
ontologies. 
On the one hand, an overview of the problem sheds light on two interrelated 
concepts, the origins and the successes of screening. With regard to origins, Robert 
Guthrie (d. 1995), made a breakthrough.96 With regard to the successes, phenylketonuria 
screening has largely been a success story that celebrates the marriage of patient 
advocacy with concerned health professionals to promote screening.97 
On the other hand, disease ontology can be best understood through pre-screening 
and post-screening. With regard to pre-screening, the understanding of medium-chain 
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acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency was very limited.98 With regard to post-
screening, several variants that were previously unknown have been identified. After 
screening, geneticists have a better understanding of diseases like medium-chain acyl-
coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency and have adjusted treatment regimens.99 
This chapter has considered major issues in reproductive technology that have 
significant applications for the Catholic ethical tradition. Catholic teaching engages each 
of them dynamically to develop its moral doctrine. This is based on emerging science, but 
also to indicate clearly where there appears to be wrongdoing from individual and social 
perspectives. The next chapter continues this analysis of engaging the Catholic Tradition 
with breakthroughs in science and medicine by examining emerging issues in 
regenerative technology. 
V. Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious Directives. 
The final section of the chapter presents a critique of the ethical analysis from the 
normative perspective of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services. 
Chapter 5. Regenerative Technology. 
With the progress in human genetics, enhancement via germline genetic 
modification is replete with bioethical concerns. A general ethical landscape for assessing 
specific germline technologies has four related topics: genetic enhancement, germline 
modification, mitochondrial DNA, and gene editing with clustered-interspaced short 
palindromic repeats (CRISPR). 
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I. Genetic Enhancement. 
The ethical debate on genetic enhancement focuses upon human progress and 
future generations. 
A. Human Progress. 
First, a consideration of the significance of genetic enhancement for human 
progress engages two foundational issues: human development and human nature. 
On the one hand, discourse on human development highlights ethical dilemmas 
that arise and a consideration of historical enhancements. With regard to ethical 
dilemmas, ethics discourse revolves around goods or benefits. In these approaches, the 
key focus is eliminating any social harm that could arise from enhancements.100 With 
regard to historical enhancements, society has benefited from what is construed as non-
controversial enhancements such as literacy, the agrarian revolution, computer 
technology, and health care, etc.101 All have offered benefit to humanity.102 
On the other hand, to approach the meaning of human nature in a nuanced manner 
requires a consideration of its common characteristics combined with sensitivity to the 
precautionary principle. With regard to common characteristics, human nature involves a 
set of common characteristics differentiating human beings and other creatures.103 With 
regard to the precautionary principle, there is an ethical responsibility to honor the 
concern of humanity overreaching its legitimate moral authority.104 
B. Future Generations. 
Second, the impact of germline genetic modification on human progress raises the 
question of influencing future generations focusing upon the significance of identity and 
perfection. 
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On the one hand, discussion about identity raises issues about superhuman 
enhancements and enhancements that deal with disease avoidance. With regard to 
superhuman enhancements, three moral concerns emerge: goals of medicine as 
incompatible with enhancement, the Positional Goods Argument (giving one person 
advantage over another), and the argument that enhancements generate inequality.105 
With regard to disease avoidance, the ethical debate revolves around therapy (healing a 
pathology), functionality (improving the human functioning), and transhumanism 
(changing human nature).106 
On the other hand, discussion about perfection via genetic enhancement engages 
two pivotal issues: stewardship of nature and naturalism versus transhumanism. With 
regard to stewardship of nature, a central concern deals with non-malfeasance to future 
generations.107 From this perspective of avoiding harm, stewardship entails an obligation 
about many interrelated issues: the use of natural resources, preservation of the 
environment, and oversight of the human gene pool.108 With regard to naturalism versus 
transhumanism, the core debate revolves around the quest for perfection. These extreme 
versions of human development raise significant ethical challenges. 
II. Germline Genetic Modification. 
The ethical debate on genetic enhancement, in general, leads to the more specific 
focus on genetic germline modification that requires examining two related perspectives: 
the religious and secular perspectives. 
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A. Religious Perspectives. 
First, two mainstream religious perspectives of germline genetic modifications are 
represented in the views of the Roman Catholic Church and traditional Protestant 
Christianity. 
On the one hand, the views of the Roman Catholic highlight what is permissible 
and what is prohibited. With regard to what is permissible, several illustrative points can 
be made. Two theological issues need to be stressed. Modifying human genetics is 
directly tied to the person’s good and raises concerns that are problematic.109 With regard 
to what is prohibited several issues arise. First, because embryos are living human beings, 
any experimentation that is not therapeutic is illicit. Second, every individual human 
body has dignity thus it is not allowed to engage in cloning. And thirdly, personal dignity 
must be maintained hence attempting to alter human chromosomes or genetic inheritance 
must not be allowed.110  
On the other hand, from the perspective of traditional Protestant Christianity, just 
as with Catholicism, there are issues that are prohibited and issues that are permissible.  
With regard to what is prohibited, Protestant Christianity is replete with cautionary tales 
limiting the embrace of acts that extend beyond natural limits.111 With regard to what 
may be permissible, there is agreement that human nature was not created in its present 
form.112 One intriguing possibility that Protestantism is open to considering regarding 
germline genetic modification is when it is adopted to increase resistance to deadly 
disease that impacts the human species.113 
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B. Secular Perspectives. 
Second, the secular perspective on germline genetic modification revolves around 
discussions on justice and the common good, and also implications for risk and safety. 
On the one hand, discussion on justice and common good raises issues that focus 
on social concerns and long-term impact. With regard to social concerns, germline 
genetic modification could be justified if it could make medical and technological 
modifications to solve potential problems.114 But justice would require treatments to be 
made widely available.115 There are different approaches to the discourse on justice, such 
as distributive, commutative, and rectification justice.116 Equitable distribution of benefits 
is crucial for the common good.117 With regard to long-term impact, with germline 
genetic modification the potential for good and harm is great.118 Long-term impacts affect 
our common interests. Therefore, regulation of germline genetic modification is 
indispensable. An interdisciplinary approach is needed because of the complex 
interaction between genetics and ethics.119 
On the other hand, accompanying discussion of justice, crucial concerns regarding 
risk and safety arise.120 These concerns deal with differing approaches to germline 
modification and human-nonhuman chimera research. With regard to differing 
approaches, the most dangerous aspect of germline modification is the unintentional 
results that affect the species, even though restricting enhancement to a limited scale can 
diminish risk.121 There are different approaches to the risk reduction of unintentional 
germline modifications, including total prohibition, implementing a risk-reducing 
principle, or using cautionary heuristics.122 With regard to human-nonhuman chimera 
research, there is widespread consensus that denigration of human dignity would result 
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from germline modification that arises in chimera creations.123 In sum, the concept of 
human dignity is crucial for evaluating the morality of these new genetic technologies.124 
III. Mitochondrial DNA. 
The previous sections on genetic enhancement and germline genetic modification 
delineate the ethical landscape for evaluating new genetic technologies that will impact 
future generations. Two recent technologies have emerged that are now considered in 
further detail: mitochondrial DNA and gene editing technology, CRISPR. 
To discuss the ethics of mitochondrial DNA, the pivotal ethical topics require 
examining two related topics: the science of mitochondrial DNA and the ethical, social, 
and policy considerations. 
A. Science of Mitochondrial DNA. 
First, to understand the ethical debate on mitochondrial DNA, a discussion must 
address human reproduction as well as mitochondrial DNA biology and the 
mitochondrial DNA diseases and research. 
On the one hand, fundamentals of human reproduction and the mitochondrial 
biology raise ethical issues related to propagation and mitochondrial DNA science. With 
regard to issues dealing with propagation, the ethical debate revolves around the point of 
fusion of an egg and sperm that create the zygote as the first step in human 
embryogenesis.125 With regard to issues dealing with mitochondria DNA science, the 
focus is upon mitochondria being in nearly all cell types. Understanding the basic science 
is indispensable for ethical debate on mitochondrial DNA interventions. 
On the other hand, giving attention to mitochondrial DNA diseases and research 
requires a focus on maladies and various techniques utilized. With regard to maladies, the 
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diseases of mitochondrial DNA are similar, manifesting themselves in respiratory chain 
activity, primarily in organs of the highest energy demand. Some of the maternally 
inherited mitochondrial DNA diseases are Leigh syndrome; mitochondrial 
encephalomyopathy, lactic acidosis, and stroke-like episodes; myoclonic epilepsy with 
ragged-red fibers; neuropathy, ataxia, and retinitis pigmentosa; maternally inherited 
diabetes and deafness; maternally inherited Leigh syndrome; and Leber hereditary optic 
neuropathy.126 Research of mitochondrial DNA diseases has led to gene editing of 
somatic cells. With regard to various techniques for mitochondrial replacement, the main 
focus is on maternal spindle transfer and pro-nuclear transfer. Other techniques, such as 
polar body transfer are being explored.127 
B. Ethical, Social, and Policy Considerations. 
Second, an understanding of the science of mitochondrial DNA sets the stage for 
addressing ethical, social, and policy considerations. These considerations are in large 
part addressed in discussions of unintended consequences and the recommendations of 
the Institute of Medicine. 
On the one hand, to assess the unintended consequences, two points must be 
considered: evaluating unknowns and predicting impact. With regard to evaluating 
unknowns, considerations need to be addressed: heteroplasmy, the mitochondrial DNA 
bottleneck, and mitochondrial evolutionary theory.128 With regard to predicting impact, 
the science of mitochondrial genetics makes preclinical studies difficult.129 
On the other hand, the Institute of Medicine recommendations indicate that with 
attention to impact and with proper criteria for research expansion clinical investigation 
of mitochondrial replacement technique should be allowed to move forward. With regard 
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to considering impact, mitochondrial replacement techniques should be considered if the 
following conditions are met: safety must be established, and risk to all parties must be 
minimized, especially to future children, the likelihood of success must be evident, 
investigations must be limited to women who risk transmitting severe mitochondrial 
DNA diseases, risk should be minimized to alleviate adverse health for pregnant mothers 
and fetus, investigators and centers have to have demonstrated expertise for this 
technology, investigation should be limited to male embryos for intrauterine transfer, and 
every possible risk of mitochondrial DNA-nuclear DNA incompatibility needs to be 
mitigated.130 With regard to criteria for research expansion, the United States Food and 
Drug Administration must review and approve, with subsequent marketing of 
mitochondrial replacement techniques incorporating the following elements: transparency 
that maximizes public sharing of information, public engagement through the 
involvement of relevant stakeholders, partnership with other regulatory authorities in 
aiding the assessment of benefits and risks, maximization of data quality through cross-
referencing and pooling, circumscribed use by limiting the utilization of the technology 
to individuals and settings for which it’s approved, and long-term follow-up with periodic 
review must be a requirement.131 
IV. Gene Editing with Clustered-Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR).  
Closely related to the mitochondrial DNA ethical discussion is the debate on 
clustered-interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR). This is gene editing technique 
targeting and modifying DNA. The pivotal ethical discussions on clustered-interspaced 
short palindromic repeats address two related topics: the science of genome editing and 
the ethical, social, and religious concerns. 
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A. Science of Gene Editing with CRISPR. 
First, to appreciate the science of genome editing with CRISPR requires 
understanding of its history and its methodology. 
On the one hand, in the historical development of CRISPR, two perspectives are 
helpful, biological breakthroughs and the current status of science. With regard to the 
breakthroughs in biology, CRISPR emerged from the new era of biology with the 
development of recombinant DNA technology in the 1970s. With regard to the current 
status of science, a major development occurred in 2010 when observing that the 
CRISPR system could recognize specific patterns of DNA from foreign invaders. In 
2013, CRISPR successfully modified the primary mechanism of DNA. Because of that 
success, it has become a powerful tool that can now reliably cut human genome DNA at 
any location.132 
On the other hand, to properly discuss the methodology of CRISPR two points are 
involved: tools for genome editing and its potential. With regard to the tools for genome 
editing, the methodology was by targeted molecular machines. With regard to the 
potential of CRISPR, experts believe these advances could have wide-ranging clinical 
applications with the potential to prevent or cure a variety of diseases.133 The simplicity 
of this technology drastically reduces the time for conducting genome experiments.134  
The ethical debate on this technique will expand in the years ahead as treatments emerge. 
B. Ethical, Social, and Religious Concerns. 
Second, the concerns about CRISPR technology need to be discussed from the 
perspective of social and ethical dimensions as well as from the religious perspective. 
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On the one hand, from social and ethical perspectives, CRISPR raises concerns 
about impact and regarding the need for regulation. With regard to impact, the CRISPR 
approach to ‘reprogramming DNA’ raises similar concerns to those of genetic 
manipulation in general. Most notable of the concerns are the passing on to subsequent 
generations deleterious impacts on the human genome.135 Before this technology can be 
utilized for germline modification, important knowledge needs to be gained regarding 
human genetic interaction in the interplay between diseases.136 With regard to the need 
for regulation of this technology, it is crucial because of the potential for exploitation in 
non-therapeutic uses, off-target modifications, and embryonic screening.137 
On the other hand, from the religious perspective, this technology raises 
significant concerns about dignity and respecting the unitive and procreative connection 
in human reproduction. With regard to the maintenance of dignity, a distinction must be 
made between editing for therapeutic purposes and enhancement to augment human 
capacities.138 With regard to respecting the connection between the unitive and 
procreative aspects of human reproduction, the Catholic Church insists on not breaking 
that connection.139 
This chapter has explored the ethical debates on the emerging regenerative 
technologies. The next chapter moves to address technological issues that arise at the end 
of life. 
V. Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious Directives. 
The final section of the chapter presents a critique of the ethical analysis from the 
normative perspective of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services. 
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Chapter 6. On Death and Dying. 
Throughout history, the attitudes of death and dying have transformed gradually, 
shifting focus from the dying and their families to the role of the physician and the health 
care team. As a result, the dying process has become rife with ethical dilemmas. To 
adequately discuss death and dying requires examining three related topics: changing 
attitudes to death and dying, the meaning of medical futility, and the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment. 
I. Changing Attitudes towards Death and Dying. 
Death is the final journey all must take. To discuss the changing attitudes to death 
and dying, two areas elicit attention: the contemporary characteristics of death and dying 
and related philosophical approaches. 
A. Characteristics. 
First, contemporary characteristics of death and dying can be revealed in 
discussions about the locus of control and about accompanying rituals. 
On the one hand, discussions about the locus of control tend to revolve around the 
meaning of a tame death, and around prolonging life. With regard to the meaning of a 
tame death, it can be a kind act of nature. Society has moved from the time when death 
was not a struggle; it was part of life. Philippe Aries refers to this perspective as “tamed 
death” or death that comes with natural warning signs.140 A long lingering death was very 
unusual. People typically died of disease with rapid onset and a quick end.141 With regard 
to the prolongation of life, there can be inappropriate approaches that resist the dying 
process as a natural phenomenon. Today’s sophisticated medical technology can lead to 
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unjustified struggle against death in so far as health care is concerned as a master of 
death.142 
On the other hand, discussions on the locus of control of death regarding the use 
of medical technology need to be situated within a broader context that respects rituals 
around death. With regard to the historical developments, as the locus of control of death 
shifted over the centuries, so did the rituals regarding death. For centuries, there was 
simplicity about the rituals.143 As life expectancy began to shift, so did the view of death, 
the “tame death” came to an end due largely to the rise of scientific medicine. In the 
1900s, death was taken out of the hands of families and put in the hands of doctors and 
medical institutions.144 With regard to the evolution of the rituals around death, by the 
1800s, the rituals of mourning became more public. As a result, mourning developed a 
double purpose, serving as a period of sorrow out of respect for the family while allowing 
for the dissipation of grief.145 
B. Philosophical Approaches. 
Second, the changing characteristics of dying over time have been accompanied 
by different philosophical tenets about death. Throughout history, as attitudes and 
customs towards death and dying changed, two philosophical approaches emerged to 
guide the dying process, one being physician-centered, the other being patient-centered 
care. 
On the one hand, for the philosophical approach that is physician-centered, two 
interrelated issues are important: the meaning of the Hippocratic tradition and the role of 
paternalism and beneficence. With regard to the Hippocratic tradition, in taking the 
Hippocratic oath, physicians promise to act for the good and keep their patients from 
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harm. This Oath requires physicians to use their skills not as they would prefer but for 
human benefit.146 With regard to paternalism and beneficence, they became the norm in 
the early 20th century. In this philosophy, the physician always knows best.147 Medical 
paternalism ignores the patient’s viewpoint and can focus on the cure of disease, at times 
leading to an inappropriate medical management of death.148 
On the other hand, for the philosophical approach that is patient-centered, the 
focus is on patient autonomy and the accompanying conflict that can arise. With regard to 
focusing on patient autonomy, a tidal wave of change has occurred in medical ethics 
starting in 1965, shifting focus from the physician to the patient in decision-making.149  
With regard to the conflict that results from this new focus on autonomy can be an 
excessive or reflexive medical deference to patient autonomy.150 
II. Medical Futility. 
The discussion above on changing attitudes on death and dying offer insight into 
the ethical debate surrounding medical futility. The discussion over medical futility is 
fraught with controversy. To discuss medical futility requires examining two related 
topics: the debate about the meaning of futility and the goals of medicine. 
A. Futility Polemic. 
First, to clarify the meaning of medical futility, the ethical debate revolves around 
the definition of futility and the definition of rationing. 
On the one hand, the definition of medical futility can be clarified by considering 
the purpose of treatment and by looking at an example of a futility policy, specifically the 
Texas Advance Directives Act. With regard to the purpose of treatment, clinicians need 
to recognize when interventions offer benefit. Hippocrates (d.375bce) stated that 
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physicians should not treat those who are overmastered by their disease.151 To deal with 
situations of futility, three concepts are essential. First, treatments that are ineffective or 
harmful to patients are not obligatory. Second, physicians must engage in dialogue 
concerning futile treatments. Thirdly, physicians must convey concern even if there is no 
cure.152 With regard to the policy enunciated in the Texas Advance Directives Act 
(September 1999), it became law to regulate end-of-life futility in the state of Texas. The 
law allows the physician to practice according to their conscience and the law seeks the 
good of the patient by preventing a prolonged dying process.153 
On the other hand, discussing of medical futility needs to be distinguished from 
rationing. With regard to defining rationing, it needs to be separated from futility because 
they are very different ethical concepts. Futility deals with continuing treatment that has 
no benefit. Rationing is defined as withholding a treatment that does have a benefit. 
Limiting access to beneficial health care services both explicitly and implicitly rations 
health care resources. The core ethical debate is not whether health care can be rationed 
but how it is rationed, by whom, and to what degree. With regard to the purpose of 
rationing, it should be understood within the context of the organizational stewardship of 
scarce resources in health care.154 
B. Compassionate Goals of Medicine and Health Care. 
Second, the debate on medical futility connects the meaning of futility with the 
goals of medicine. To understand the goals of medicine when facing situations of medical 
futility, two issues must be addressed: the meaning of compassionate succor and how to 
deal with end-of-life dilemmas. 
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On the one hand, the meaning of compassionate succor refers to situations that 
deal with the prevention of disease and prevention of untimely death. With regard to 
situations dealing with the prevention of disease, compassionate succor has three roles. 
First, it is better to avoid disease. A physician’s duty is to help patients stay well. 
Secondly, there can be a beneficial economic consequence for patients and society by 
helping reduce chronic disease. Thirdly, the public at large, as well as the medical 
community, needs to be aware that the preventive health care has significant benefits and 
needs emphasis.155 With regard to prevention of untimely death, a goal of medicine is the 
prevention of premature death. In medicine today, its first aim should be to reduce 
premature death. The secondary purpose is proper care and support for those whose death 
is not premature.156 
On the other hand, the goals of medicine raise issues regarding end-of-life 
dilemmas. End-of-life dilemmas raise ethical issues about balancing criteria of burden 
versus benefit and about the sanctity of life. With regard to balancing criteria of burden 
versus benefit, patients are now often subjected to prolonged lives and acute 
complications, forcing them to make decisions about how vigorously to treat and when it 
is permissible to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures.157 With regard to the 
sanctity of life, the determination of the balance burden and benefit must demonstrate 
respect for life (used interchangeably with the religious concept of sanctity of life), 
thereby respecting the human person.158 
III. Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment. 
Related to the above discussion regarding attitudes to death and medical futility, 
is the ethical debate around the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. This discussion 
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requires consideration of two related topics: medically assisted nutrition and hydration 
and the relief of suffering at the end-of-life. 
A. Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration. 
First, medically assisted nutrition and hydration are especially significant as a 
medical intervention at end-of-life and for patients in a persistent vegetative state. 
On the one hand, at end-of-life, the ethical debate on medically assisted nutrition 
and hydration revolve around clarifying its medical purpose and how these encounter 
cultural pressures. With regard to medical purpose of assisted nutrition and hydration at 
the end of life, two reasons are typically cited for using this technology: to improve 
fatigue and to avoid ‘starving to death.’159 With regard to cultural pressures, family 
members often feel helpless in the face of disease progression.160 Often the conversation 
around nutrition and hydration has more to do with acceptance of dying. When used 
inappropriately due to cultural pressure, artificial feeding can cause needless pain-and-
suffering and prolongation of death.161 
On the other hand, medically assisted nutrition and hydration are used for patients 
in a persistent vegetative state. With regard to definition, a persistent vegetative state is a 
clinical condition of complete unawareness of self in the environment, accompanied by 
sleep-wake cycles, with either complete or partial preservation of brain in brainstem 
function. Patients in a persistent vegetative state show no evidence of sustained, 
deducible, purposeful, or voluntary behavioral responses.162 With regard to moral 
direction about providing persistent vegetative state patients with artificial feeding, in a 
papal allocution March 20, 2004, Pope John II is helpful. He stated that hydration and 
nutrition constitute a morally ordinary treatment for persistent vegetative state patients 
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and that foregoing would be considered ‘euthanasia by omission.’163 The United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops interpreted this papal statement by explaining “certain 
measures to provide nutrition and hydration may become excessively burdensome and 
therefore not obligatory.”164 
B. Relief of Suffering. 
Second, the withdrawal of life–sustaining treatment is designed to address the 
relief of suffering at the end-of-life. This raises specific ethical concerns regarding 
palliative care and assisted suicide. 
On the one hand, to address palliative care, two interrelated concepts need 
consideration: care at end-of-life and palliative sedation. With regard to care at the end of 
life, patients near the end-of-life often have multiple transitions; these transitions can 
cause medical errors, poor care planning, and lack of coordination and continuity of 
care.165 To aid in the alleviation of these obstacles, palliative care provides pain control as 
well as providing relief from other distressing symptoms.166 With regard to palliative 
sedation, symptom control (pain, dyspnea, shortness of breath, restlessness, and 
nausea/vomiting) is one of the reasons for not having a good death. 167 When symptoms 
are not controlled, palliative sedation has been approved and endorsed by the American 
Medical Association, American Nurses Association, the American Academy of Pain 
Medicine, and the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine.168 Rarely is it 
necessary to sedate patients to the point of sleep to accomplish symptom control. But if 
necessary, sedation for the control of intractable suffering in an imminently dying patient 
is humane, appropriate, and medically acceptable. Palliative sedation therapy is the use of 
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specific sedative medications to relieve intractable suffering from refractory 
symptoms.169 
On the other hand, assisted suicide raises issues related to symptom control and 
patient autonomy. With regard to symptom control, the predominant reason for 
requesting physician-assisted suicide is symptom control.170 With regard to patient 
autonomy, paradoxes have surfaced in the argument about physician-assisted suicide.171 
This chapter has extended the discussion of medical technology from the start of 
life to address end of life dilemmas. The contribution of the Catholic Tradition is to be 
highly attuned to protecting the dignity of the patients, especially at the end-of-life and 
even when they request medical technology for assisted suicide. The Catholic Tradition 
urges the use of medical technology to alleviate patient suffering without intending their 
death. 
IV. Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious Directives. 
The final section of the chapter presents a critique of the ethical analysis from the 
normative perspective of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care. 
Chapter 7. Conclusion. 
This proposed dissertation has presented an explanation of the contribution that 
the normative approach of Catholic teaching for resolving ethical dilemmas regarding 
medical technology in Catholic health care. The Ethical and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Health Care Services have provided authoritative and normative guidance on 
moral issues while grounding us in three concepts: social, pastoral, and professional 
responsibility. This normative framework for Catholic health care ethics is utilized to 
discuss ethical decision-making models that are consistent with Catholic ethics. The 
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following topics are examined in light of these foundational principles: moral agency and 
organizational ethics, the competence of patients for making end-of-life decisions, and 
the role of clinical ethics consultation services. Additionally, reproductive technology is 
examined in light of the normative guidance, addressing these topics: the embryo and 
personhood, stem cell technologies, prenatal testing, and newborn screening. Catholic 
teaching engages these areas of emerging science to indicate where there may be 
wrongdoing from individual and social perspectives. Additionally, in light of Catholic 
teaching, emerging issues are examined in the area of regenerative technology: genetic 
enhancement, germline modifications, mitochondrial DNA, and gene editing with 
clustered-interspaced short palindromic repeats. Finally, the technological issues that 
arise at the end-of-life are addressed in light of Catholic teaching, focusing on these 
pivotal topics: changing attitudes on death and dying, medical futility, and withdrawal of 
life-sustaining therapies. 
The analysis will emphasize that the commitment to promote and defend dignity 
of the human person from the moment of conception until natural death has remained at 
the forefront of the discussion.  
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Chapter 2. Normative Framework of Catholic Health Care Ethics. 
To discuss the normative framework of Catholic health care ethics requires 
examining two related topics: the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Care Services and practical ethical principles for Catholic health care. 
I. Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. 
The normative framework of Catholic health care ethics is presented in the 
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. The Ethical and 
Religious Directives are a body of moral principles that introduce the teaching on the 
ethical standards of behavior and provide authoritative and normative guidance on moral 
issues in health care. The Ethical and Religious Directives are grounded on three leading 
concepts: social responsibility, pastoral responsibility, and professional responsibility. 
The Ethical and Religious Directives are designed to address the challenges raised by 
medical technology in order to provide normative guidance for ethical decision-making 
when trying to resolve complex ethical dilemmas. 
With the Catholic Church’s commitment to the mission of healing and the ever-
changing health care delivery, a body of moral principles has emerged from the Church’s 
teachings. The Ethical and Religious Directives have the purpose of affirming ethical 
standards of behavior. They also provide authoritative guidance on certain moral issues. 
The Ethical and Religious Directives do not offer guidance on every detail of all the 
complex health care issues but are periodically reviewed. This review is in light of 
maintaining the true dignity of the human person. It is often argued that science and faith 
contradict each other but both are grounded in truth and freedom. As knowledge and 
technology expand, it is each individual’s task to form a correct conscience guided by 
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moral norms. The Ethical and Religious Directives should be followed with deliberation 
and often need to be considered on a case-by-case basis. The Ethical and Religious 
Directives strike the precarious balance between absolutism and relativism. 
In sum, the Preamble and the Introduction to the Ethical and Religious Directives 
for Catholic Health Care Services highlight the need for an ethical framework to 
critically engage and normatively guide the use of medical technology today. Hence, the 
main sections of the Ethical and Religious Directives are designed to present a cogent and 
consistent ethical framework that is adopted throughout this dissertation to provide a 
critical appraisal of the ethical debate on medical technology. The ethical framework 
combines the integral relation between human dignity and social responsibility with a set 
of ethical principles to provide normative guidance. This integral relation and its 
accompanying ethical principles are discussed in the next two sections to present a robust 
foundation for the analysis in the subsequent chapters. The integral relation between 
human dignity and social responsibility in the Ethical and Religious Directives are 
described in terms of social responsibilities of Catholic health care services (Part One of 
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services), the Pastoral and 
Spiritual Responsibility of Catholic health care (Part Two of the Ethical and Religious 
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services) and the professional-patient relationship 
(Part Three of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services). 
Each of these is considered in turn. 
A. Social Responsibility. 
To address the social responsibility of Catholic health care, the Ethical and 
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services emphasize that the “complex 
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health care system confronts a range of economic, technological, social, and moral 
challenges.”1 This dissertation focuses upon the technological and moral challenges that 
present themselves. The response of Catholic health care to these challenges “is guided 
by normative principles”2. The foundation for these principles is the integral relation 
between human dignity and social responsibility. This integral relation builds upon a 
biblical background to guide moral responsibility in health care, as discussed in the 
following two sections. 
 1. Biblical Background. 
The Bible emphasizes that human dignity and vulnerability must be understood in 
relationship to God and in relationship with others. This reciprocal relationship highlights 
the reciprocity between God’s invitation and human response. 
  God’s Invitation and Human Response. 
The biblical concept of the person is defined in terms of word and response 
enabled because of the human being made in the image and likeness of God. In light of 
that image and likeness of God we are assured the sacredness of all human life.3 The 
person is a speaker of the word and the hearer of the word because we are addressed by 
God and given inalienable dignity. In the Old Testament, the widows and orphans had no 
one to defend them thus they were given protection under the law; consequently they 
maintained an inviolable dignity. In the Old and New Testament, dignity is based upon 
the relationship with God not on the autonomous and inviolable selfhood. Because of that 
relationship with God we too are called to maintain a mutual respect for those most 
vulnerable.4 In the earliest writings, God gives human dignity and He unconditionally 
accepts, affirms, sustains, and supports that dignity. In the Synoptic Gospels, Jesus 
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invites those who were sinners and thought to be absent of dignity into his company.5 
Jesus is the greatest example for us, thus we must become animated advocates for the 
most disadvantaged and vulnerable.6 As imitators of Christ, we are mandated to care for 
the needs of the poor as well.7 
Dignity is also characterized by the human response to God’s invitation. Dignity 
is intrinsic to every human being and cannot be given or taken away by the state, human 
laws, or another human being. Integrated with the soul, dignity is given by God at 
conception and is an aspect of personhood. Man’s life is a wonderful gift that should 
never be disrespected or used as a way to accomplish another’s selfish end. Man was 
created in God’s image and likeness and has an eternal place in heaven prepared for him. 
Man is endowed with the capacity to accept or reject God and our relationship with 
others. Respect for human dignity means that everyone must have what they need to lead 
a truly human life: food, clothing, shelter, the freedom to choose a state of life and to 
establish a family, the right to education, employment, a good reputation, respect, 
appropriate information, action in good conscience, protection of privacy, and religious 
freedom. God made us into one family, and we should treat one another in the spirit of 
community.8 Thus we are called to contribute to man’s common good.9 
Understanding human dignity and its origin from God provide the foundation for 
our relationship with others. This relationship with others highlights the importance of 
objective dignity and its recognition of human vulnerability. 
Dignity and Vulnerability. 
Historically, in the classical time of Rome, dignity was confined to individuals 
and never applied to humans in general. From the early Christian writings, humans 
  56 
possessed dignity because they are unique from other creatures. Unconditional forms of 
dignity continued during the Renaissance period when dignity was opposed to misery. 
After the Renaissance, a new form of dignity called subjective dignity was formulated. 
Based on subjective dignity, it was argued that God says that all created things are 
constrained within prescribed laws of man who may choose the limits of his nature. Man 
has the opportunity to fashion himself in whatever shape he chooses. Immanuel Kant 
introduced another form of dignity during the age of reason: objective dignity. This 
means that rational beings have dignity as long as they are capable of moral action. In 
modern times, an increasing emphasis on respect for dignity has taken place and even 
adopted into the charter of the United Nations. This understanding of objective dignity 
highlights the reality of human vulnerability.10 
Understanding dignity in relation to others not only highlights the objective nature 
of human dignity but also emphasizes the recognition of humans as being vulnerable. 
This is especially important for health care. Dignity should be viewed from the 
perspective of policy principle as well as the view that the value of dignity is a standard 
of patient care. These two concepts are not mutually exclusive. Human dignity has 
emerged as an obligation to be recognized that all people have a basic right. Human 
dignity is not viewed as merely a metaphysical hypothesis but emerges as an 
indispensable basis for the fair functioning of all of human society. Humans are granted 
dignity because of their capability to be kind, understanding, self-aware and loving. 
Dignity should be a standard of health care reflecting the understanding of the patient as a 
vulnerable person relates to the dynamic of interaction between patient and health care 
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professionals. Because of the vulnerability of the patient, great care needs to be exercised 
to promote the dignity of the patient.11 
Briefly, with the biblical background of dignity highlights the reciprocal relation 
with God and with others. This presents the foundation for understanding moral 
responsibility in health care. 
2. Moral Responsibility in Health Care. 
Moral responsibility in health care emphasizes the importance of social 
accountability and natural law as exemplified in the Ethical and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Health Care Services. 
Accountability. 
Moral responsibility highlights two related components of social accountability: 
the common good and professional accountability. Sociality is a dimension of the human 
person. Man is a social individual, a member of society but only as a being, infinitely 
transcending the society. Humanity is worthy of being called human if a society of 
persons is founded on the principle of common good. The human person has the capacity 
for inter-relations and communication. The human social dimension is based on human 
personhood. We have obligations and responsibilities to always respect the rights of 
others and to work for the common good. Man creates society; man is not created by 
society. Man must fulfill himself by being a full participating member of human 
society.12 
To heal the whole person, health professionals must understand not only what 
disease is attacking the body but also what that disease is doing to the patient as a 
spiritual being. Illness is a spiritual event disturbing both the soul and the body. Spiritual 
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questions raised at this time can be of meaning regarding value and relationships. Health 
professionals have to address these questions themselves before they can help their 
patients. The transcendent is present in the midst of daily practice. The transcendent can 
be found not only in conversations about spiritual dimensions with patients but in the 
moments in which meaning and value can be communicated to the patient. Barriers can 
stand in the way to the awakening of health care as a spiritual enterprise. Scientific 
reductionism, the denying of the transcendent, and the industrialization of health care 
threaten the restorative relationship that can begin when one person feels sick and 
another, skilled and socially authorized person provides support.13 
Social accountability, with its related components of respecting the common good 
and inspiring health professionals, fosters moral responsibility especially in the health 
care environment that is illustrated by the Ethical and Religious Directives. The Ethical 
and Religious Directives arose from the development of ethical norms that express the 
Church’s teaching on medical and moral matters. 
Natural Law. 
Engaged professionals in health care have always tried to maintain the spirit of 
Christ in the ministry and in accord with the church’s teachings. Theologians beginning 
in the 16th century engaged ethical issues in the practice of medicine. These included the 
elongation of life and methods to determine when death occurred. Standards of care were 
applied to treatments and general norms emerged. Written directives were established 
because of the development of Catholic health care and the need for guidance for serious 
moral issues. Initially these directives were rather legalistic, not explaining the church’s 
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teaching or scriptural basis but merely laid out rules. Recent additions of the Catholic 
health care directives have adopted a more theological approach to ethical guidance.14 
The Ethical and Religious Directives have emerged as a body of moral principles 
of the Church that are applicable to ever-changing health care. The Ethical and Religious 
Directives have two main purposes: (1) to provide guidance for health care today and (2) 
they set forth the ethical standards that flow from the church’s teaching about dignity of 
the human person. The Ethical and Religious Directives are helpful for health care 
professionals and also offers guidance on health care decisions of the Catholic faithful. 
Natural law, knowing God through reason in addition to knowledge through biblical 
revelation, and the authority of the Church Magisterium provide the foundation for the 
moral teachings. The Ethical and Religious Directives call for each person to form a 
correct conscience. The Ethical and Religious Directives should be considered on a case-
by-case analysis. These directives were not developed with absolutism in mind nor were 
they developed from a relativist’s perspective.15 
In sum, human dignity and social responsibility highlight the contribution of the 
biblical foundation for moral responsibility in health care. The combination of our 
relation with God and others (based on the Bible) enables us to understand the social 
accountability of the Ethical and Religious Directives as applications of our moral 
responsibility. 
B. Pastoral Responsibility. 
The foundational concept of social responsibility is accompanied with the concept 
of pastoral responsibility. To fulfill our pastoral responsibility, two areas must be 
expounded upon: spiritual responsibility and pastoral care. 
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1. Spiritual Responsibility. 
To fulfill the pastoral responsibility we must recognize and attend to the spiritual 
dimension and the spiritual struggles that are brought to the struggles of the patient in 
health care. Both will be discussed in this section. 
Spiritual Dimension. 
A community of healing and compassion incorporates not only the treatment of a 
malady but encompasses the psychosocial and the spiritual dimension of the human 
person.16 Without health of the Spirit, little hope for healing the whole person can be 
achieved through focused technology alone.17 Spiritual dimension or commonly referred 
to as spirituality, has not stopped evolving in its meaning. Spirituality has a “fuzzy” 
construct and is not purely an academic question.18 Spirituality can be defined as a “the 
search for the sacred.” The heart and soul of spirituality is the sacred, a higher power or 
divine being. For others the sacred is in the broader sense, such as objects, music, 
vegetarianism, virtues, or visions. The sacred can be aspects of life that have divine 
character or represent divinity as well as the concept of God, the divine or transcendent 
reality.19 Problematic of the divine is that it is inherently mysterious, elusive, and 
indescribable and language, symbols, and stories fail to capture its essence. Regardless of 
our understanding or varying ways of imagining at the core of the sacred is God, divine 
beings, or a transcendent reality.20 
To aid our understanding and to become communities of healing and compassion, 
we must understand that even though God is central of the sacred, sacred matters 
encompass other aspects of life.21 Personal illness or injury, illness or death of a family 
member, can be great life stressors perceived to be violations of the sacred. Spiritual 
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violations impact people emotionally and physically, these may be viewed as sacred 
losses. The sacred losses can elicit anger and rage as well as sadness and depression.22 
Even guilt may be a manifestation of the personal violations of the sacred. The spiritual 
integration of an individual will have an impact on how well these individuals cope. 
Holding on to the sacred is the first choice in trying to cope with these violations. 
Spiritual Struggles. 
Spiritual struggles may emerge if holding on to the sacred seems no longer viable. 
But two major ways of spiritual coping will emerge: one is to conserve the sacred while 
the other transforms the sacred.23 To maintain their relationship with the sacred, various 
methods of coping can be used to deal with threatening situations. These coping methods 
come in a variety of shapes and forms. In the midst of crisis, these methods help sustain 
people psychologically, socially, physically, and spiritually. Some of these methods of 
spiritual coping are: (1) reevaluating a stressor as to its potential benefit, (2) seeking love 
and concern from the sacred, (3) seeking a connectedness with the transcendent, (4) 
providing spiritual support to others, (5) seeking a partnership with the transcendent, and 
(6) using ritual for spiritual cleansing. Spiritual struggles can be a sign of disorientation, 
tension, and strain. Within spiritual struggles there are three types: interpersonal, 
intrapersonal, and the divine. Interpersonal spiritual struggles involve conflicts with 
families, friends, and congregations.24 The intrapersonal struggles question one’s own 
value, efficacy, or spiritual purpose.25 And finally, spiritual struggles involve strain 
between the individual and the divine. Stressful life events can throw a pall over the view 
that God is a loving all-powerful being who ensures only good things for us.26 
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Spiritual transformation may occur as a result of stressors. The place and 
character of the sacred in a person’s life may fundamentally change, as well as the path to 
the sacred. Spiritual transformation can be a painful process but can be the normal part of 
the search for the sacred. Transformation of the spiritual can end in failure but success as 
well and the right of passage may feel empty and meaningless. Spirituality may ebb and 
flow over our lifespan and can become downright puzzling but a very normal dimension 
of our human experience. It is simply part of what it means to be human.27 
2. Pastoral Care. 
To fulfill our pastoral care responsibility, we first have to understand and 
appreciate the spiritual dimension of the human person. In that understanding and 
appreciation we must then minister and shepherd the patient within our care. 
Ministry. 
The human person was created by God to be in relationship and this relationship 
continues by God’s hearing us, remembering us and meeting us in our relationships with 
one another. Pastoral care is a ministry that occurs in a Christian community through 
remembering God’s action for us. Additionally, hearing and remembering those we 
minister to as we remember who we are as God’s people.28 A natural thing for us is 
caring for one another because we are created for fellowship with God and one another.29 
The human beings deepest need is to be cared about by God and in God’s name care for 
others. In that caring for others, we must have an attitude of protectiveness and 
solicitude.30 An additional characteristic of a caring attitude is supportiveness. 
Supportiveness is acknowledging the worthiness and integrity of another in their own 
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right referring to qualities of warmth, empathy, and unconditional positive regard for 
another. Encouraging is the final quality important to caring.31 
Shepherding is a particular kind of caring relationship and attitude, one that we all 
are called to cultivate towards others.32 
Shepherding. 
The foundation of a shepherding relationship begins with empathy. Empathy is 
the capacity to know and feel others feelings. The total acceptance of others with 
whatever feelings they may exhibit is essential in establishing a caring relationship.33 
Empathy requires discernment of how another is feeling, a sense of feeling with, 
requiring appropriate distance and appropriate detachment.34 Another foundation of the 
shepherding relationship is that of genuineness and humility. This involves offering 
ourselves as finite, fallen, redeemed people, and only able to help others by God’s grace 
and love. Simply stated, being humble and grateful is the essence of being genuine. It is 
more than consistency, integrity, and wholeness. Being transparent to the One in whom 
we have our being is the chief constituent of genuineness.35 Additionally, another basic of 
the shepherding relationship is that of respect. Respect is valuing the dignity and worth of 
one of God’s creations. With respect, there is no obligation to feel the way they feel about 
things, to agree with them in their way of thinking or decisions, or are we to agree with 
their every action. But we are to have regard for and protect their rights as human 
beings.36 An unconditional positive regard is an obligation of every caregiver. People 
must set aside their prejudices, animosities, and their inclination for judgment in order to 
minister and be a good shepherd.37 Hope tempered with realism, another characteristic of 
good shepherding, is in anticipation of the positive change in the external conditions as 
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well as the inward process of reacting to them. Hope must prevail to have any semblance 
of healing but hope is more than a basic outlook or attitude. Hope is alive in us already; it 
does not have to be created. Hope is derived from a desirable self-image, healthy self-
esteem, and belief in the ability to exert influence on the world. 38 The most helpful and 
appreciated skill to be someone’s shepherd is the skill of listening. We must develop the 
skill of genuine interest in what a person wants and needs. Rather than being an 
obligation, when we listen from interest we are then most able to respond thoughtfully 
and appropriately.39 Listening runs against our self-centeredness but in doing something 
for another we have to take a basic attitude that we are going to open ourselves and 
actively listen to the care receiver. To hear what is beyond, behind, and beneath the 
surface is the ultimate aim of listening. Good listening is vital to good shepherding.40 
C. Professional Responsibilities. 
In addition to foundational concepts of social and pastoral responsibility, the 
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services also address the basic 
concept of professional responsibility. In the concept of professional responsibility that 
addresses the patient-physician relationship, three areas stand out: informed consent, 
surrogate decision-making, and the need for a conscience clause that provides protection 
for physicians. Each is considered briefly. 
1. Informed Consent. 
In this discussion of informed consent, purpose along with components and the 
effective process will be engaged. 
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Purpose. 
Historically, informed consent as it is practiced today is a relatively new arrival in 
medical ethics. Now, informed consent is central to professional-patient relationships.41 
Informed consent has often remained controversial because as practiced questions are 
raised as to whether it is really an informed choice by the patient.  Because of past abuses, 
controversial cases, and the growing of patient rights movements as well as a skeptical 
attitude of patients toward medicine, the importance of informed consent may be more 
assumed than actually practiced.42 The justification for informed consent is for the 
safeguard of the patient's dignity and autonomy. Autonomy, being one of the four parts of 
“common morality” shared by “all morally serious persons,” is the ability to make 
independent decisions.43 To better understand the professional-patient relationship, 
autonomy should be looked at as the kind of contract where the patient is empowered to 
play an active equal part in the decision-making about their treatment. It has been argued 
that this kind of contractual model can present dangers if fulfilled to the letter of the 
contract but no more or conversely if one performs every possible test and procedure with 
unlikely benefit. Even so, this contractual model has significant advantages over the 
paternalistic model of the past.44 
Informed consent has become the primary tool for protecting the legal rights of 
patients and in guiding the ethical practice of medicine. Legally, informed consent 
protects patients against assault and battery as well as safeguarding the rights of 
autonomy, self-determination, inviolability, and dignity.45 The ethical purpose of 
informed consent is intended to shift the decision-making away from the physician 
toward the patient. Informed consent should not be an event but a process that continues 
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as long as choices remain. All too often the consent form is confused with the consent 
process.46 In the informed consent process four basic elements are necessary: (1) the 
decision-maker has capacity to make decisions, (2) the physician must disclose sufficient 
detail for the decision-maker to make an appropriate choice, (3) the decision-maker 
displays understanding of the information given, and (4) the decision-maker should be 
allowed to freely agree.47 
Components and Effective Process. 
Five components should be included in the conversation regarding informed 
consent: the diagnosis, the treatment plan, the risks and benefits of the treatment, any 
alternative treatments, and the risks and benefits of declining treatment.48 
Well-documented limitations complicate the practice of informed consent. These 
limitations include patient comprehension, patient use of disclosed information, 
autonomy, and the pressure placed on health care providers. During the informed consent 
process patients often remember very little of the information disclosed. Their level of 
comprehension is overestimated because of factors such as age, education, intelligence, 
cognitive function, and anxiety all deleteriously affecting the patient’s understanding.49 
Even though patients are uniformly interested in learning about their proposed 
procedures, some patients make decisions in a linear, rational fashion considering the risk 
and benefits while others base their decisions on intuition or instincts. Social forces can 
undermine the effectiveness of informed consent as well.50 Rather than exercising their 
autonomy independently many patients prefer to delegate their decisions to others or 
make decisions collaboratively with their support systems.51 Clinical schedules are 
extremely busy thus making a rigorous informed consent process very difficult. Health 
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care administrators rarely recognize or accommodate for such time commitments.52 
Despite the consensus that informed consent should pervade medical practice, physicians 
rarely meet minimal standards of disclosure in obtaining informed consent. The consent 
process is primarily viewed as a tool for building trust rather than a technique for 
decision-making.53 
The move from physician-centered to patient-centered decision-making has been 
accomplished with regards to the law and ethics of informed consent. There are 
increasing concerns that the pendulum may have swung too far by mandating the 
patients’ self-determination must be exercised in a very particular way.54 To ally this 
concern, there is a growing focus on a shared process of decision-making. This would be 
a process that emphasizes the critical importance of the patient’s input while recognizing 
that it should be tailored to each patient’s ability and interest in participation. This 
process recognizes the physician’s contribution to the decision, which is important and 
deserves its own respect.55 This process also recognizes that medical treatment is a 
partnership between the patient and clinician and there is moral responsibility assumed by 
both partners. Neither can dominate the decision nor can they abrogate.56 Another 
approach regarding informed consent pertains primarily to those decisions that involve 
choices about the goals of medical treatment. Interpretations of informed consent that are 
overly rigid confuse the roles of the physician. Eliciting patients values allow the 
physician and the patient to reach agreement. Once agreement of the goals has been 
reached then the physician is free to make appropriate medical decisions.57 
The practice of informed consent can be complex and confusing requiring 
flexibility to accomplish goals. These goals are legal ones such as protecting patients’ 
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rights, ethical goals pertaining to autonomous decision-making, administrative goals 
assuring efficient healthcare, and finally interpersonal goals of building trust needed to 
accomplish medical interventions.58 To accomplish these goals the following suggestions 
are for optimizing the clinical informed consent process: 
1. Make a practice of involving patients in making medical decisions. 
a. Be aware of patients’ preferences and their unique decision-making styles. 
b. Openly address the risks and benefits, alternatives, and what is to be expected. 
c. These practices will aid in: 
Patients’ decision-making 
Free choice devoid of undue influence 
Patients’ understanding 
2. Determine the goals of care. 
a. Clarification of goals of care may be needed. 
b. The more complex the decisions the more explicit the discussion. 
3. Allow the informed consent process to fulfill its varied purposes. 
a. Legal to protect patients’ rights. 
b. Ethical to support autonomy and dignity. 
c. Administrative to promote efficient health care. 
d. Interpersonal to accommodate and build trust. 
4. To ensure understanding and permanence document electronic medical record 
including: 
a. Consent forms. 
b. Education materials. 
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c. Notes describing the process. 
d. Decision aids utilized in the process.59 
This suggested process serves as a pragmatic approach to facilitate and document the 
involvement of patients in medical decision-making. These practices of establishing 
informed consent of patients making medical decisions demonstrate the ethical spirit of 
informed consent.60 
2. Surrogate Decision-Making. 
In keeping with the consideration of the professional-patient relationship in the 
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, it is imperative that a 
discussion of surrogate decision-making takes place. In surrogate decision-making, two 
areas will be discussed: the function and naming and advising.  
Function. 
Traditionally, physicians have acted paternalistically on behalf of their patients. 
Contemporary health care ethics contend that physicians should not take on this role 
alone. Particularly in light of health care moving to team consultation, physicians do not 
know what their intact patients want done in the event of serious illness.61 Additionally, 
physicians typically underestimate their patients’ quality-of-life and are thereby less 
likely to favor life-sustaining treatments than are the patients themselves.62 A surrogate 
serves as the patient’s representative; ideally the patient should make this choice when 
they are able to make an informed decision. Often next of kin serve this role in the 
absence of a formally designated surrogate.63 The surrogate is expected to make health 
care decisions based upon substituted judgment; making decisions based upon what the 
patient would have wanted if they had decisional capacity.64 Many maintain that the 
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incapacitated patients’ family is the most appropriate surrogate decision-maker but 
empirical studies suggests that nuclear family members generally do not know the 
preference of patients regarding the termination of life-sustaining treatments and thus 
would not reach the same decisions that the patient would have reached.65 Studies have 
found that shared decision-making about end-of-life treatment choices has been often 
incomplete, especially among less educated families. But what was noted was the higher 
levels of shared decision-making were associated with greater family satisfaction.66 In the 
interest of justice and dignity, the families members making certain medical decisions 
must ensure that the patients’, not the decision-makers, needs are most important in 
determining decisions.67 Additionally, one third of surrogates had a significant prolonged 
negative psychological experience after making an end-of-life decision for a family 
member. A small number had a positive emotional response when they were confident 
they knew which treatment the patient would have wanted.68 
Naming and Advising. 
In light of these findings, naming and advising a surrogate decision-maker is 
extremely critical in making the patients’ wishes known. Surrogates often have to play a 
role in decision-making even when the patient is not at the end-of-life.69 The important 
considerations in naming a surrogate decision-maker are someone you trust, someone 
who knows you well, and will honor your wishes. Often people assume their closest 
relatives would be the ones who would know their wishes the best. However, people 
often find when actually talking to their loved ones about situations needing a surrogate 
decision-maker their views is very different. The key to assuring that your surrogate 
decision-maker knows what one would want is talking openly about one’s preferences.70 
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Sharing your personal concerns, values, your spiritual beliefs, and about what life worth 
living would look like then share that with your surrogate decision-maker. To alleviate 
any disagreement and to ensure that one’s wishes are followed, one must communicate 
with family that you have knowingly shared your desires with your surrogate decision-
maker and would ask them to abdicate totally to your decision-maker and your wishes.71 
Some of the most difficult problems in contemporary health care ethics are in the area of 
decision-making for patients who no longer have capacity to make their own decisions. 
The main issue is on what moral grounds such decisions ought to be made. Respect for 
the non-autonomous patients’ autonomy should be the guiding norm for the surrogate 
decision-making. Thus, the surrogate in making health care decisions should use the 
substituted judgment standard. This will be possible because of the information shared 
with the surrogate decision-maker by the patient prior to incapacity.72 
3. Conscience Clause. 
Furthermore, professional responsibility typically involves the need for a 
conscience clause to protect clinicians. Three topics shed light on the conscience clause: 
the historical perspective, consent paradigms and physician perspectives. 
Historical Perspective. 
 Because of the tidal wave in the patient autonomy movement that has been 
gaining momentum for decades, the physician is sometimes viewed as only the patient’s 
agent. Because of advertising, Internet and peers, the physician has just become the 
patient’s technical accomplice. Sometimes the physician has had to abandon their own 
moral agency in order to fill the role that the patient desires, thus threatening the 
autonomy of the physicians.73 
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 With the advent of secularism and the effects of patient autonomy, many 
physicians, ones with moral conviction or religious beliefs, feel marginalized. A need for 
statutory protection for these physicians arose. Congress has passed the Church 
Amendment to specifically address abortions and forty-six states followed suit. This 
amendment protects physicians from consequences for their refusal to participate in 
abortions. Some states expanded this law to cover other morally objectionable services 
such as contraception, sterilization assisted reproduction, human cloning, physician-
assisted suicide, fetal experimentation, and withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatments. Laws have gone even further to cover other health care providers such as 
nurses and pharmacists, as well as the health care institutions, hospitals and insurers. This 
legislation is still in effect today and is called the ‘conscience clause.’74 These conscience 
clause laws have given significant protection to physicians. Patients are unlikely to have 
any remedy against the physician that refuses to give medical services because of their 
personal moral objections. It can be argued that these clauses allow physicians to refuse 
too many situations without concern for the patient’s ability to acquire these medical 
services.75 
The real issue with conscience clause legislation results in too many situations 
where physicians arbitrarily refuse medical services to patients and, therefore, restrict the 
patient’s ability to access much needed medical care. The current conscience clause 
policy strikes the wrong balance between patient access to medical services and the 
physician’s ability to refuse to offer services for many patients; thus, needed medical 
services are denied.76 Furthermore, state boards have the authority to regulate the medical 
profession. Conscience clauses for physicians limit many state licensing boards from 
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discriminating against conscientious refuters. Without these laws stated as a conscious 
clause, the licensing boards could have freer rein on constraining physician’s conscience. 
A physician’s refusal to provide morally objectionable service might be construed as 
unprofessional.77 The concept of professionalism plays a significant part of this conscious 
clause debate. At the heart is the question: whether or not a professional is always willing 
to place the needs of others before themselves. Often professional organizations disagree 
as to the correct model for doctor-patient relationships and to what specifically the 
physician owes the patient.78 One such organization is the American Medical 
Association. Its code of medical ethics states that physicians have a responsibility to 
place “the patient’s welfare” above their own while allowing physicians, beyond 
emergency circumstances, the discretion to refuse to provide medical services. Moreover, 
professionalism does not require a physician to completely subordinate his own personal 
interest in lieu of those of the patient; this standard is known as the ‘primary principle.’79  
Historical developments have changed the concept of what it means to be a 
physician and even sparking the controversy of the conscience clause itself, beginning 
with the emergence of a consumer-based medical system. A change in the paternalistic 
role of the physician toward the patient autonomous model has eroded the professional 
stature of the physician. The relationship between physician and patient has become one 
of a contract.80 Likewise technological developments, particularly at the beginning and 
end-of-life, have had a tremendous impact on what it means to be a “good doctor” and 
raise many issues about what is his true duty. Finally, the physician may no longer be 
willing to totally pay the price to be the “professional” that has permeated the definition 
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of a professional physician. Instead the physician may be looking to have significant 
balance in his life and not totally sacrifice himself for his patients.81 
 The use of the conscience clause may allow a physician to use it inappropriately, 
thus calling into the question one’s professionalism. Different paradigm models have 
emerged that may give insight into answering this question: What is a professional? 
Paradigms to be discussed include the models of consent, patient-centered, physician-
centric, and gatekeeper. 
Consent Paradigm. 
In the consent model, both a physician and his professional obligations are 
voluntary. This model recognizes that certain physical risks involved in the profession 
exist. By becoming a physician, voluntarily one has acquiesced to these risks.82 A 
physician has to accept a set of obligations that are “all-or–nothing” when it comes to 
selecting personal obligations and potentially rejecting others. The services that a 
physician provides is determined by what is socially acceptable of a “good” physician, 
not by an individual physician. Right and wrong are not determined by the norms of the 
physician.83 
In the patient-centric model, the physician has to provide all medical services 
within his specialty. One should not be a doctor if he has moral conflicts. The physician 
should provide any appropriate medical care as long as it is legal and desired by the 
patient. This is a model for the “technician,” where there is no room for personal morality 
or personal autonomy.84 In the physician-centric model, the physician has an inalienable 
right to conscientiously object on moral grounds not to provide services he deems 
morally offensive. In this model, a physician does not have to sacrifice his freedom just 
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because he chose to be a physician.85 The gatekeeper model contends that the physician 
has a duty to provide service when he has a special ability and when others rely on this 
specialty of medicine. In this model it has been suggested that there could be ‘just’ 
distribution of medical services without impacting the autonomy of the physician. One of 
the physician’s obligations would be to prevent their conscientious refusal from 
becoming a burden to patient access.86 
  Physician Perspective. 
 The balancing act continues between supply of physicians and patients needing 
medical services that may be deemed morally objectionable. It would become a 
professional obligation for a physician, who refuses medical services because of their 
moral conviction, to register with their licensing board. A licensing board would be 
responsible for determining if the physician is sincere in invoking the conscience clause. 
The licensing board would test both the validity and sincerity of the physician’s beliefs, 
thus alleviating potential conflict. A registration system would be a simple means of 
measuring supply of physicians as well.87 If there were a sufficient supply of physicians 
willing to provide potentially morally objectionable medical services to a potential 
population, there would be no imbalance. An outcry to question the conscience clause 
would no longer be necessary. Still remaining is the question of imbalance. If the balance 
were deemed a reality, then licensing boards could be required to be engaged in helping 
to assess the patient demand for medical services. Licensing boards could glean this 
information from various sources such as insurance companies and hospitals that 
routinely collect such data.88 
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 Informed consent, which has developed only in the last 40 years, is a result of a 
shift from paternalism to patient autonomy. Informed consent is a doctor’s obligation. 
The physician has an ethical responsibility to disclose all reasonable treatment options 
even those that the physician does not provide. The responsibility to disclose options 
extends to the physician who refuses to perform a particular medical procedure even if 
one finds it morally repugnant. Their duty is not unlimited. The physician must provide 
all the facts to allow a reasonable patient to make an appropriate decision.89 Physicians 
cannot discriminate against patients based on patient characteristics; they must fulfill 
their obligation to notify patients about services not performed based on moral grounds. 
The physician must offer information regarding medical options even if the patient’s 
physician does not offer that service. In an emergency, the physician must provide for 
patient to the best of their ability. Some suggest that the physician must be required to 
refer to someone who can provide the needed medical services. Furthermore, physicians 
should not abuse their power when giving advice as to the patient’s best course of 
treatment.90 
Patients also have a responsibility to show respect and consideration for the 
autonomy of the physician. Both sides of the physician-patient relationship have rights 
and obligations. It is in the best interest of the patient to glean, as early as possible, the 
physician’s moral beliefs to foster a better doctor-patient matching to avoid conflicts.91 
The issue of referral is one of the most difficult aspects of the conscience clause 
debate. Much conversation has circulated around a physician who morally refuses to 
provide medical services. The physician should be required to offer a patient a referral to 
a physician who will provide that service. Problems arise for many reasons but most 
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notably that the physician could view this as participating in formal cooperation. A 
potential remedy could be for the refusing physician to provide a list of cooperating 
physicians. This too has questions of moral complicity and the culpability. At the very 
least a physician could refer the patient to a state licensing board to secure a potential 
physician who would provide the medical services requested.92 
In cases of emergencies, the medical institution has a legal obligation under the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act to stabilize the patients presenting 
themselves with a medical condition without regard to their being unfunded. Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act does not preempt the conscience clause in 
protecting individual physicians. In an emergency situation, a physician may have a 
moral issue but is able to pass the patient to another physician who is more morally in-
line without imposing risk to the patient. The major concern is where a transfer is not 
possible; in this case, the patient could be seriously wronged and/or harmed.93 Another 
emergency might occur when a patient lacks access to services within a specific 
geographic area deemed deficient in those medical services; such areas could be defined 
as an emergency situation and require the physician to treat it as an emergency. This 
declaration of an emergency could be made by the state licensing board.94  
II. Practical Ethical Principles for Catholic Health Care. 
The above basic concepts of social, pastoral, and professional responsibility led 
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services to develop 
practical ethical principles for Catholic health care. These principles are based on the 
premise that man is not the master of his life; God is and has dominion over it.95 The duty 
to preserve our life and use it for God’s glory is a positive precept but it is not absolute.96 
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The practical ethical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives address the 
following: the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of treatment; the 
principle of double effect; and the principle of cooperation. These are discussed in turn. 
A. Ordinary and Extraordinary Means. 
In the Catholic moral tradition a balance of proportionality has to be achieved. To 
that end an historical survey and decision-making foundations will be discussed with 
regard to ordinary and extraordinary means. There will be an accompanying analysis and 
appropriate discussion in referencing applicable Ethical and Religious Directives. 
1. Historical Survey. 
In the section, a discussion of early moral theologians and subjectivism and 
relativism will ensue. 
In the tradition of the Catholic Church it is held that man is not the master of his 
own life. God is the master and has dominion over it. Human life is a gift from God.97 
Since man does not have absolute authority over life one can conclude that we do have an 
obligation to take care of it.98 This point is indicated in the Ethical and Religious 
Directives in this manner: “We are not owners of our lives.”99 Therefore, we do not have 
life and death decision-making authority when it comes to the final disposition of our 
lives. God has given us the gift of life, not as a right that we can claim but a gift that we 
may receive.100 We are more life’s administrator.101 The duty to conserve our lives is one 
side of the moral coin while the prohibition of suicide is on the other.102 This point is 
mentioned in the Ethical and Religious Directives in this manner: “We have a duty to 
preserve our life and use it for the glory of God.”103 God's attitude towards us is marked 
by generosity, faithfulness, and grace. We must extend those similar qualities to others. 
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Having received so much from God’s bountiful care, we can give to others gratitude of 
our hearts and this is what gives glory to God.104 This duty to preserve our lives is a 
positive precept but it is not absolute. The significance is described in Ethical and 
Religious Directives in this manner: “We do not have absolute power over life.”105 Life 
has infinite value and lived well leads to gratitude, wisdom, and sanctity. We must realize 
that we are sent to fulfill a God-given task.106  
This begs the question, “When is it enough?” raising the core distinction of 
extraordinary means versus ordinary means in preserving our lives.107 The distinction is 
expressed in the Ethical and Religious Directives in this manner: “A person has a moral 
obligation to use ordinary or proportionate means of preserving his or her life. 
Proportionate means are those that in the judgment of the patient offer a reasonable hope 
of benefit and do not entail excessive burden or impose excessive expense on the family 
or the community.”108 Often at the beginning of a serious illness many medical 
interventions seem appropriate but there usually comes a time when continued treatments 
are no longer a benefit to the patient. This is not abandoning the hope of cure rather 
acknowledgment of the human condition and the limits of medicine.109 
Early Moral Theologians. 
Historically, the seed of this distinction can be traced back to St. Thomas Aquinas 
(1274 d.). Although he did not specifically develop this concept regarding the duty to 
preserve life, he recognized that it does have limits. This point is explained in the Ethical 
and Religious Directives in this manner: “no person should be obliged to submit to a 
health care procedure that the person has judged, with a free and informed conscience, 
not to provide a reasonable hope of benefit.”110 In Catholic moral tradition, simply 
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prolonging physical life, especially when that means precarious and burdensome, is not a 
requirement. The “hope of success” is best used in thinking of assessment of any medical 
procedure.111 Later theologian, Francisco de Victoria (1545 d.) clarified that it is one 
thing not to protect life and it is another to destroy it. He expounds by saying that one is 
not obligated to expensive or extravagant cures or the best food or the healthiest air. 
Victoria says the obligation to conserve our life does not bind us when food or medicine 
exceeds what is customary, even if death is probable.112 This point can be explained using 
the Ethical and Religious Directives in this way. Excessive burden is not required to 
prolong life if determined by a free and informed conscience. The conscience, the “most 
secret core and sanctuary” where one is alone with God to help make judgments about 
what one ought to do or not do. To aid in that conscience formation, one must search for 
truth, discern what is right and good, and then act accordingly.113 
Dominic Soto (1560 d.) makes a similar point about the preservation of life due to 
an infected leg and subsequent amputation. Dominic Baenz (1604 d.) is the first to 
contrast ordinary means and extraordinary means. This point can be explained using the 
Ethical and Religious Directives in this fashion. A free and informed conscience by the 
patient is required to determine what is proportionate and what is excessive. Making such 
decisions in the Catholic moral tradition is the right of the patient or their surrogate. Such 
decisions should not be taken lightly and should be made taking into consideration 
Catholic moral teachings.114 
With the rapid advancement of medical technology in the 20th century, Catholic 
theologians were forced to clarify the view of sanctity of life and the enormous costs 
associated with adhering to that concept.115 This subsequently led to the Church’s 
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response in 1957 with Pope Pius XII’s (1958 d.) declaration that normally one is required 
to use only ordinary means.116 The essence of this response in the Ethical and Religious 
Directives is posited in this way: “Disproportionate means are those that in the patient’s 
judgment do not offer a reasonable hope of benefit and or entail an excessive burden, or 
impose excessive expense on the family or the community then there is no requirement to 
use extraordinary means to preserve life.”117 Medical interventions that seem no longer to 
correspond to the real situation of the patient may be discontinued. That real situation can 
involve disproportionate means or an imposition of an excessive burden. The Catholic 
moral tradition has been very willing to acquiesce to the free and informed conscience of 
the patient.118 
Subjectivism and Vitalism.  
This declaration of Pope Pius XII (1958 d.) aligned the issue of 
ordinary/extraordinary means with the distinction between subjectivism and vitalism. The 
two key principles of medical ethics for assessing this are beneficence and non-
malfeasance. Subjectivism maintains that one’s primary obligation is to oneself, human 
life having no intrinsic value and life only having value if an individual gives it such. 
Fundamentally, the dignity of life is rejected because life only has worth and value if an 
individual sees life as valuable.119 Vitalism claims that life itself must be sustained at all 
cost because of its greatest possible value. Vitalism forbids discontinuation of efforts to 
prolong life.120 
2. Decision-making Foundations. 
The defining of elements and making a moral assessment will be discussed as it 
relates to ordinary/extraordinary means. 
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Defining Elements. 
To bring the argument back to ordinary/extraordinary means requires a set of 
criteria for making important distinctions. On the one hand, ordinary means has four 
major elements: (1) Reasonable hope of benefit: this benefit must have both quality and 
duration. If something offers little benefit then it would be unreasonable for someone to 
be morally obligated. (2) Common means: one does not have to go beyond what would 
be common diligence. To go beyond the usual would increase the extraordinary nature. 
(3) Proportionate according to status: it must be reasonable according to one’s financial 
or social status. (4) Undemanding means: the balance must be struck between gravity of 
the moral law and the recognition that the obligation is too difficult to fulfill. The 
excessive difficulty is the key not the ordinary means being free of any difficulty.121 In 
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, the obligation to 
submit to a health care procedure can only be judged by a “free and informed 
conscience.” The Catholic moral tradition does not address specific technological 
remedies or interventions but asks whether a medical treatment is burdensome or 
beneficial to the patient.122 
On the other hand, there are four aspects in helping to determine extraordinary 
means: (1) Great effort: exerting tremendous amount of effort is not required. (2) 
Enormous pain: an unreasonable amount of pain can be recognized as extraordinary. (3) 
Extraordinary means and expense: an obligation to spend an exorbitant amount of money 
to conserve life is not mandatory. A person may decide not to impose excessive cost to 
oneself, one’s family, or the community. (4) Severe dread: an intense fear or abhorrence 
toward a means can be viewed as extraordinary.123 A strong repugnance can also make an 
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ordinary means excessively burdensome.124 In the Ethical and Religious Directives, all 
four of these aspects presented help clarify what would be excessive and burdensome 
judged by a “free and informed conscience” of the patient.125 
Moral Assessment. 
A moral assessment of each individual case must come before it can be decided 
whether a particular treatment is ordinary or extraordinary. The definition of ordinary 
means is usual, commonplace, not exceptional and conversely extraordinary means 
unusual, uncommon, and exceptional.126 All these definitions could be rejected for terms 
such as ethically indicated or non-indicated, which substantially make the distinctions 
more understandable. The distinction between ordinary means and extraordinary means 
can be very deceptive because of their appearance of simplicity.127 To clarify these terms, 
the distinguishing aspect of ordinary from extraordinary in Catholic moral theology is 
whether the treatment is beneficial (ordinary) or excessively burdensome 
(extraordinary).128 The criteria for decision-making need to relate primarily to the patient 
not the remedy.129 The specific criteria which can relate to risks, costs, pain and 
likelihood of success, anticipated results and side effects can reduce confusion but also 
provide an opportunity to discuss complex issues among all stakeholders.130 In the 
Ethical and Religious Directives, the decision-making revolves around the judgment of 
the patient not the treatment. The health care team and other stakeholders often overlook 
this as well.131 
B. The Principle of Double Effect. 
The second focus of practical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives 
deals with the principle of double effect. Here the distinction between ordinary and 
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extraordinary means is applied to provide practical distinctions to resolve moral 
dilemmas. To discuss the principle of double effect it is helpful to look at its historical 
perspective before considering its implementation. 
 1. Historical Overview. 
Formulation of the principle of double effect and an articulation of the debate-
shaping standard will ensue. 
Formulation of Principle 
Historically, since the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, Catholic medical ethics has 
utilized the principle of double effect. The principle of double effect is still widely 
utilized in Catholic bioethics today.132 It is thought that St. Thomas Aquinas (1274 d.) 
was the first to formulate the principle. Some argue that the principle originates much 
earlier in implicit moral reasoning even dating back to the Old Testament. There are 
examples of a justifiable act that causes both good and bad effects in early Scripture. 
These justifiable acts utilized moral reasoning, very similar to the principle of double 
effect.133 Aquinas was first to analyze a case of self-defense from which two effects, one 
good and one bad, would occur. Aquinas utilized this principle in the situation of self-
defense against an unjust aggressor. In developing the first nascent version of the 
principle, the concepts of dual effects, intentions, and proportionality were utilized. 
Clarity and attention to the principle of double effect did not occur until two centuries 
after Aquinas. Cardinal Cajetan (1534 d.) clarified the principle's effectiveness.134 It was 
not until the publishing of Jean-Pierre Gury’s (1866 d.) work in 1866 that awareness was 
brought to the principle as a normative tool for all of moral theology.135 In the 20th 
century, the Ethical and Religious Directives applied to principle to various dilemmas 
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regarding death, emphasizing the following: the dignity of the patient as they approach 
death is what is paramount.136 This point is explained in the Ethical and Religious 
Directives in this manner: “Medicines capable of alleviating or suppressing pain may be 
given to a dying person even if this therapy may indirectly shorten the person’s life so 
long as the intent in not to hasten death.”137 
Debate Shaping Standard. 
In St. Thomas’ general statement about the application of the principle of the 
lawfulness of killing in self-defense, an act can have two effects. We understand it today 
as an articulation of the principle of double effect. One of the effects is intended while the 
other is unintended.138 Even though one of the effects is bad but not intended then the act 
itself can be licit. This occurs because the character of moral action derives from what is 
intended, not from what is outside of that intention. But if there are two effects, one good 
and one bad, even if only the good effect was intended we cannot always conclude the act 
is licit.139 St. Thomas says, “An act that proceeds from a good intention may be rendered 
illicit, if it is not proportioned to the end intended.”140 Thus, it is imperative to analyze 
the action and its effects to determine its lawfulness. This was purported to be the only 
time Aquinas directly addressed the principle of double effect. 
After the contributions of Aquinas and others as mentioned earlier, the principle 
reached a level of consistency in understanding and use with the work of Jean Pierre 
Gury (1866 d.). It was Gury’s work that produced the distinct conditions that exists 
today.141 The principle was further developed by Peter Knauer (1935 b.) in the 20th 
century that led to the establishment of the following conditions of principle of double 
effect.142 
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2. Implementing the Principle of Double Effect.  
Conditions that are applied to implementing the principle of double effect and the 
application of the principle will be discussed. 
Conditions. 
To justify an action that may cause a bad effect, in addition to caused good 
effects, the principle of double effect to be correctly applied has four main conditions that 
must be satisfied. To apply the principle to an action, the conditions are listed in a logical 
order. While the first two conditions deal with the act itself, the latter two deal with 
intentionality and the consequences.143 The four conditions of the principle of double 
effect are as follows: 
1. The action and its effects, considered by itself must not be morally evil. 
2. The good effect must not be caused by the bad effect. 
3. There must be no intention of the bad effect. 
4. The good effect must outweigh the bad effect.144 
These four conditions give us a template to normatively judge good and evil 
consequences. Being an effective normative tool, the principle of double effect can aid us 
in morally distinguishing various ethical decision-making options.145 At the end of the 
20th century, the United States bioethicist David Kelly argued for a further refinement of 
these conditions. He argued that the third condition should be “intend as an end to be 
sought” and not “intend either as a means or as an end” as is typically understood.146 He 
argued that in foregoing life-sustaining treatment, the justification for doing so in the 
Catholic Tradition sheds light on the conditions of the principle of double effect. He 
insisted that the third condition of the principle of double effect is reduced to a form of 
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the first two principles of double effect conditions.147 His point was to focus upon the 
distinction between morally intended action and the unintended side effects.148 The 
contributions of Knauer and Kelly continue to shape the development of the principle of 
double effect. 
One final point needs to be made about using the conditions of the principle of 
double effect, the use of the terms “direct” and “indirect.”149 These terms are utilized to 
apply to actions after they have gone through the scrutiny of the four conditions of the 
principle of double effect. If an action meets all four conditions, then it is considered 
“indirect” and acceptable. If they do not meet the four conditions then they are “direct” 
and are considered forbidden.150 
Application. 
The application of the principle of double effect is commonplace. However, using 
the principle of double effect to make the distinction between killing and allowing to die 
can be one of the most heart-wrenching in medical care. It is sometimes moral to allow a 
person to die but the direct killing is never morally correct.151 The withholding of life-
sustaining treatment is an example of allowing to die. The Ethical and Religious 
Directives explain this concern in this manner: “The free and informed judgment”152 of 
the patient dictates utilization of the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures if they are 
not contrary to Catholic moral teaching. While living the many passages of life well, we 
also should prepare for our final passage to death.153 This preparation requires us to 
consider the use of life-sustaining technology. 
The use of certain medical means (ventilator, cardio-vascular resuscitation, or 
pressors, etc.) is not killing the patient but allowing a natural death. If it is “morally 
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extraordinary,” then the decision not to use these means is generally accepted as moral.154 
Withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is another action that requires evaluation as to its 
acceptability. The action of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment would be considered 
equal to withholding life-sustaining treatments in the Catholic moral tradition. This 
would be contingent upon the assumption that the burden outweighs the benefit. The 
Ethical and Religious Directives describe this situation in this way: “The person has a 
moral obligation to use ordinary or proportionate means of preserving his or her life. 
Proportionate means are those that in the judgment of the patient offer reasonable hope of 
benefit and do not entail an excessive burden or impose excessive expense on the family 
or community.”155 
By embracing the reality of our mortal life, we anticipate eternal life.156 
Withholding and withdrawing treatment may seem vastly different but morally there is no 
difference.157 This point is explained in the Ethical and Religious Directives in this 
manner: “A person may forgo extraordinary or disproportionate means preserving life. 
Disproportionate means are those that in the patient's judgment do not offer a reasonable 
hope of benefit or entail an excessive burden, or impose excessive expense on the family 
or the community.”158 Only by facing our mortality can we anticipate the life that 
transcends death. This vision of a perfect life, God has promised us.159 
Another action that has traditionally been accepted as ethically justifiable by the 
principle of double effect is that of palliative sedation. The Ethical and Religious 
Directives elucidate this situation in this manner: “Patients should be kept as free of pain 
as possible so that they may die comfortably and with dignity, and in the place where 
they wish to die.”160 Care is certainly something other than cure. Cure can become 
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violent, manipulative, and even destructive if it does not grow out of care. Care is being 
with, suffering with, and feeling with another. Care is compassion. We may not always 
be able to cure, but we are always able to care.161 When patients are experiencing 
intractable pain at the end-of-life, extreme measures to gain control of that pain may have 
to be utilized. One of those extreme measures is that of sedation. This concern is 
addressed in the Ethical and Religious Directives in this way: “Medicines capable of 
alleviating or suppressing pain may be given to a dying person if this therapy may 
indirectly shorten the person’s life as long as the intent is not to hasten death.”162 
Intentionality has to be tempered with the knowledge of proportionality.163 
Palliative sedation potentially can cause the patient to lose consciousness to 
adequately relieve the refractory symptoms. With the goal to eliminate pain, suppression 
of respiration may be the cause of their death. Relieving pain is certainly a moral act. 
Therefore appropriate palliative medication to relieve intractable pain at the end-of-life 
can be considered ethically justifiable.164 This point is explained in the Ethical and 
Religious Directives in this manner: “One of the primary purposes of medicine in caring 
for the dying is the relief of pain and the suffering caused by it.”165 But what must be kept 
in mind is that often the greatest suffering is loneliness, the feeling of being unloved and 
unwanted. Supportive presence may be the most appropriate gift that one can give to the 
dying.166 
Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide cannot be justified by principle of 
double effect. This point is emphasized in the Ethical and Religious Directives in this 
manner: “Catholic health care cannot condone or participate in euthanasia or physician 
assisted suicide.”167 We must live in response to God and face life’s challenges and 
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difficulties in hope. Our challenge and goal is to share that with those who are struggling 
and discouraged.168 The very act of purposefully ending life is morally evil and so is 
prohibited by the first condition of the principle of double effect; the act cannot be 
morally evil. The evil act must not produce a good effect is the second condition. It is not 
fulfilled because the evil effect, the death of the patient, is the means of producing the 
good effect, the relief of the patient’s suffering. The first two conditions of principle of 
double effect are intended to alleviate any rationalizations of evil actions.169 These are 
applications that are readily addressed but there are many other applications of principle 
of double effect, as one of the most useful normative tools of Catholic moral theology.170 
C. Principle of Cooperation and Complicity. 
The third focus of practical principles in the Ethical and Religious Directives 
deals with the principle of cooperation to address issues of complicity. The principle of 
cooperation was developed to analyze a person’s moral action and to help determine 
whether one’s action contributes to the wrongdoing of another.171 Again, a historical 
perspective clarifies basic distinctions in the principle. 
1. Historical Overview. 
In providing a historical overview, the original purpose as well as a discussion of 
its theological development will ensue. 
Purpose. 
The principle of cooperation, a principle of Catholic moral theology, was 
developed to analyze a person’s moral action. This theological principle also helps 
determine whether ones action contributes to the wrongdoing of another.172 The principle 
of cooperation came about because of the concern that there are times when bringing 
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about good is almost impossible without associating with others wrongdoing.173 The 
Ethical and Religious Directives explain “activities must be limited to what is in accord 
with the moral principles governing cooperation.”174 Cooperation is relevant for us 
because of being called to be disciples to advance the kingdom of God. Because of our 
identity and integrity, the principle of cooperation helps us to be who we claim to be and 
act accordingly.175  
“Cooperation” has a positive connotation in English usage. It connotes the 
working together for common good. In the case of this principle, it involves one’s action 
and has been expanded to include the actions of an institutions as well as an individual.  
The message of the Ethical and Religious Directives is thus:  “Catholic partners should 
avoid entering into partnerships that would involve them in cooperation with the 
wrongdoing of other providers.”176 The principle of cooperation has become a useful tool 
for today’s health care environment by guiding us as we advance the kingdom of God.177  
The principle was originally formulated to help individuals and their confessor determine 
if and how they might act morally when they come in contact with the actions of others 
who were involved in wrongdoing. In the context of the practice of the Catholic 
sacrament of Reconciliation, guidance was needed to aid the penitent and confessor.178 
Theological Development. 
Historically, St. Thomas Aquinas (1274 d.) was one of the first theologians to 
give some direction regarding this principle when his observations later became known as 
the principle of double effect.179 In the 16th century moral theologian, Thomas Sanchez 
(1610 d.) articulated a concern about individuals cooperating directly with evil.180  St. 
Alphonse Liguori (1787 d.) gave the principle of cooperation much of its present form. 
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The principle of cooperation can be seen as an application of the principle of double 
effect.181 In this case, the principle deals with the action of individuals and organizations 
involved with immoral actions of others.182 However, some scholars consider the 
principle of cooperation as distinct from the principle of double effect. The reason is 
because cooperation involves two agents with distinct moral actions, whereas double 
effect involves a single moral agent with good and bad effects related to action.183  
However, the principle of cooperation is quite different from the principle of toleration. 
The principle of toleration, advanced from the time of St. Augustine, deals more with the 
power of institution that has the wherewithal to overcome evil but chooses to tolerate the 
immoral action for the greater good.184 Pope John Paul II (2005 d.) in his 1995 encyclical, 
Evangelium vitae, acknowledged the principle of toleration explaining that “public 
authority can sometimes choose not to put a stop to something which were prohibited 
would cause more harm” (no. 71).185 
2. Distinctions. 
Addressed by the principle of cooperation are actions that are wrong in all 
circumstances (intrinsically evil) and to justify cooperation, the action of the person 
cooperating cannot be wrong. In avoiding moral culpability, the distinction between illicit 
formal and licit material cooperation must be made.186 
Formal Cooperation. 
If one were to knowingly and willingly cooperate with someone who performs 
evil acts or were to withhold actions that would prevent such acts, this would be 
considered morally wrong. This point is explained in the Ethical and Religious Directives 
for Catholic Health Care Services in this manner: “Catholic health care organizations are 
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not permitted to engage in immediate material cooperation in actions that are intrinsically 
immoral.”187 To maintain an individual and/or institutional identity and integrity, asking 
these questions should precede every act of permissible cooperation: How will 
cooperation likely affect one’s identity and integrity in this instance? How will this action 
impact others? Does this action advance the kingdom of God?188 Additionally, to 
encourage another to perform acts of evil or to agree with the evil purpose, even if no 
physical action were extended, is also morally wrong. To directly intend the evil act is to 
share in moral responsibility.189  
The critical factor is intentionality or voluntariness.190 When a person cooperates, 
clearly intending the wrongdoing, the formal cooperation would be explicit. If 
cooperation were not explicit but nonetheless immediately associated with wrongdoing, 
this category would be implicit formal cooperation. To clarify, explicit is when there is 
clear intention in the wrongdoing, therefore wrong.  Implicit formal cooperation is when 
there is actual cooperation in the wrongdoing.191 When cooperation is utilized to justify a 
cooperating action, that action is mediate material cooperation.192 In assessing formal 
cooperation, one must assess the intention of the cooperating agent. Two questions must 
be asked: (1) is the cooperating agent contributing to the morally wrong action in an 
essential way? (2) is the cooperating agent in agreement with the morally wrong action? 
If the answer is yes to both then this is explicit formal cooperation and illicit. If the first 
answer is yes and to the second question, no, then the question has to be answered: is the 
cooperating agent participating in the action in such a way as to assume that the 
cooperating agent agrees with the morally wrong action? If yes, then this is implicit 
formal cooperation and also not acceptable.193 The Ethical and Religious Directives 
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explain that limitations must be placed on the participation in activities that would be 
judged morally wrong by the Church. To apply the principle of cooperation, particular 
arrangements have to be considered such as ownership, governance, management, 
finances, actual performances of the deed, and scandal. Because of our call to be a 
prophetic witness it may be necessary to cooperate in order to achieve some good and/or 
avoid some harm.194 
Material Cooperation. 
With material cooperation, in some way one is involved with the wrongdoer but 
does not share in the intentionality. In this case one should not participate in the illicit act 
of another person and ought to be only involved with the acts that either proceed or 
follow the wrongful act.195 Mediate material cooperation involves a cooperator only with 
action and not with the will of the person doing the wrong. The wrong action is neither 
approved nor desired by the cooperator, thus the cooperator is unwillingly involved.196 
Prudence must guide those involved in regards to questions of intention, duress, distance, 
necessity, and gravity. 
To assess material cooperation there must be no intention or agreement of the 
cooperating agent with the action. The cooperating agent still in some way contributes to 
or facilitates the wrongdoing. The question that has to be asked in this case: is the action 
of the cooperating agent performing good or at least morally indifferent action? 
Additionally, does the cooperating agent contribute in a substantial way, providing an 
essential element, without which the act would not be accomplished? If the answer to this 
question is yes, the action is immediate material cooperation and usually not acceptable. 
If the answer is no, the subsequent question has to be asked: does the cooperating agent’s 
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action contribute some non-essential element? If the answer is yes, the action is mediate 
material cooperation and can be morally permissible. In the utilizing the principle of 
cooperation, the Catholic Church demonstrates the rejection of relativism as well as the 
avoidance of the moralistic hyper-rigorous tradition that would reject any collaborative 
efforts with those that the Church may have value disagreements.197  
However, the use of the principle of cooperation requires that scandal be 
avoided.198 To use material cooperation, the possibility of scandal must be eliminated.199  
The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services explain as 
follows: “The possibility of scandal must be considered when applying the principle 
governing cooperation.”200 Scandal in this environment is not what might be newsworthy 
but what may lead one to sin. Scandal is morally offensive to others, may incite others to 
do evil, or might provide others with an occasion for morally wrongful conduct. How we 
act or do not act may appear to encourage the virtuous conduct of others. The appearance 
of scandal amounts to doing wrong against our neighbor; because love of our neighbor 
dictates that we encourage one another to virtuous conduct.201 
III. Conclusion. 
The practical ethical principles of Catholic health care including ordinary and 
extraordinary means, double effect, cooperation, and complicity give us basic principles 
to better implement the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services. This provides a normative framework for Catholic health care ethics, creating a 
foundation for the ethical decision-making models to be dealt with in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3. Ethical Decision-Making Models Consistent with Catholic Ethics. 
To discuss ethical decision-making models consistent with Catholic ethics 
requires examining three related topics: moral agency and organizational ethics, the 
competence of patients for making end-of-life decisions, and the role of clinical ethics 
consultation services. 
I. Organization Ethics and Moral Agency. 
 Moral agency is the state by which organizations, as well as individuals, are held 
accountable for making right or wrong decisions. Both organizations and individuals are 
expected to act ethically in all matters and to be evaluated accordingly. While most 
Health Care Organizations have ethics committees to assist in establishing and 
maintaining standards, often those committees are insufficient and cannot carry this 
burden alone. All members of the Health Care Organizations must be responsible for the 
organization’s understanding of moral agency, and all employees must manifest this 
understanding as they perform their assigned duties. Health Care Organization are 
ethically responsible yet are constantly being challenged by both internal and external 
stakeholders. This chapter will discuss common dilemmas that must be addressed by 
Health Care Organizations to meet expected ethical standards in clinical, professional, 
and organizational environments. 
A. Characteristics. 
First, the characteristics of organizational moral agency engage two foundational 
issues: the purpose of moral agency and the role of ethics in the organization. 
Organizations like individuals have moral agency, but in different ways. They both have 
purpose that must be evaluated in terms of being accountable through conscience. 
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Organizational moral agency, as well as clinical and organizational ethics, has 
distinctiveness in healthcare ethics that will be discussed. 
1. Organizational Moral Agency. 
To evaluate Organization Moral Agency, the ethical aims have to be identified 
and ethical accountability has to be established. 
Ethical Aims. 
Organizations have moral agency because they have a defined purpose. 
Individuals have a purpose and, if not fulfilled, will also be subject to the whims of the 
universe. This purpose of organizations, like individuals, involves ethical aims. To pursue 
these ethical aims, organizations set goals. In this goal setting, manifested as mission 
statements, strategic plans, and budgets, organizations act like individuals insofar as they 
pursue moral agency. This moral agency means they have responsibilities to society, to 
other institutions, to other individuals within and without the organization, and ultimately 
to the people they serve.1 
Ethical Accountability. 
Another aspect of moral agency is that organizations will periodically be 
evaluated. This evaluation will occur internally as well as externally to monitor their 
activities with regard to their ethical aims. Individuals they come in contact with, society 
at large, as well as the recipients of their service measures this evaluation. Part of that 
evaluation will be to determine whether they have been socially responsible, how they 
treat their employees and individuals, and most especially how they have fulfilled goals 
stated in their mission statement. Such evaluation highlights the ethical accountability of 
organizations. Organizations are held morally accountable insofar as they are systems 
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with ethical aims (goals, mission statements, etc.) that are evaluated. Here the difference 
between organizational and individual moral agency becomes apparent. Individuals and 
groups act as moral agents with ethical aims and accountability, whereas organizations 
act as moral agents with ethical aims and accountability by analogy. That is, 
organizations are not human individuals; but their ethical aims and accountability are 
similar to that of human individuals. Hence, organizations have moral agency by analogy 
to individual moral agency.2 Just as individuals are responsible for their formation of 
conscience, organizations are responsible for creating that climate and evaluating whether 
an act fits that climate.3 
2. Health Care Organizations Ethics. 
Within a Health Care Organizations, clinical ethics and organizational ethics need 
to be discussed in a related manner. 
  Clinical Ethics.  
Often clinical ethics have organizational ramifications. Structural problems in the 
organization can come to light as clinical cases are reviewed. Such problems could be the 
result of inadequate staffing, inept administration of medications, or the absence of clear 
policies.4 Other clinical problems may materialize because of organizational changes, 
such as policy or even directional changes of the Health Care Organization itself. The 
Health Care Organization may have an impact on the clinical environment if they do not 
give appropriate ethical consideration to their decisions. Problems can occur if the Health 
Care Organization is not committed to an integration of ethics throughout the 
organization. The organization can be accused of not meeting the “moral minimum” or 
the lack of respect for other stakeholders.5  Most Health Care Organizations have an 
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established clinical ethics committee that set guidelines and procedures to address ethical 
issues occurring in the delivery of health care.6  Policies are not just theories but practical 
tools and thus should be implemented with fidelity. Facilitating communications, dispute 
resolution, and education are just some of the areas in which the ethics committee can aid 
an organization in adhering to its written policies. 
Organizational Ethics. 
 With the evolution of health care and having a larger stake in society, Health Care 
Organizations must become more cognizant of their impact and perceptions. Clinical 
ethics can no longer be confined to case-centered environment but must become part of 
the organizational culture. Ethical implications must be considered in all their actions. 
Often they are not addressed by the organization as a whole. The ethical implications are 
often outside the purview of the ethics committee, yet issues are delegated to that group. 
Consequently, the Health Care Organization feels they have satisfied their need to 
consider ethical implications, and no other actions are taken. Areas outside the ethics 
committee jurisdiction and often overlooked include executive hierarchy, organizational 
structures, and relations with stakeholders.7 
 Organizational ethics problems can be analogous to individual acts in ethics (i.e. 
informed consent, choice, appropriate disclosures, etc.) Effective Health Care 
Organizations ensure protection of their patients in the areas of unauthorized access, 
patient privacy, patient confidentiality, and safeguards for patient autonomy. In this time 
of hypersensitivity to access, who has that access and what guidelines are in place to 
protect the patient’s information? These questions and many others point out a significant 
need for a forum to discuss areas of ethical concern throughout the Health Care 
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Organization. As moral agents, organizations must pay particular attention to the ethical 
expectations of society.8  
B. Ethical Theories and the Ethical Climate in Health Care Organizations. 
Second, in addition to the above characteristics, ethical theories impact the health 
care organization in two ways, relating business ethics with the ethical climate of the 
organization. 
1. Business Ethics and Organizational Ethics. 
Stakeholder Theory and Professional Ethics need to be discussed in both business 
and organizational ethics. 
Stakeholder Theory. 
Health Care Organizations have unique challenges and obstacles. These obstacles 
are inherent in an environment that is very competitive resulting in the Health Care 
Organizations being caught in the tension between profitability and the demand to meet 
high ethical standards. Therefore, it is necessary to look at various models of business 
ethics to identify a feasible a model for effective Health Care Organizations.9 Models 
such as rational choice theory, integrated social contracts theory, stakeholder theory, and 
other theories need to be reviewed in light of a Health Care Organization.  Each of these 
theories has their strengths and weaknesses, but stakeholder theory offers the best option 
for Health Care Organizations. Stakeholder theory is defined as a framework for 
understanding the potential conflicts of value, loyalty, commitment, and interest of a 
group of individuals who can be impacted by corporate actions. Stakeholder theory also 
provides the best integration of financial issues and other considerations, while 
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recognizing the role of moral agency.10 Stakeholders have a shared moral community and 
appeal to fairness principles.11 
Professional Ethics. 
To the naïve, there would seem to be no conflict between organizational ethics 
and professional ethics; however, an organization must integrate clinical, business, and 
professional ethics. The latter may be the most important and most controversial. Health 
care professionals are responsible for patients, to the health care insurers, and to their 
community. All of these forces challenge the ethics of the individual professional.12 A 
professional is defined as exhibiting five attributes: (1) a highly specialized training and 
role, (2) an interest in society before self-interest, (3) personal self-control ruled by a 
code of ethics, (4) a desire for rewards as symbols rather than ends, and (5) virtues and 
morals as guides for ethical behavior. These guiding principles for the professional would 
be control, responsibility, and virtue. Such guiding principles are the essence of a health 
care professional whether doctor or nurse.13 
Professionals, such as physicians, nurses, social workers, chaplains, and therapists 
have codes of ethics that they all portend to abide by.  Governing bodies of Health Care 
Organizations expect competency and advocacy for patients as a minimal code of ethics. 
The eradication of conflicts of interest and the elimination of conflicts of commitment, 
honesty, respect for the law, continuing education in their specialized areas of expertise, 
as well as a sense of responsibility to society are all attributes Health Care Organization’s 
governing boards expect.14 Organizational ethics by the Health Care Organizations 
should be a further attempt to combine all these different codes of ethics into a culture of 
ethical behavior within a positive ethical climate.15 
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2. Ethical Climate in Health Care Organizations. 
Managed care organizations and organization ethics programs will be engaged as 
they relate to an ethical climate within Health Care Organizations. 
Managed Care Organizations. 
With the perceived need for health care reform and its failure to come to fruition 
in 1994, there was a major shift of power from inside the Health Care Organizations to 
the outside. The power moved to government, both state and federal, and to American 
business; both are large-scale consumers of health care. This shift was a result of the 
perceived need voiced by the general population who believed there was “something 
severely wrong with the health care system.”16  Managed Care Organizations and Health 
Maintenance Organizations both grew because they were designed to slow health care 
cost and to provide enhanced health care to a defined group. These types of Health 
Maintenance Organizations were set up because there was such a tension between profit 
and service. They were rife with ethical dilemmas. Controlling cost, changing provider 
behavior, risk shifting, and risk sharing are just some of the potentially ethical 
problematic areas for Health Maintenance Organizations.17 To further exacerbate the 
ethical climate, physicians were subject to new reimbursement schemes, withholds, 
capitation arrangements, bonuses, and gatekeeper arrangements. Also, physicians were 
forced to sometimes compromise and balance the tension of good health care and 
financial reward.18 Consolidation of Health Maintenance Organizations became the new 
norm. Consolidation was done to negotiate more clout with all service providers and also 
to accomplish the economies of scale. Health Maintenance Organization’s stakeholders 
(including patients, physicians, nurses, staff, and the community) can experience 
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significant angst because of staff reductions and reassignments; another reason to develop 
desperately needed organizational ethical guidelines that help to create a healthy internal 
ethical climate.19 
Organization Ethics Programs. 
To achieve a healthy ethical climate requires first looking at a Health 
Maintenance Organizations relation to its mission and core values to determine if there 
are any impediments. To help achieve an organizational ethics program, two major 
stimuli have been instrumental in making Health Maintenance Organizations comply: the 
first being the Justice Department; and secondly, the standards organization, Joint 
Commission and Accreditation of Health Organizations.20  In establishing an effective 
organizational ethics program, certain criteria must be met: respect, visibility, and proper 
authority. The ethics program must bring into line mission and codes of ethics that 
address specific issues such as marketing, admissions, transfer, discharge, billing 
practices, providers, payers, and educational institutions. Each of these individual issues 
is required to be evaluated.21 
 The organization’s ethics program should be established at the level of Board of 
Directors and be given responsibility for morale, reputation and the Health Maintenance 
Organization’s competitive advantage. The program should be give decision-making 
authority but utilized very discriminately. The program should be more than an advisory 
board.22  The organization’s ethics program should be the umbrella over three 
subcommittees: the patient care ethics subcommittee, the organization ethics 
subcommittee, and a professional ethics subcommittee. Each subcommittee should have 
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its own functions in the areas of education, policy development, consultation activities, 
and research activities.23 
II. Clinical Ethics and Competency. 
The challenges mentioned above of organizational ethics and moral agency has 
often led to the compromise of a patient’s rights. The Catholic Church asserts patients 
have a right to make their healthcare decisions.24 “The decision should be made by the 
patient if he is competent and able or, if not, by those legally entitled to act for the 
patient, whose reasonable will and legitimate interest must always be respected.”25 To 
discuss clinical ethics and competency consists of examining two related topics: 
competency of the patient and advanced directives. 
A. Competency. 
First, the fundamental concept in bringing decision-making of the patient to 
fruition is that of determining competency. Competency engages two foundational issues: 
decisions by competent patients and decisions for incompetent patients. 
1. Decisions by Competent Patients.  
Making decisions by competent patients will be engaged from the perspective of 
paternalism and making treatment decisions. 
Paternalism. 
Patients that are capable of making decisions about foregoing treatment may 
refuse that treatment based upon their legal right even against the advice of their 
physician. The patient has rights of privacy, autonomy, and liberty thus choosing to forgo 
treatment is within the purview of the competent patient. American law supporting these 
rights comes from three sources, statutory law; laws passed by legislatures, and 
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constitutional law. The American Constitution is the source for the right to privacy and 
autonomy while common-law allows the refusal of unwanted treatments.26 
Emphasis in modernity has been placed on respecting the patient's autonomy but 
paternalism continues to occur.27 Paternalism is when another decides on behalf of the 
patient; as a result the patient’s autonomy is limited. Someone else is making moral 
choices for the patient about treatment decisions. When competency of a patient is not in 
question, the patient should be making treatment decisions. The patient knows what 
burdens they are willing to bear and what risks they are willing to take.28 Moral 
responsibility in the case of decision-making continues to fall within the confines of 
health care professionals. They are the ones responsible for presenting the possible 
choices to the patient and facilitating the decision-making process.29 
Another definition of paternalism is when one interferes with the patient’s 
autonomous decision-making to avoid harm and to promote authentic welfare and values 
of the patient. The physician may feel the expressed preferences of the patient may be 
inauthentic and therefore may act counter to the preferences of a patient.30 The physician 
may feel the patient is not competent or that the patient’s decision was coerced.  Family 
members may have appealed to duty or reciprocity and even possibly coercion to solicit 
compliance with their wishes regarding a particular treatment that is not shared by the 
patient. An implicit or explicit threat may be influencing the patient. Acting against an 
inauthentic preference could be defined as “soft paternalism.”31 
Treatment Decisions. 
Treatment decisions are not based on knowledge alone but on patient’s values and 
moral beliefs. Values guide a person’s behavior and choices while disclosing what offers 
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meaning and worth. Values are integral to a person and thus often people do not even 
realize that decisions are based on their values. Because values are unique to each 
individual they are relevant to decision-making. Decision-making requires value 
judgments.32 
Treatment decisions are contextual in nature therefore more than the technical 
aspects of that decision needs to be considered. Only the patient can know what is most 
important, requiring their values being considered. Others cannot know a patient’s values 
unless they have shared them. Even with that knowledge making decisions based on 
other’s values is extremely difficult especially if the values are not shared. Consequently, 
others should not make medical choices for competent individuals.33 
The knowledge of one’s own values empowers the patient to act autonomously. 
Often patients have not contemplated nor articulated what is most important to them 
when faced with health care decisions. Health care professionals can and should help 
individuals clarify their personal values through self-reflection and self-examination.34 
This process includes the clarification phase in which patients select values from among a 
group of values. Once these values are determined the patient moves on to the prizing 
phase, a term used to describe values clarification. At the prizing phase, the patient has 
determined their values and is willing and able to communicate those values to others. 
The last phase, acting on one’s values, allows an individual to make decisions and take 
appropriate action. The patient is the only one that knows what burdens they are willing 
to bear therefore treatment decisions are moral decisions belonging to the patient only.35 
One of the most vexing problems for physicians is determining if the patient is capable of 
making adequate medical decisions. Determination of competency is crucial for 
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achieving the proper balance between autonomy of the patient and protecting the patient 
that may have a cognitive impairment.36 
Competency denotes a legal status that should be determined by a court therefore 
referring to legal judgments and conversely capacity to clinical ones. These terms are 
used interchangeably sometimes causing confusion. The physician should continue the 
tradition of determining patient’s capacity and decide when to seek substituted consent. 
Generally, a medical determination of incapacity is the trigger for activating directives. 
Consent from an incompetent patient is invalid; a physician could be accused of treating 
the patient without informed consent if he did not obtain a substitute decision-maker.37 
An appropriate balance between respecting one’s autonomy and protection from the 
consequences of a bad decision is what must be kept in mind.  Performing capacity 
assessment is the only means to offer protection of the patient and physician. Therefore 
only patients with significant impairment should be considered incapacitated. The 
preciseness of the test varies with the seriousness of the consequences of the patient’s 
decision-making.38 Decision-making capacity should be a “sliding scale” approach rather 
than an either/or argument.39 
Assessing decision-making capacity falls into four categories: the ability to 
articulate a choice, the ability to understand information, the ability to appreciate 
consequences, and the ability to manage information.40 More formal bedside tests to 
determine the patient’s cognitive function are available. The Mini-Mental Status 
Examination, even though not developed for decision-making capacity assessment, has 
performed reasonably well. The Mini-Mental Status Examination does not address areas 
such as understanding or choices.41 The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tools for 
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Treatment is considered the “gold standard” for capacity assessment tools. This test does 
require training to administer and interpret. Additional tests available are the Capacity to 
Consent to Treatment Instrument and the Hopemont Capacity Assessment Interview.42 
2. Decisions for Incompetent Patients. 
Determining capacity and applying guidance standards can complicate decision-
making for incompetent patients both of these will have light shed on them. 
Determining Capacity. 
For incompetent patients, two central ethical issues for decision-making exist: 
who should decide and what standards guide these decisions. If a durable power of 
attorney for health care exists, that addresses the first ethical issue thus supporting the 
value of self-determination or autonomy. It is in self-determination that one is able to 
exercise control over and responsibility for one’s life. It may seem self-determination 
would be irrelevant to decision-making for an incompetent patient but that patient, that is 
now incompetent, was at some point competent to exercise self-determination by 
selecting and instructing a surrogate.43 
If the now incompetent patient has appointed no surrogate decision-maker, then it 
is common to turn to a close family member to be the surrogate, which also respects the 
patient’s autonomy. Family members are likely to know the patient’s wishes and values 
and have the patient’s best interest in mind, therefore family members may be the best 
suited to make medical decisions for the incapacitated patient. Decisions by the surrogate 
must be guided by the standard of substituted judgment, the decisions would be based on 
the now incompetent patients values and preferences and would reflect what the patient 
would have wanted.44 
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Guidance Standards. 
Three distinct standards apply to certain decision-making: substituted judgment, 
substituted judgment combined with best interests, and best interests. Ideally these three 
standards should be applied in this order. The first standard, substituted judgment would 
presume, with clear proof, that the patient actually said what they would prefer under 
certain circumstances. The judgment of the surrogate should not substitute for the 
patient’s wishes. The surrogate is only to decide what they know the patient would have 
wanted and would decide.45 The second standard, the substituted judgment combined 
with best interests, would assume that there is some proof about the patient’s preferences 
but not sufficient to base a decision. In this case, objective standards regarding the best 
interest of the patient would have to be taken in consideration. The third standard when 
there is no proof of what the incompetent patient would want is the best interests 
standard. Ideally, one would look to the purely subjective wishes of the patient but if this 
information is not available we have to turn to the objective best interests of the patient.46 
At this point in the decision-making process evaluating morally ordinary and morally 
extraordinary treatments have to be considered. The surrogate cannot legally or ethically 
prohibit a treatment that would be in the best interests of the patient. Beneficence and 
autonomy have to be considered with the incapacitated patient. 47 
To aid in the decision-making process for the surrogate, the treatment team should 
attempt to be as explicit about the patient’s condition as possible. Treatment options need 
to be presented to the surrogate clearly with benefits, risks, and any other possible 
outcomes.48 Outcome of surrogate decision-making can be influenced by personal beliefs, 
morals, and values of the health care providers as well as other clinicians, thus care 
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should be taken to minimize the opportunity for influencing the surrogates decisions and 
encouraging them to become appropriately educated to provide the best outcome for the 
patient.49 
B. Advance Directives. 
Second, these competency-determining challenges reveal the crucial need for 
advance directives. The advance directives are impacted in two ways: advance care 
planning and end-of-life care planning. 
1. Advance Care Planning. 
In advance care planning, the process and the required communication need to be 
discussed. 
Process. 
Advance care planning for patients becomes more critical as their ability to make 
appropriate decision choices as physical and cognitive abilities diminish. Most people 
want to be in control of decisions about their care. Advance care planning is preparation 
for future medical care when and if the patients are unable to make their own decisions. It 
should be part of the routine medical care conducted with their chosen medical decision-
maker. It is best to approach the process of advance care planning in incremental steps. 
Advance care planning is a process in which patients explores, discusses, articulates, and 
then documents their preferences. In the process, patients identify and clarify their 
personal values and goals regarding their medical treatment. They articulate the care they 
would like and who they are comfortable speaking on their behalf. This planning should 
be done in a structured environment and woven into the regular care plan.50  It is best to 
review the care plan and update it periodically. The advance care plan is designed to 
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insure that the desires of patients are respected in the event they are unable to make 
medical decisions for themselves. A sense of control and peace of mind are fostered by 
this exercise. The proxy decision-maker, by being involved in this process, comes to a 
much clearer view and appreciation for the desires of the patient.51 
Communication. 
Clinician-patient communication in advance care planning should involve family 
members, patient and proxy decision-maker. Advance care planning process centers on 
values, goals, and treatment preferences and provides a guide for future decisions. It has 
been found that people who have had these open and frank discussions commonly choose 
care that focuses on quality of life rather than life extension.52 Studies have also shown 
that patients expect health care professionals to initiate these conversations and health 
care professionals, especially physicians, expect patients to initiate them. Three possible 
reasons why this may not be a comfortable area for physicians include (1) that they may 
lack knowledge and be reluctant to discuss end-of-life care, (2) that they may lack 
training to confidently speak of advance care planning, and (3) that they are not 
compensated for their time involved in these discussions and may feel death is not an 
appropriate outcome of care.53  
Advance care planning is important for physicians. They have a legal and 
professional responsibility because patients have a right to participate in the planning of 
their own health care. This planning helps build trust and confidence with the physician 
to better appreciate and understand the values, goals, and preferences of patients. This 
process fosters open and frank conversations eliminating anxieties and fear for both 
participants. The advance care planning is preventive medicine.54 
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Even if advance care plans and advance directives have faithfully been executed, 
they are often not followed. Family input is often a complicating aspect.  Physicians are 
often likely to follow family preferences rather than the advance directives. Sometimes 
physicians follow their own values and choose not to implement directives they find 
objectionable. Litigation fear also can play a role in not following the advance directive: 
"Live people sue; dead ones don't." Advance directives should be executed long before 
the end of life is imminent. Delaying the conversation until hospital admission is too late 
in the process as patients can be overwhelmed with making other decisions.55 
The Church has been moderately active in securing and encouraging parishioners 
to engage their families and physicians to have frank and honest discussions regarding 
their end of life wishes. The Church is very explicit about looking at life as a precious gift 
from God and that humans are stewards of life rather than custodians. Preservation of life 
is a duty and all are expected to use their lives for the glory of God. Likewise, 
preservation of life is not absolute and may be rejected if it is deemed insufficiently 
beneficial or excessively burdensome. “The task of medicine is to care even when it 
cannot cure.”56  
2. Care Planning at the End-of-Life. 
To adequately advance care plan at end-of-life a discussion will ensue regarding 
choosing a surrogate and the Patient Self-Determination Act. 
Choosing Surrogate. 
In the realm of advance care planning, there are two kinds of advanced directives. 
First is the proxy or durable power of attorney for health care. The second, treatment 
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directives are instructions regarding the care of a person that becomes incapacitated and 
cannot make appropriate health care decisions.57 
Adult individuals who are mentally competent to make health care decisions for 
themselves have a right to do so. If incapacity should occur, an individual needs someone 
to make decisions for them. Two types of surrogate decision-makers exist for health care, 
a court appointed surrogate, guardian, for individuals whose incapacity has been 
determined, and surrogate decision-makers allowing a competent person to designate 
someone else as their attorney-in-fact. The second differs in two significant respects. 
First, the individual not the court makes the decision. Secondly, the principle chooses the 
specific power to be delegated. Additionally, their attorney-in-fact survives incapacity.58 
Choosing a surrogate decision-maker is an extremely important decision because 
one is giving them the authority to make life-and-death decisions. A surrogate will be 
making decisions based on substituted judgment.59 One must make sure the person 
chosen is willing to perform that task. The person chosen must be willing to talk with you 
and know about your wishes, will understand what you want and your priorities about 
health care and will exercise your wishes. One must choose very carefully because you 
are entrusting someone with your life.60 Choosing someone who can be a strong advocate 
and can handle conflicting opinions from family, friends, and medical personnel is 
paramount.61  
Patient Self-Determination Act. 
Since the passage of the 1990 Patient Self-Determination Act, advance care 
planning has been recognized as a means of improving decision-making at the end-of-
life. The goal of the Patient Self-Determination Act is to ensure patient preferences guide 
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medical care in the event of their incapacity.62 People may want and expect to control 
decisions about their medical care throughout their lives, but many factors work against 
realizing that goal. Many people nearing the end-of-life are not able to direct their 
medical care because often they do not realize that end-of-life is nearing. The advance 
directive was developed to aid people when they are fully competent to make the 
determination of their desires when they no longer can communicate their authentic 
wishes.63 
Advance care planning should involve family members and clinicians and can 
start at any state of health and age. Life’s goals, values, and treatment preferences are at 
the center of any discussion. The information gained in periodic revisiting will give an 
opportunity for matching subsequent care decisions with the wishes of the patient. 
Patients that have executed an advance directive are more likely to receive end-of-life 
care consistent with their preferences.64 
Most physicians avoid end-of-life discussions until death is near. End-of-life 
discussions should take place during periods of relative medical stability and not in 
hospital settings. Medical deterioration is the reason the physicians will finally have the 
end-of-life conversation. The primary care physician rather than an institutional physician 
is best equipped to have conversations about patient’s values and goals at end-of-life. As 
previously noted, most often patients expect physicians to initiate the end-of-life 
conversations and physicians expect the patient to initiate. The lack of knowledge and 
training is most often given for the reluctance of physicians to discuss end-of-life care. 
Other reasons for avoidance of the end-of-life conversation by physicians are that (1) 
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advance directives are not necessary for young and healthy patients and (2) the physician 
is not compensated for the time involved in these discussions.65 
Strong views are expressed when asked about what kind of care people want 
when they are seriously ill and approaching death. They prefer to die at home and remain 
in control of decisions about their medical care but that is quite opposite of the facts: 
nearly 25% die in nursing homes and another 25% die in the hospital.66 Nearly 40% of all 
adult patients in a hospital setting are incapable of making their own medical decisions. 
The reasons for these abhorrent statistics are multiple: lack of awareness on the part of 
the patient and families, unwillingness to adhere to patient’s wishes by clinicians, lack of 
institutional support, including resistance within the medical community for completing 
and following advance directives.67 
Less than 30% of the population has completed advance care planning while 90% 
believe having the conversation with the family is important. But that same report said 
they would sooner concentrate on staying alive than talk about death and completing 
directives. Most frequent conversation about advance care planning focuses on people 
who want to avoid intensive and non-beneficial medical intervention but it is clear that 
many worry about being denied care or being “given up on” too early.68 
A living will and a durable power of attorney for health care offer a significant 
impact on the outcomes of decision-making. In keeping patient’s wishes, advance 
directives are positive tools and more patients should avail themselves of them. The 
health care system should be allowed the time, the space, and the reimbursement to aid 
people in planning appropriately for the end-of-life.69 
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III.  Clinical Ethics Consultation. 
An inherent relationship exists between clinical and organizational ethics. Thus an 
ethics infrastructure is an essential component of an organization’s ethics integration and 
strategy. The ethics infrastructure links fundamental processes in clinical practice to the 
mission and core values of the organization. To accomplish effective clinical ethics 
consultations require examining three related topics: the ethics approach, the quality and 
professionalism, and case analysis. 
A. Ethics Approaches. 
First, the focus of ethics approaches engages two foundational issues: ethics 
consultation system and the Veterans Health Administration. 
1. Ethics Consultation Systems. 
A discussion of ethical dilemma analysis and various models within the ethics 
consultation system will be discussed. 
Ethical Dilemma Analysis. 
Modern medical ethics depend on moral principles that respect autonomy, 
beneficence, non-malfeasance, and justice. In clinical medicine, which is intensely 
practical, one may find these ethical principles and the theories behind them too 
cumbersome to apply and utilize quickly to assist in making ethical decisions. Thus, 
ethical dilemmas can be analyzed by the means of the four following topics: (1) medical 
indications, (2) patient preferences, (3) quality-of-life, and (4) contextual features. 
Medical indications include the usual content of a clinical discussion: diagnosis, 
prognosis, and treatment of a medical situation. “Indications” refer to the diagnostic and 
therapeutic interventions. Patient preferences, patient’s values and assessment of burdens 
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and benefits are all ethically important. A goal of medical intervention is to restore, 
maintain, or improve quality of life. Therefore, the patient’s quality of life must be 
evaluated and considered. The contextual features are the social, economic, legal, and 
administrative context of the patient’s case.70 
Models. 
Three distinct models exist to accomplish ethics consultations: an individual 
consultant, an entire ethics committee, or the consultation team. Because each model has 
advantages and disadvantages, health care organizations should determine which is most 
appropriate in specific situations. An individual consultant model is when one person, an 
independent consultant or member of the ethics committee, performs a specific consult 
alone. A second model is one in which an entire ethics committee jointly provides the 
ethics consultation. This committee is a stable group of people made up of usually six to 
twenty numbers. The final model, the consultation team, is the most adaptable to many 
situations. The team should be comprised of a physician and individuals from other 
disciplines, such as nursing, social work, etc., offering different perspectives, mutual 
support, reflection, adaptability, and timeliness are the key components to the 
effectiveness of this model.71 
 2. The Veterans Health Administration System. 
The Veterans Health Administration System has two effective models for 
approaching ethical dilemmas: the IntegratedEthics model and the CASES approach. 
These two models will be discussed in a related manner. 
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IntergratedEthics Model. 
The IntegratedEthics model is a significant departure from the traditional 
approach of ethics in health care organizations. This model has received positive press 
nationally and internationally having become recognized for his innovation and 
comprehensive design impacting multiple areas of health care. IntegratedEthics methods 
and tools have been validated through testing and demonstration and thus been proven to 
be authenticated and valuable. With Veterans Health Administration System’s excellent 
reputation for addressing ethical concerns, it developed an approach to ethics it is called 
IntegratedEthics. This methodology provides a significant paradigm shift: a unique and 
innovative way to address ethics in health care. IntegratedEthics changes the focus of 
ethics in health care from a reactive, case-based encounter, often fraught with a 
fragmented approach, to one that adopts a proactive and comprehensive method.72 
CASES Approach. 
The Veterans Health Administration System has a five-step approach to ethical 
consultation, known as CASES: (1) clarify, (2) assemble, (3) synthesize, (4) explain, and 
(5) support. This process offers an exemplary guide for other Health Care Ethics 
Consultants. Not every situation will lend itself to using all five steps, but it would 
behoove one to systematically work through these relevant steps when confronted with 
ethical health care decisions. 
The first step is to clarify the request given to consultants. A preliminary 
understanding as to why the ethics consultation is needed and what should be the mode of 
action. In clarifying the request, it should be determined whether or not this is a request 
for resolution of an ethical concern. If not, then assistance needs to be given to direct the 
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requester to the appropriate offices or programs.73 If the case were an active clinical one, 
then it would require the suggested CASES process. If this were a non-active clinical 
case, it would be considered a non-case consultation and may not require the full use of 
the CASES approach. Non-case consultations may involve answering questions about 
ethics, interpreting policy and reviewing documents from an ethics perspective. Other 
issues may consist of organizational ethics concerns or ethical analysis on a hypothetical 
or historical question.74 
Case consultations lend themselves to the CASES approach most often, but 
consultations can also be very relevant in non-case consultations. The CASES approach 
should be used when deemed appropriate. Additionally, in the clarifying stage, ethics 
consultants should establish a clear statement of goals. The role of the consultant also 
should be explained. At this point in the process, an ethics question should be formulated 
which allows all involved to work productively toward a resolution.75 
The second step in the CASES approach is to assemble pertinent information. At 
this point, the consultant needs to determine the types of information that needed, such as 
medical facts, patient values, and information about other parties. Visiting patients face-
to-face is always desirable because certain information can be gleaned from that 
encounter. Even if the patient is nonresponsive or not interactive, there can be many 
useful pieces of information gathered. Access to the medical facts through the medical 
records and the patient’s chart are essential in making a competent ethics consultation. 
Likewise, staff and family members need to be interviewed to gain insight into the 
patient. Verifying all the information gathered is important and carefully sorting through 
facts from value judgment prospective is essential.76 In this phase, the Health Care Ethics 
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Consultant must help others become aware of their own moral views and must be 
attentive to the following factors: (1) each individual’s understanding of the issues, (2) 
how the issues have arisen, (3) the individual’s perceptions, and (4) the stakeholders 
understanding of decisional factors. By engaging in the discovery of the personal, 
religious, and emotional values of the stakeholders, the Health Care Ethics Consultant 
can listen attentively and begin to determine potential resolutions.77 Consultants should 
always explain their role, explain the ethics question, and that the charge is to attempt to 
protect the rights and interests of all involved. They need to keep in mind that 
participation in the consultation by all parties is voluntary. Before the patient is visited, 
notification of the patient’s attending physician is mandatory, both as a courtesy and as 
an obligation, to ascertain if there are any medical considerations. Finally, after all 
information is brought together and verified, this information should be summarized in a 
clear and succinct manner for everyone’s benefit.78 
Step three in the CASES approach is to synthesize the data. After gathering all 
relevant information, ethics consultants should help resolve any remaining uncertainty or 
conflict by analyzing and synthesizing information into practical terms utilizing ethics 
knowledge.79 Next, consultants should determine whether the synthesis would be best 
accomplished by a formal meeting, a face-to-face discussion, or in less difficult situations 
telephone or email. If a formal meeting is utilized, it can be intimidating and fraught with 
challenges.80 If a formal meeting is deemed necessary, however, consultants should 
communicate with each stakeholder beforehand, allowing them to clarify and express 
their values.81 Furthermore, formal meetings require ground rules and the establishment 
of a goal for answering ethics questions. During synthesis, or the summary of the 
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consultation, the appropriate decision-maker needs to be guided within an ethically 
justifiable range.82 
The fourth step is to explain the written synthesis. All stakeholders should have a 
clear understanding of the completed synthesis. This can be accomplished by direct 
communication to the key participants. Documentation needs to be made in both the 
medical record and the consultation service record. Important information is thus 
communicated to involved staff and serves as an educational tool when placed in the 
medical record. The medical record note also promotes accountability and transparency.  
In the consultation service record, observations of dynamics, performance improvements, 
or any other appropriate comments regarding the consultation should be documented.83 
Step five, the final step, is to support the consultation process. This last step 
consists of a follow-up with the participants, a critical self-review, feedback from peers, 
and an assessment of the participants in the case. Such elements will aid significantly in 
the gleaning of information to help maintain an effective ethics consultation. Lastly, 
ethical issues needing addressing at a system-level needs to be brought to the appropriate 
individual or body.84 In this follow-up phase, it can become a complicated question as to 
which part or parts one must follow up; it may not be a clinical activity. Overlapping 
between methods and practices of an ethics consult can occur. Most often, however, the 
follow-up has traditionally ignored quality measures and the emphasis has been focused 
on the collection of data.85 
Effective ethics consultations are essential in providing quality ethics practices 
and patient care. By systematically working through a well-integrated process, the 
CASES approach offers a means to accomplish those ends. In clarifying requests, 
  133 
assembling the information, synthesizing that information, explaining the synthesis, and 
then finally supporting the process ensures the overall effective consultation process. 
Serving the needs of patients and families as well as staff and the institution with an 
ethical forum is a tremendous vehicle to improve patient care and to support an 
environment of mutual respect.86 
Of all of the steps in the CASES approach, the formulation of the ethical question 
is the most important aspect to guarantee a successful outcome. Visiting the patient and 
then listening to the family to better understand the values of the patient is often 
overlooked. Participation of the attending physician and appropriate consultants are 
necessary to accomplish goals. Families need the input of these health care providers. 
Feedback and self–reflection, even though mandatory, are often neglected. 87 
Briefly, presented are the goals, models, and steps to better understanding and 
appreciation of ethical decision-making and the Veterans Health Administration Systems 
methods utilized. 
B. Quality and Professionalism. 
Second, accomplishing quality and professionalism is a key to success of the 
ethics consultation. To that end, process standards along with certification and attestation 
are two fundamental elements in achieving quality and professionalism. 
1. Process Standards. 
To effectively have process standards, goals of a Health Care Ethics Committee 
and knowledge and evaluation areas have to be brought to light. 
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Goals of a Health Care Ethics Committee. 
Quality in health care is an overreaching goal of a Health Care Ethics Committee. 
Identifying and analyzing the ethical principles in question or the substance of the 
conflict enhances quality improvement. All resolutions should be done in a respectful 
atmosphere with all stakeholders’ interest taken into account. The Health Care Ethics 
Committee can aid in reaching the goal of promoting ethical norms by providing 
education about current and future ethical concerns. Clear standards have to be 
established to bring about quality in health care. To establish what quality in health care 
means, the Institute of Medicine gives a comprehensive definition: quality is defined as 
the proportion to which healthcare outcomes are increased while maintaining congruency 
with current practices.88 
Knowledge and Evaluation Areas. 
Regardless of the composition of the ethics consultation (e.g., individual, team, 
committee), the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities has determined six 
knowledge areas necessary for operating a successful Health Care Ethics Committee 
service.89 The first area of competency is moral reasoning and ethical theory including 
consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches, utilitarian and ontological 
approaches, natural law, communitarian, and rights theories. The second area deals with 
common bioethical issues and concepts such as patient rights, autonomy, paternalism, 
surrogate decision-making advance care planning. A third area is in health care systems 
that include managed care, organization and administration, institutional review boards, 
and relevant federal and state government systems. Knowledge of clinical context implies 
the understanding of terms and factors that influence the process of diseases, awareness 
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of the grieving process, familiarity with technology, and an understanding and 
appreciation of various services such as long-term care and hospice care. If not competent 
in this fourth area, the Health Care Ethics Committee would be hampered and unable to 
function effectively. 
Additionally, a fifth area is the knowledge of the local health care institution with 
its mission statement, structure, decision-making processes, and its clinical context. The 
sixth and final area is the ability to understand the beliefs of local patient and staff 
populations and perspectives. The knowledge of relevant codes of ethics and professional 
conduct guidelines and relevant health law are essential.90 Recognizing that different 
individuals bring different strengths, backgrounds, life experiences, and varying personal 
attributes, each individual consultant, team or committee should aspire to be proficient in 
these six areas.91 
While all of the process standards and core competencies are important, reflection 
and transparency are the most critical. Stagnation of the process can occur. Continual 
growth can only be accomplished through reflection–action. Additionally, a concerted 
effort to make all stakeholders aware of the availability of the Health Care Ethics 
Committee is needed. This awareness will also instill in the culture of a health care 
institution the positive benefits of Health Care Ethics Committee. 
It is essential that a Health Care Ethics Committee be evaluated because of the 
need to be accountable and to ensure common standards. This evaluation is critical to 
improve the performance of the organization. Simultaneously, evaluations contribute new 
knowledge and better ways to provide the ethics service in the future.92 Quality of 
assessment is broken down and evaluated in terms of structure, process, and outcomes.93 
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The first element requiring evaluation is structure. Structural elements of a Health Care 
Ethics Committee service consist of personnel, resources, environment, and the mode of 
documentation. Typical elements include: (1) to whom the Health Care Ethics Committee 
reports, (2) policies and procedures, (3) the number of individuals in the Health care 
Ethics Committee, (4) the members’ character and proficiency, (5) available time each 
member devotes to the service and (6) Management support.94 
Evaluating the quality of the Health Care Ethics Committee service with regard to 
structure has often met with limited emphasis due to the lack of standards. Veterans 
Health Administration Systems IntegratedEthics model offers tools to evaluate service. 
The most often voiced concern in evaluating a service from the structural perspective is 
the competency of the members of an ethics committee. Tools are available to aid in this 
area, such as the Veterans Health Administration Systems Ethics Consultation 
Proficiency Assessment Tool. Self-assessment, although convenient, may not lead to 
competency. Third-party involvement as well as peer evaluation may be viable options.95 
The second element requiring evaluation is process. The quality of the Health 
Care Ethics Committee process, or the relationship between the Health Care Ethics 
Committee service and the individuals served, likewise needs to be assessed. This 
assessment can be viewed as to the degree in which the established standards match 
actual practice. Standards commonly assessed include the following: (1) timeliness of 
response, (2) appropriateness of ethical concern, (3) notification of stakeholders, (4) 
interviewing and the gathering of appropriate knowledge, (5) determining the decision-
maker, (6) conducting moral deliberation and making decisions, (7) documenting and 
following up with stakeholders, and (8) determining system concerns.96 Using tools that 
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are available, collected data can help evaluate the quality of a Health Care Ethics 
Committee’s recommendations. By utilizing the collected data, an internal review of 
performance standards could be achieved. Additionally, participants could be asked to 
rate the service provided.97 
The third and final area needing evaluation is the Health Care Ethics Committee 
service outcomes, or the results of the service provided. Outcomes include benefits and 
burdens to both patients and staff. In need of outcome evaluation are four areas: 
ethicality, satisfaction, conflict resolution, and education. In the area of ethicality, it 
should be determined whether decisions were consistent with ethical standards. It is 
highly recommended by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities that a peer 
review or external raters evaluate this point. With regard to the area of satisfaction, 
several studies reporting the results of stakeholder surveys have shown an 
overwhelmingly positive satisfaction rate for the Health Care Ethics Committee service. 
Comparably, conflict resolution has met with overwhelmingly high ratings in surveys. 
Although a systematic evaluation has not been conducted in the area of education, it has 
been shown that education has offered new knowledge, has made participants more 
aware of ethical considerations, and has helped to clarify values. Because of ethics 
education, a positive impact has occurred on staff morale and an improvement in ethical 
awareness within the organization.98 
Access can be defined as the availability to the group that it aims to serve. To this 
end, all relevant parties must be encouraged and allowed to request Health Care Ethics 
Committee services. The perception of usefulness, the ability to access, convenience, and 
pleasantness must be paramount for Health Care Ethics Committee services to be 
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effective. Services cannot be perceived as punitive. Because of the perception of being 
punitive and the lack of awareness of the availability of Health Care Ethics Committee 
services, only a fraction of the cases involving ethical concerns are ever brought for 
ethics consultations.99 Evaluation of the access can be accomplished by looking at the 
sources of the consultations and by determining whether all areas seemed to have access 
to patients, families and staff. 
Efficiency is evaluated in terms of cost (money, time, and effort). Return on 
investment and cost effectiveness is increasingly a concern in health care. While the goal 
of ethics consultations should not be cost savings, neither should it waste resources. 
Given the limited resources available, standardization of the processes can lead to 
significant cost savings. One of the most important efficiency and cost savings of Health 
Care Ethics Committee services is in the area of identifying systems’ issues and 
education of potential sentinel events, as well as preventing unnecessary costs in the 
future.100 These three areas of quality, access, and efficiency are distinct ways of 
assessing ethics consultation services within a healthcare organization. 
Often, the evaluation of Health Care Ethics Committee services is non-existent or 
evaluation is only performed to answer questions such as “Will we get sued?” or “Will 
our health care institution make the ten o’clock news if we do ‘X’ or ‘Y’?” These two 
questions are all too often the driving force behind most evaluations, rather than “How 
might we improve the quality of our services?” Stakeholders, staff, patients, and families 
are rarely polled to determine satisfaction nor informally asked to provide feedback.101 
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2. Certification and Attestation. 
A discussion regarding certification requirements of consultants and an evaluation 
process needs to be discussed in a related manner.  
Certification Requirements. 
Ethics consultation training and recommendations for individual certification of 
health care consultants is now being proposed by a number of health care professionals. 
First, a formal training program should consist of standards and competencies necessary 
for ethics consultation. Secondly, supervised apprenticeship should include case 
consultations in which the apprentice serves as lead on several cases. The supervisor 
however would have authority to determine competency of the individual to perform 
ethics consultations. The training called for is one that requires Health Care Ethics 
Committee to participate in formal verifiable training program in bioethics. The Health 
Care Ethics Committee must possess knowledge in clinical medicine as well as bioethics. 
One must have training and proficiency in interpersonal skills such as facilitation, 
negotiation, and communication. In a formal training program, there should be written 
evaluations of the potential Health Care Ethics Committee as well as the potential 
consultants completion of a formal apprenticeship. 
Evaluation Process. 
Another way of establishing professionalism within the ethics community is 
attestation, the analysis of one’s ability to perform a Health Care Ethics Committee 
consultation. This review will evaluate consultants’ education, skills, and experience. 
Quality attestation is different than privileging within a healthcare organization and also 
different from formal board certification. Quality attestation falls between these two.102 
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 The need to establish clinical ethics consultation accountability and transparency 
has become a rather contentious subject. This community has been unable for decades to 
come to a consensus as to whether their work and the consultants themselves should be 
accountable.103 The Health Care Ethics Committee has largely been operating outside of 
regulations and oversight despite the gravity of their work. With findings showing that 
the Health Care Ethics Committees can place patients at risk, a growing outcry has been 
heard for some kind of standards for assessing knowledge, skills, and practice of clinical 
consultants. In this time of evolution in the health care industry, a significant need exists 
to establish quality standards for consultants who have privileges and responsibilities in 
providing care to patients. The clinical ethics consultants are called upon to help facilitate 
in a contentious, stressful and often emotional time. The Health Care Ethics Committee 
must be thoroughly trained in many areas and especially to avoid asserting their judgment 
or prejudice into emotional situations. The clinical ethics consultants’ authority is 
procured because of education and skill not by institutional appointment. 104 
The American Society put voluntary standards into place initially in 1988 for Bioethics 
and Humanities. These standards were knowledge and skills-based. Even though the 
standards may have been helpful in skill building and curriculum development for ethics 
committees, they have not significantly impacted the quality or consistency of ethics 
consultations. Thus, a task force was assembled to help determine the best way forward. 
The Quality Attestation Presidential Task Force has proposed a two-part model for 
evaluating ethics consultants against standards established by the American Society for 
Bioethics and Humanities. A collection of written work with an oral exam allowing the 
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assessment of consultants’ skills, experience, and ability to express themselves before a 
group of examiners is the model being proposed and currently being implemented.105 
 Portfolio review is the first step in the Quality Attestation Presidential Task Force 
evaluation procedures. The portfolio is used to help determine competency in a variety of 
clinical settings and for a range of ethical issues. It allows for a wide variation in 
bioethics knowledge, but the end result must be within parameters of the American 
Society for Bioethics and Humanities core competencies. The hope is that these 
portfolios will accommodate those who have learned ethics by doing and individuals who 
have formal ethical education. Also included in this portfolio is a curriculum vitae with 
copies of diplomas or evidence of completion of ethics training. It is expected that 
candidates have at least a master’s degree in a relevant discipline. In the portfolio a 
summary of Health Care Ethics Committee’s experience as well as a statement of 
philosophy must be included. A sample of six consultations with which individuals were 
intimately involved should also be included. Finally, three letters are required from 
people who are responsible for oversight of candidates’ working environment.106 After 
portfolios are reviewed and individuals are deemed competent, candidates will become 
eligible for an oral examination, which will be offered annually at the American Society 
for Bioethics and Humanities annual meeting.107 
 The area of attestation offers significant pause. If the goal of the Quality 
Attestation Presidential Task Force is to establish competencies and professionalism, then 
future members of the health care profession may choose not to participate. From one 
who has dealt with certification processes and the development of competencies, great 
care must be taken so that people are not discriminated against because of their 
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geographic location, size of their institution, or frequency of their consultations. Thus, 
this tedious attestation process appears to be heavily weighted in favor of large academic 
settings.108 
In sum, quality, and professionalism are assured with the implementation of the 
process standards and competencies. Additionally, setting minimum standards through 
certification and attestation will aid in the competencies of the ethics consultant moving 
forward. 
C. Case Analysis. 
Third, a final integral part of an ethics consultation is the creation of a patient case 
analysis. For clinical ethics and case analysis to be useful, one must start with as clear a 
perspective as possible. Integral to case analysis are constituents features and value 
judgments. 
1. Constituent Features. 
Medical indicators and patient preferences are factors that can cause significant 
angst for healthcare providers and patients. It is crucial that these two areas be considered 
to realize the overall goal of medicine: prevention, cure, and care. 
Medical Indicators. 
Medical indicators are facts about the patient’s condition that indicate what forms 
of treatments are appropriate. Medical indicators are the facts that describe the day-to-day 
work of clinical care. Beneficence and non-malfeasance are the ethical principles that 
guide these activities. Beneficence is the duty to bring improvement to the health of the 
patient and the non-malfeasance refer to those activities that prevent injury and reduce 
risk. Both of these principles combine to help assess the benefit/burden ratio.109 
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The “respect for persons principle” requires the physician to comply with the wishes of 
the adult patient even if the consequences are unfavorable.110 The two ethical principles 
of beneficence and non-malfeasance could support an opposite conclusion. Non-
malfeasance requires avoidance of harm while beneficence calls for maximizing benefits 
and minimizing harms. Respect for persons typically requires a physician to honor the 
patient’s preferences.111 
In the conventional medical model,112 five questions are asked to secure the medical 
indicators: (1) what is the medical problem, (2) what are the goals of treatment, (3) are 
there circumstances that medical treatment would not be indicated, (4) what is the 
likelihood of successful treatment and can harm be avoided, and (5) how will this patient 
be benefited.113 
Medicine is not abstract. Medicine deals with patients that present themselves 
with health issues. For clinical ethics to be effective one must start with as clear a 
perspective as possible. Patients should be playing an ever-greater role in the evolution of 
the doctor-patient relationship. There is a transition from the authoritarian physician to a 
model based on patient’s autonomy where patients are becoming customers, collecting 
more information, and want to be more involved in decision-making that impact them. 
The principle of “nothing about me without me” is becoming the more accepted 
practice.114 
Thus the term “patient-centered” care has become the new norm. The Institute of 
Medicine has defined patient-centered care as “care that is respectful of and responsive to 
individual patient preferences, needs, and values.”115 The most important aspect of 
patient-centered care is the involvement of patients when the patient arrives at a 
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crossroad of medical options. The key aspects of patient-centered care are respect for 
patient’s values, preferences, and expressed needs. In this approach clear information, 
education and alleviation of angst while involving family and friends are crucial 
components.116 
The comparative characteristics of the conventional medical model are provider-
centered, founded on the principles of beneficence and authoritarianism, and are typically 
disease–oriented. In this model, treatment is the main focus, while the patient’s 
perspective is often ignored. In contrast, the patient-centered model is founded on the 
principle of autonomy; it is patient-oriented and is focused on the importance of the 
patient and their outcomes. In this model, patient inputs are part of the decision-making 
and delivery of care, thus the physician and the patient share decision-making.117 
Rather than the five questions asked in the conventional medical model there are four 
interactive components to the patient-centered clinical method: (1) exploring the entire 
health experience: perceptions, history, and various aspects of illness experience (2) 
appreciation of the whole person: proximal and distal context, (3) searching for common 
ground: goals of treatment and roles of the physician and patient, and (4) enriching the 
patient-physician relationship: healing and hope.118 
One of the most important elements of patient-centered medicine is a full 
participation of patients in decision-making.119 Shared decision-making requires a 
significant change in the conventional model of the doctor-patient relationship. The 
patient is required to provide the doctor with preferences about the disease process and a 
well-informed patient is critical in the decision-making based on those preferences.120 
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Patient Preferences. 
The fundamental principle of all morality is respect for persons and that every 
person has value and dignity. The implication of this is personal autonomy, the right of 
people to follow their own plan of life. Parts of that plan are the patient’s preferences and 
choices that people make when facing decisions about health and medical treatment. 
Reflected in these choices are the patient’s personal experience, beliefs, and values.121 
In general, autonomy refers to the concept encompassing self-governance and 
self-rule. Within modern health care, autonomy has arguably been used ambiguously and 
inconsistently. Clarity occurs when the libertarian view of autonomy is adopted; which is 
associated with freedom from constraints and freedom of non-interference.122 Autonomy 
comprises the right of a person to choose alternatives for their own lives and to effect 
self-determination. Also implied is the responsibility of others to not interfere with the 
exercise of one’s own autonomy. Health care providers should provide the support and 
promotion of autonomy. Patients have interconnectedness and interdependencies with 
families, communities, and social relationships that need to be considered in the 
promotion of a patient’s autonomy.123 
From a Christian and Catholic perspective, autonomy is not absolute. One is 
obligated to use freedom wisely. To do the right and good thing, autonomy is necessary. 
The right and good thing means no self-destructive behavior, neglecting one’s medical 
care, or participating in a lifestyle that would be deleterious.124 But if one chooses any of 
these behaviors, the physician cannot impose duties upon the person. In contrast, 
paternalistic action limits the freedom to choose, intrinsic to being human and inherently 
violating the humanity of a person, a gift given by God.125 
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Health care providers need to explore with their patients the values that are 
important to them. It would be problematic to address concerns that are not shared by the 
patient. In light of patient–centeredness, there must be a strong inclination for patients to 
be allowed health-related practices that are most important to them. Health care providers 
must avoid forcing patients into pre-existing institutional molds.126 
A person is not autonomous when they are uninformed, deceived, manipulated, or 
coerced. Each is an obstacle to the exercise of autonomy. Because someone is not 
appropriately informed does not mean they do not have capacity but instead may not have 
appropriate knowledge and therefore unable to exercise autonomy.127 Beneficence and 
non-malfeasance are challenged when there is not appropriate informed consent.128 
Informed consent is a vital part of current medical practice; it has different meanings in 
varying situations. Informed consent can be used for different purposes: legal, ethical, 
and administrative. Legally, informed consent is the primary source of the protection of 
patient rights and a guiding ethical practice of medical care. Establishing the patient’s 
right to control what can be done to one’s body dates back the earliest 20th-century.129 
Additional obligations for physicians to disclose details about treatment emerged in the 
1950s with a reasonable “physician” standard requiring the disclosure of information 
customarily disclosed by physicians. In 1975, the American courts required disclosure to 
a patient who would want to know information in a similar situation, the reasonable 
“person” standard. Informed consent protects the patient against unwanted medical 
intervention and safeguards autonomy and self-determination.130 
Ethically, the purpose of informed consent is to ensure the treatment is respecting 
patient autonomy. The key is that decision-making is shifted away from the physician-
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centered model to a patient-centered approach emphasizing that informed consent is not 
an event but a process. Care must be taken to ensure patient comprehension, being 
cognizant of patient age, education, intelligence, cognitive function, and angst.131 
Administratively, the informed consent document ensures that a consent process has 
occurred. Stakeholders generally agree there are four basic elements for discussion 
regarding informed consent: the patient has capacity, the physician has disclosed enough 
detail for the patient to make an informed choice, the patient indicates understanding, and 
finally the decision-maker authorizes the procedure.132 
Many people are concerned that too little is left in the hands of the patient 
regarding informed consent. Concerns about understanding, too little information, and 
undue pressure from physicians are all valid. Thusly, patients should be helped and 
supported so that they can make good and sound decisions. If needed, patients should be 
confronted if their decisions are distorted or if they are not in compliance with their 
values. Promoting their values and helping to maintain their concept of good increases 
the respect for their autonomy.133 
2. Value Judgments. 
Quality of life can be difficult to define. Distinctions between quality of life are 
brought to the forefront to help express value judgments of the patient. Various 
contextual features that can influence the patient and physician are discussed. 
Quality of Life. 
Patient satisfaction reflects the principle of beneficence and respect for autonomy. 
The aim of a medical intervention is to produce patient satisfaction. Quality of life is the 
degree of satisfaction that the patient would experience. 134 While satisfaction is a value 
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judgment, it is important to provide some empirical basis using such measures as 
mobility, daily living activities, pain, social interaction, and mental acuity. Quality of life 
may be defined as multi-dimensional including social roles, physical and mental health, 
intellectual and social functioning, and overall well being and pain.135 The improvement 
of quality of life is a fundamental goal of medical care.136 The physician responding to a 
patient seeking medical attention because of their distress must respond by examining, 
investigating, and together deciding which of the aims give the greatest improvement of 
the patient’s quality of life. Together the patient and physician have to determine if the 
quality of life is desirable, attainable, and appropriate. 137 The perspectives on quality 
end-of-life care fall into the following five domains: adequate pain control, avoiding 
prolonging life, maintaining control, relieving any burden, and enhancing loved ones 
relationships. 138 
When an ethicist speaks of quality of life it can be a designation of one pole of an 
axiological line with quality of life at one end and sanctity of life at the other end. These 
concepts are used to determine whether human life is to be evaluated on the basis of its 
quality or if sanctity is irrelevant in decision-making about health care. At one end, 
absolute sanctity of life would require any means to save human life. A person would 
never be allowed to die regardless of the quality of life. A person’s life must be 
prolonged even if they were unable engage in any social interaction.139 A vitalist is one 
who holds the belief that physical life is the ultimate value.140 Few moralists have agreed 
with this position. However, some in health care approach this end of the spectrum even 
if medical intervention seems useless. At the other end of that ethical line is the argument 
that human life loses value based upon the argument that the strongest and the fittest are 
  149 
the only ones to merit health care. Few moralists have adopted this extreme position nor 
has health care. Sanctity of life and quality of life are both very important.141 
The Roman Catholic Tradition has rejected both of these extremes. The Church has 
recognized the sanctity of life, at the same time the importance of certain aspects of the 
quality of life.142 In the Church’s view, life never loses its value but it does allow for the 
benefits of continued living can be outweighed by the burdens of treatment. Allowing for 
the time when enough is enough and patients are allowed to die comfortably, with 
dignity, and where they want to die.143 
Developing the empirical basis to evaluate the value judgment of quality of life 
and to assess outcomes of clinical intervention has recently emerged. Evaluating quality 
of life is always related to providing appropriate medical care. Six questions are relevant 
to identifying and assessing how the quality of life can impact ethical dilemmas: (1) what 
are the chances of returning to normal life even if treatment succeeds, (2) what are the 
grounds for the judgment of quality of life for someone who cannot make such a 
judgment, (3) what are the biases that might influence the providers view of quality of 
life, (4) what are the ethical issues arising from enhancing a patient’s quality of life, (5) 
are there any questions raised regarding changes in treatment plans about the quality of 
life, and (6) are there plans of forgoing life-sustaining treatments.144 
Personal evaluation about one’s quality of life is based upon the ethics of personal 
autonomy. Quality of life can refer to personal satisfaction or may be referred to by an 
observer’s evaluation of someone else's quality of life. Observers often judge a life to be 
a poor quality while the one living the life considers it satisfactory or at least tolerable. It 
is then best that the patients express their own quality of life and when persons cannot 
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make their wishes known other should be extremely cautious in applying their own 
values.145 
An observer may have some standard that they consider desirable and the 
sufferer’s experience falls below that standard, making for a poor quality of life. 
If that were the case then again the patient must make their wishes known and 
observers must be cognizant of that human beings are adaptive. Quality of life also can 
change with time therefore; neither patients nor providers should make major decisions 
based on temporary conditions.146 
Finally, patients consistently rate their quality of life much higher than do the 
physicians who care for them. Physicians base their assessments on disease conditions 
while patients take into account nonmedical factors, personal relationships, finances, and 
social interaction.147 
Contextual Features. 
Medical decisions are not simply choices by two autonomous agents, the 
physician and the patient, but choices within the confines of contextual considerations. 
The considerations include proximal factors such as family, financial security, education, 
employment, leisure, and social support. The distal factors included are community, 
culture, economics, health care system, social historical factors, geography, media, and 
the ecosystem.148 
The assessment of the importance of all these contextual features is a crucial 
ethical task. Certainly the principles of beneficence and autonomy intersect at this 
juncture but the concept of justice and fairness has to be added and considered. In the 
  151 
clinical ethics environment, the most important justice related feature is fairness, the 
moral characteristic that guides transactions between individuals.149 
Of the four principles (beneficence/non-malfeasance, autonomy, utility and 
justice), justice is the most complex because it is a virtue and a principle. As a virtue, a 
trait of character, that is giving what is due each person. As a principle, rendering each 
their do and the treating like cases alike.150 The complexity stems from the fact that it has 
no mean. All people should possess fundamental dignity but being that humans are less 
than perfect, it is next to impossible to be “too just”. Distributive, commutative, and 
rectificatory are the three major elements of virtue of justice.151 
With commutative justice, individual good, the patient is deserving of respect 
from the physician. The physician should act on the basis of the patient's good. In the 
healing process attention must be given to the patient's value system. With regard to 
actions, the physician holds the patient's values “in trust”. To keep the patients needs and 
goals in focus can be a significant struggle requiring intelligence to do justice.152 
In honoring the patient’s autonomy, the autonomy of the physician can be 
compromised as a human being with personal values and beliefs. Demands that the 
physicians violate standards of care or violate a physician’s conscience in the name of 
autonomy of the patient are unfair. In certain domains, a growing attitude exists that the 
physician is just an instrument of the patient’s will and should leave personal morality 
behind. In fact the physician and the patient are moral agents, each deserving respect and 
justice requiring that neither impose their values on the other. It would be maleficent for 
either to violate each other’s autonomy.153 
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To ensure justice and fairness for the elderly, the following features should be 
kept in mind: (1) flexibility in the doctor-patient relationship would be kept intact and 
individual treatment plans would be allowed to continue, (2) all people with same 
categories of illness would have equal access to care, (3) defining the limits of care for 
specific conditions would require physician involvement, drawing on research and 
practical experience, (4) addressing increasing health care costs with some public control, 
(5) advance care-planning emphasis, and (6) increased emphasis on wellness and 
prevention rather than prolongation of life, an emphasis on quality of life.154 
Nowhere in medicine is there more a question of justice and fairness than in the area of 
medical technology and its use and misuse as interventions with the aging and dying 
patient.155 The use of medical technology does not equate to better care. It is not the 
technology but the care received that determines well-being. Personal control over the 
dying process is being lost.156 
Responsible use of power by the physician for the good of their patients is 
medical temperance. Avoiding underuse of technology and interventions with its 
subsequent abandonment of patients, or the overuse of technology and interventions with 
its prolongation of death, seeking the correct balance of interventions and outcomes 
would be responsible use of power. The temptation exists to use technology rather than 
give oneself in the healing process, a “technological fix”. The “technological fix” is 
generally much easier to conceive and implement than the process of true human 
interaction.157 
Secular justice is practical and methodical. Others are owed their due because we 
want our due in return. In this view, justice is an obligation of communal living. Thus by 
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compliance we can assure happiness for all. Conversely, in light of revelation, justice is 
transformed by Christian faith, having its deepest roots in love. By not doing justice we 
would relapse in self-interest, turning from the love of others to the love of self. In 
rendering Christian justice to others, their due is not only what is legalistically owed but 
also what is expected by love. Christian justice’s first principle is charity.158 
In the power of Christ’s healing, we are called to a special kind of love and 
justice. The awareness God’s call changes a profession into a vocation, a fidelity to 
justice transformed by charity. The Christian is called to a state of sanctity, to be perfect 
"as the father is perfect," and to cooperate with God in God’s work. The Catholic 
Christian is called on to help the less fortunate and expected to exercise a “preferential 
option” for the poor, the sick, the troubled, the oppressed, and the outcast.159 
IV. Conclusion of Chapters 2 and 3: Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious 
Directives. 
A. The Normativity of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Care Services. 
 To discuss the Normativity of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services requires examining two related topics: the different categories of 
Normative Catholic Teaching and the history of the Ethical and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Health Care Services. 
1. Different Categories of Normative Catholic Teaching. 
The Catholic Church, drawing on both faith and reason, strives to create an 
integral vision of the human vocation incorporating everything that is good in human 
activity. The Magisterium considers “science an invaluable service to the integral good of 
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the life and dignity of every human being.”160 Additionally, the Church desires to reach 
out to every human being that is suffering in mind, body or spirit bringing them comfort 
as well as light and hope.161 
To pursue this vision, the Catholic Tradition provides “authoritative teaching” 
through four kinds of magisterial statements, as codified in Canon Law. The four levels 
of authoritative teaching establish “the order of truths to which the believer adheres.”162 
They are: (1) truths taught as divinely revealed, (2) definitively proposed statements on 
matters closely connected with revealed truth, (3) ordinary teaching on faith and morals, 
and (4) ordinary prudential teaching on disciplinary matters. To aid in clarity, these four 
magisterial statements have been given the names: (1) definitive dogma, (2) definitive 
doctrine, (3) non-definitive, authoritative doctrine, and (4) prudential admonitions and 
provisional applications of church doctrine.163 
In the first category, “divinely revealed" or definitive dogma deals with truths 
contained in the word of God and which the Magisterium affirms to be divinely revealed, 
requiring the faithful to give obedience of faith. Examples of this category are the articles 
of the Creed, the Christological dogmas, and the Marian dogmas, the sacraments, the 
Real Presence, the existence of Original Sin, the immortality of the human soul, the 
inerrancy of Holy Scripture.164 
The definitive doctrines are not explicitly contained in the sacred deposit of 
Scripture and Tradition. They are rooted in the primary points of secondary truths which 
necessarily follow either logically or historically, and which are needed to expound them 
faithfully. St. John Paul II (d. 2005) explains that such truths are the result of the 
Church’s “deeper understanding” of her dogmas on faith and morals. These truths are 
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connected to divine revelation, illustrating the Holy Spirit’s inspiration for the Church’s 
deeper understanding of the truth concerning faith and morals. Although scripture is 
indispensable for morality, it does not necessarily provide concrete answers to current 
issues. Scripture must be supplemented by reason, tradition, and the magisterium 
otherwise it becomes a form of moral fundamentalism.165 In Catholic teaching, scripture 
is not read as an independent document.166 In this regard, Church tradition helps to 
interpret scripture. The more classical interpretation of this tradition is that the 
magisterial authority safeguards the “deposit of faith.” These truths are to be shown the 
assent of faith, but one technically distinguished as a “firm and definitive assent.”167 
The third category is ordinary teaching on faith and morals that spells out Christian 
doctrines. All these teachings on faith and morals are presented as true, even though they 
have not been defined infallibly with a solemn judgment or proposed as definitive by the 
ordinary magisterium. This category is called the “authentic magisterium.” The authority 
of the “authentic magisterium” is different from Papal Infallibility. Vatican I emphasized 
that infallibility belongs to Papal ex-cathedra teachings.168 This category of Church 
teachings encompasses the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services.169 
The fourth category for Magisterial teaching, “interventions in the prudential 
order,” or prudential admonitions and provisional applications of church doctrine would 
include any of the routine publications of the Holy See and Bishops in their diocese. The 
key element in this category is its contingency upon circumstances of time and place. The 
possibility of error at this level of teaching is stronger than any previous category.170  
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Each person must form a correct conscience based on moral norms. Conscience is 
the individual capacity to discern what is good to ascertain morally what action should 
occur. In Pope Francis’s exhortation, Amoris Laetitia, the Church has been called to help 
form conscience by church teaching. Conscience can recognize with "a certain moral 
security" what God is asking of individuals. The role of the conscience is paramount in 
moral decision-making reflecting the tradition that the conscience is the final arbiter.171 
The Church respects conscience as having a crucial role in moral discernment,172 as 
clearly expressed in Vatican II: “deep within his conscience man discovers a law which 
he must obey…his dignity lies in observing this law, and by it will be judged.”173 “It is 
through his conscience that man sees and recognizes the demands of divine law. He is 
bound to follow this conscience faithfully in all its activity. Therefore, he must not be 
forced to act contrary to his conscience.”174 Thus, man’s informed conscience is the final 
arbiter. Finally, the well-formed conscience will develop not only through knowledge of 
the moral teachings but also through the development of and the practice of the Virtue of 
Prudence. Prudence enables us “to discern our true good in every circumstance and to 
choose the right means of achieving it.”175 
In light of these categories of Church teachings, Papal Encyclicals have special 
significance. A Papal Encyclical is a letter written by the Pope to address moral, 
doctrinal, or disciplinary issues to the universal church. Encyclicals have become the 
standard means for popes to exercise their ordinary (not infallible) teaching authority. 
The Catholic faithful is morally obligated to comply unless their conscience prudentially 
prevents doing so. Several points can be noted regarding papal encyclicals: (1) they carry 
less authority than dogmatic pronouncements made infallibly (by the Pope ex-cathedra), 
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(2) because they do not contain infallible teaching, acceptance can theoretically be 
conditional (to respect prudential decisions of individual conscience), but in practice the 
faithful should usually comply, and (3) the theological issues examined are not 
considered to be closed.176 Many Papal Encyclicals have been used in the Ethical and 
Religious Directives to formulate Church teaching: Donum Vitae, Pacem in Terris, 
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, Gaudium et Spes, Humanae Vitae, and Veritatis Splendor. 
In the preamble of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services, reference is made to the emergence of moral principles expressing the Church's 
teaching on medical and moral matters that developed throughout the centuries. In a 
statement from the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Health and Health 
Care presented the theological principles that guide the churches vision of health care. In 
that statement, all Catholics are called to share in the healing mission of the church, offer 
encouragement, and make a full commitment to the health care ministry.177 Further, in the 
General Introduction, the laity is invited to a much more intense and broader field of 
ministries.178 To continue the church’s ministry of healing and compassion, by their 
baptism, the laity is called to participate in the health care mission.179 With new medical 
discoveries, coupled with technological developments and social change. Church leaders 
in consultation with medical professionals review and judge these developments 
according to the principles of right reason and revealed truth, as explained above. Hence, 
the Ethical and Religious Directives represent a form of normative Church Teaching, 
representing the ordinary magisterium of the Church, in this case, the United States 
Bishops insofar as their teachings are consistent with universal Church teaching in the 
Papal encyclicals, (as mentioned above).180 
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2. History of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Heath Care 
Services. 
The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services have 
history dating back to 1921 when the first set of medical ethical norms were compiled. 
These first directives did not consider scriptural and theological teaching. A more 
inclusive uniform set of directives was published in 1948 that was approved by a majority 
of dioceses in the United States. With expanding medical technology and theological 
clarification, subsequent versions came to fruition 1956, 1971, 1994, 2001, and our 
current (5th edition) directives promulgated in 2009. The sixth edition, dealing with issues 
of forming new partnerships, will likely be promulgated in 2018.181 
Because of collaboration among the Bishops, Catholic health care leaders, 
medical professionals, theologians and ethicists, and the Holy See, the Ethical and 
Religious Directives have been the touchstone for authoritative guidance and ethical 
standards in health care in the United States. These directives constitute the normative 
authority of the authentic and ordinary magisterium of the Church. Moreover, these 
directives developed by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops have been 
recognized internationally as constituting ethical standards of behavior in health care and 
as providing guidance on moral issues that face Catholic health care.182 
Two issues related to potential bias can arise regarding the normativity of the 
Ethical and Religious Directives. First, because they are designed for Catholic health care 
in the United States, they necessarily reflect that perspective. In contrast, different 
approaches to health care elsewhere in the world may have different priorities and 
perspectives. Hence, the normative teachings therein may not be relevant elsewhere in 
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other national jurisdictions; that is for other national Conferences of Bishops to 
determine. In fact however, the United States Ethical and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Health Care Services have had a significant influence on the development of 
other forms of health care ethical directives by different Conferences of Bishops. Second, 
the United States Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services bear 
the normative authority of the authentic Magisterium of United States Bishops. There is a 
form of bias here insofar as the Ethical and Religious Directives intentionally do not 
adopt the entire theological discussion by Catholic moralists around the topics discussed. 
Those debates will continue and over time impact the continuing development of future 
versions of the Ethical and Religious Directives. This point is explored further in the next 
section where the normative foundation of Natural Law is discussed. The moral stances 
in the Ethical and Religious Directives revolve around different interpretations of the 
Natural Law. On the one hand, the conservative stance of the United States Bishops and 
some Catholic ethicists typically reflects an approach that emphasizes the role of nature, 
adopting a universal perspective. On the other hand, the more progressive stance of many 
Catholic ethicists typically reflects a different but not contradictory approach that 
emphasizes the role of persons, adopting a more historical perspective. The next section 
explores these different yet compatible approaches to Natural Law in Catholic Teaching. 
B. The Natural Law Approach. 
Natural Law has two general approaches, the focus on Nature as Universal as 
articulated by the traditional approach of the Church’s Magisterium and the second 
approach, the focus on Person as Historical as argued by the progressive approach in 
Catholic moral theology. These two approaches are not necessarily contradictory. In the 
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analysis that follows an explanation of the traditional approach to Natural Law is 
presented in a manner that can be aligned with the progressive interpretation of Natural 
Law. This alignment of both interpretations of Natural Law can be especially helpful for 
resolving ethical dilemmas in health care as discussed in the Ethical and Religious 
Directives. 
One approach is referred to as “Natural Law according to nature” and the other 
approach is described as “Natural Law according to reason.” The former approach 
focuses upon human nature as a physical reality, presenting a static and universal view of 
the human condition based on biology. This static approach has been referred to as 
physicalism. Physicalism considers “man regarding distinct faculties, each created by 
God with a particular goal or purpose, defined regarding the physical stature of the 
faculty.”183 This approach emphasizes the physical properties of actions. The physical act 
of the structure is what determines whether a behavior is correct or not, with 
intentionality secondary.184 
The latter approach focuses on the human person, presenting a dynamic and 
historical view of the human condition as contributors to God’s creation.185 
At times the discussion of Natural Law can place these two approaches in opposition to 
each other, opting for one or the other. In this scenario, the person- oriented or historical 
approach to Natural Law can be construed as being in opposition to Church teaching that 
adopts the nature-oriented or universal stance. Such a direct opposition to Church 
teaching is not pursued in this dissertation insofar as Catholic health care accepts Church 
teaching and seeks to apply it with flexibility. By doing so, Catholic health care tries to 
combine the nature-oriented and person-oriented approaches to Natural Law. This is done 
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by discussing how traditional teaching can be extended in new ways to emerging 
technologies, looking at ways in which doctrine may be developed in a legitimate 
manner. This approach is adopted in this analysis and explained in the applied chapters of 
the dissertation. 
However, it can be helpful to understand what the discussion of Natural Law from 
the traditional perspective of Catholic teaching means. At the heart of the traditional 
view, Natural Law is the “formal principle” that one should pursue what is good and 
avoid what is bad. This is a principle of practical rationality, indicating it is rational to 
pursue something as good and to avoid something that is bad. Nonetheless, this formal 
principle does not provide practical criteria to ascertain what is good.186 In this stance that 
is, there is no single criterion for goodness.187 
This focus upon human goods is at the heart of traditional approach to Natural 
Law. This stance indicates there are basic goods that are intrinsic aspects of human well-
being. This interpretation provides a theoretical foundation for Church teaching.188 This 
theory is based on the proposition that man sets out to secure things that he perceives to 
be good for him.189 In this context moral norms and principles are practical and rational 
distinct from desires and feelings.190 While human acts are influenced by feelings, 
emotions, and imagination, the basis upon which people act is the rationally perceived 
benefits of their actions.191 According to this theory, moral reason seeks something that 
will provide a benefit regarding human well-being and fulfillment.192 At the core of this 
theory is the need to respect ‘basic human goods’ as the basis for moral action.193 These 
basic goods can be categorized in a manageable way.194 For example, John Finnis in his 
book Natural Law and Natural Rights classifies them as life (and health), knowledge, 
  162 
play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and 
religion.195 
One of these basic goods that are crucial for morality is practical reasonableness 
that generates moral principles to guide moral judgment and action. The requirements for 
practical reasonableness help us to establish criteria and standards for moral judgment.196 
The requirements of practical reasonableness include the following. The first is a 
“rational plan of life.”197 One must have a structured set of purposes to which one should 
commit and which guides him through life, one must look at life as a whole and make 
discernments accordingly.198 Secondly, no basic human value can be left out, discounted, 
or exaggerated. A reasoned plan of life should neither devalue nor overvalue any aspect 
of the basic forms of human excellence.199 Thirdly, any human being can participate in 
the basic human good. Just as there is a reasonable capacity for self-preference, so also 
one has no reasonable cause to deny continuity, longevity, awareness, prosperity, or 
creativity to anyone.200 The famed Golden Rule propagated in Jewish and Christian moral 
tradition, accompanied by the moral appeal of sacred history, should be the standard to 
which we show proper respect to others.201 The fourth is detachment. Changing 
circumstances, relations, and opportunities impact our lives not allowing us to complete 
projects, sustain relationships, or fully recognize our opportunities. Therefore, an 
appropriate detachment is required to maintain a healthy balance.202 The fifth requirement 
is commitment, which strikes an important balance between fanaticism and abdication.203 
The sixth requirement is “relevance of consequence: efficiency, within reason.”204 This 
requirement demands that good must be sought by not wasting opportunities. However, 
making this requirement exclusive is irrational and thus immoral.205 The seventh 
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requirement of practical reasonableness is “respect for every basic value in every act.”206 
This suggests that one should never do anything that of it causes damage to or impedes 
other forms of human good.207 The eighth requirement is “the requirement of the 
common good.”208 This requirement holds that all basic goods are an aspect of the 
common good. The common good is “a set of conditions which enables the members of a 
community to attain for themselves objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the 
values for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively 
and negatively) in a community.”209 Following one's conscience is the ninth requirement. 
This requirement is quite distinctive in that one should not do what one assesses should 
not be done. In sum, practical reasonableness is not merely an apparatus to make morally 
correct judgments, but also a way of personal well-being.210 
 Coalescing these requirements of practical reasonableness fosters morality 
whereby basic human good flourishes.211 The theory of Natural Law theory is 
philosophically grounded in reason, rather than theology. Nonetheless, the theory 
presents a cogent foundation for Church teaching that relies on Natural Law, including 
Church teaching on health care ethics.212 Natural Law theory has remained the 
philosophical tradition of the Catholic Church.213 The most challenging contemporary 
health care problems are addressed in Church teaching by Natural Law to urge respect for 
the basic rights and the equality-in-dignity of each patient, even the most vulnerable.214 
 It was indicated earlier the traditional approach to Natural Law, as explained 
above based on the requirements of practical reasonableness, is the basis for the focus on 
nature that undergirds the teaching of the Catholic Church on morality. Now it is worth 
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noting that the historical approach to Natural Law that focuses on the person need not be 
in opposition to the traditional stance. 
Advocates of the personal approach acknowledge the physical and biological 
aspects of being human, but they assign significant weight to the personal, spiritual, and 
social concerns as being crucial for a sound understanding of the common good.215 This 
integral approach recognizes the historic character of morality.216 For example, Louis 
Janssens argues, “Ethics is fundamentally a way of living and in its growth must keep 
step with human life itself as it unfolds through history. That is precisely what we mean 
when we say that it must be dynamic, like human life itself which it directs and leads.”217 
In the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services where Catholic 
moral theology is applied to dilemmas in health care, there appears to be alignment of 
these two approaches to Natural Law. This combination of the nature-oriented and the 
person-centered approaches to Natural Law is effectively expressed in the classical 
principle of double effect.218 This principle seeks to avoid intending actions that are 
deemed to be intrinsically disordered (reflecting the focus on nature) while permitting 
these actions to occur as side effects of another permitted action (reflecting the personal 
or historical approach that deals with practical circumstances). Here, a justified moral act 
should never be separated from intention: provided there is no intention to perpetrate 
intrinsically disordered action (that may occur as an unavoidable side-effect), those 
actions can be permitted based on the good action that is intended.219 The classical 
illustration is the cancerous pregnant womb: causing the death of a fetus is an 
intrinsically disordered and morally forbidden action if intended; yet it is permissible as a 
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side-effect (via hysterectomy) that is unavoidable and unintended to save the life of the 
mother.220 
This flexible approach to Natural Law that combines the nature-oriented and the 
person-oriented perspective is part of a broad view of morality in Catholic teaching. The 
Catholic stance combines scripture, tradition, reason, and experience, as well as the 
magisterial teaching authority, as sources of moral knowledge to help answer the 
question: “How ought we, who have been gifted by God, to live.”221 
 C. Critical Framework of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services to be Used in the Applied Chapters.  
 In the subsequent analysis, the normative teaching of the Ethical and Religious 
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services is applied to the practical chapters, 
especially by considering the principle of double effect as combining the nature-oriented 
and personal-oriented approaches to Natural Law. Additionally, each main section will be 
evaluated as to which category it applies: A. Settled Issues in Church Teaching, B. 
Controversial Issues Eligible for Using the Principle of Double Effect, or C. Issues 
Requiring Doctrinal Development.
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Chapter 4. Reproductive Technology. 
Reproductive technology raises fundamental questions about the normative 
framework of propagation. To adequately discuss reproductive technology requires 
examining four related topics: embryo and personhood, stem cell technologies, prenatal 
testing, and newborn screening. 
I. Embryo and Personhood. 
The relation between embryo and personhood integrates prenatal status and 
personhood with an accompanying ethical framework. 
A. Embryo: Prenatal Status. 
 First, a consideration of the prenatal status of the embryo engages two 
foundational issues: the meaning of essence and the problem of dualism. 
1. Essence. 
The embryo’s essence will be viewed from the perspective of essentialism with a 
biological viewpoint. When considering the personhood perspective of the embryo’s 
essence, a sentience view will be applied. 
Essentialism and Biological View. 
Essentialism maintains that humans are essentially persons and could not exist 
without being a person at any given time.1 A person is a being with the capacity of 
consciousness that is manifested in complex forms such as reasoning, self-awareness, and 
intentional actions.2 One would not survive if that person were in an irreversible coma; 
the organism that continues breathing is not you.3 There is implication within 
essentialism that one was never a newborn.4 Another aspect of this essentialism is mind 
essentialism, claiming that humans are essentially minds.5 Possessing mental life is 
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necessary for identity.6 When a human being has the capacity for conscious awareness is 
when they begin to exist in all ways that matter. This usually occurs mid-gestation,7 
implying that we were never pre-sentient fetuses.8 In the biological view, we are either 
human or animal organisms and come into being whenever the organism does. The 
organism persists as long as there is biological life.9 It is easy to assume that the person 
originates at conception. Because of the ability for the embryo to divide into two, forming 
twins up to two weeks after conception, creates the possibility that human beings 
originate at different stages.10 Cell differentiation begins at the 16-cell stage. Up to that 
point there is no specialization of cells performing distinct tasks.11 They do not function 
as a single, integrated organism. This view maintains that life begins between the 16-cell 
stage and the two-week twinning potential time.12 
  Personhood and Sentience View. 
The blastocyst (mammalian embryo) has personhood because of its qualities that 
give rise to moral worth. The blastocysts have the potential to become a person and 
therefore have the same moral value as a person.13 The first argument for moral 
equivalency is because of the core biological similarity; each has a human genome.14 
Even though the blastocysts are not conscious, does not have the ability to experience its 
surroundings, it does not feel pain but it does have human DNA. Human developmental 
stages are irrelevant to their moral worth.15 All living things have interests grounded in 
biological needs. If they are damaged or killed, that would be deleterious.16 
In the sentience view, all sentient beings are capable of having feelings and that 
can be aided or harmed, are of direct moral concern.17 Not only humans have moral status 
but also some living things have it.18 Some nonpersons have moral status because of the 
  180 
actions of moral agents affecting their quality of life thus they can be benefited or 
harmed. Not all living things have moral status, they have no subjective experience and 
no quality of life.19 The sentience view has some advantages. One can explain why not 
only human persons but also sentient non-persons have moral status and should not be 
exploited or harmed.20 It is very easy to reconcile with our intuitions about moral harms 
and benefits, partly accommodating the personhood view. Holding that all beings have 
moral status and that human beings have special moral status.21 The sentient view 
connects well with consequentialism and with rights theories as well.22 
2. Dualism. 
In this section, types of dualism will be discussed as well as discussing animalism 
and how animalism can give us a true account of our nature. 
Types of Dualism. 
Dualism has a variety of forms: they are either ontological or metaphysical. Both 
of these are concerned with what really exists, while morality is concerned with how we 
should act.23 All forms of metaphysical dualism commonly hold a classification of which 
we are identical.24 In soul-body dualism advocated by Plato, the soul preexisted and did 
not entirely become corrupted by the body and would continue to live immortally. Our 
soul was our true nature and was opposed to the needs and desires of the body.25 
Descartes advocated for the mind-body dualism arguing there are two substances: the 
body or the mind. He concluded the true person is thinking and the body is closely 
aligned. The mind and body are of different nature.26 In Lockean dualism, a person is a 
thinking, intelligent being. Persons exist as separate entities from their bodies and only 
come to exist when capable of reason and reflection.27 In constitutionalism, persons are 
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distinct and different from their bodies. In its early stages the body is not a person. A 
person is distinct from its constituting animal. Humans differ from non-human animals. 
Only humans are moral agents. If a human were identical to an animal, then the manifest 
discontinuity between humans and nonhuman animals would be within biology.28 In 
moral dualism, personhood is a stage from which humans can come and go. Personhood 
can be socially bestowed or comes at a certain time with cognitive awareness. In this 
view, the human comes into being at the embryonic stage but is not worthy of moral 
respect.29 All these views of dualism can be shown to be untenable.30 
Animalism. 
Animalism justifies that the vast majority of us (exception of twinning) began to 
exist at conception.31 The human embryo is from the start distinct from its origins, mother 
or father. Its growth is not directed by external forces but internally to survive and 
mature.32 The embryo has genetic makeup that is characteristically human. Though 
immature, it is a complete whole organism.33 At the point of conception a new and 
distinct individual came into being as a complete living organism.34 Animalism is how 
we experience ourselves and interact with other people and the world. We experience 
ourselves as bodily beings. Animalism gives us a true account of our nature.35 By virtue 
of the human entity, developing in stages at which capacities will be exercisable, human 
beings develop in due course and eventually mature to be full members of their species.36 
Persons are entitled to moral respect from the beginning of their existence and should not 
be killed in the zygotic, embryonic, or fetal stage and should not be reduced to disposable 
research material due to their moral status.37 
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B. Personhood. 
Second, the debate on personhood revolves around two opposing views: the 
secular and religious. 
1. Secular View. 
In the secular view, the embryos personhood will be evaluated from the time of 
fertilization with a fourteen-day viewpoint. When considering potentiality of embryos, 
discussion will view the embryos as a group of human cells. 
Fertilization. 
At the time of fertilization, a unique genotype is established which determines its 
organization and its direction. The fertilized egg, which has genetic code, will determine 
all subsequent cell division.38 That genetic code is set when the zygote is formed 
constituting the unique individual human.39 An individual entity is formed at the time of 
fertilization with the newly constituted genome that directs multiplication of cells, 
development, and differentiation.40 The same living being organizes itself into the 
different stages of development: embryo, fetus, infant, child, and adult.41 The President’s 
Council on Bioethics has stated several arguments that pre-embryos are persons.42 The 
first argument maintains there is identity between a pre-embryo and the adult from that 
particular pre-embryo. This is based on the continuity of development process. The 
conclusion from the argument is personhood begins with fertilization because there is no 
point during development that the organism changes from non-person to person.43 An 
additional argument is from substantial identity. The argument holds that at all stages of 
development the organism possesses human being characteristics and that all human 
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beings deserve full respect. The pre-embryo is a human being, thus it deserves full moral 
dignity.44 
In the fourteen-day view, not all fertilized eggs become individual human beings. 
Zygotes develop because of their interaction with other cells and environmental cues not 
just the genotype. The genetic makeup of the zygote does not establish the human 
individual because of potential for twinning or multiples.45 A blastocyst, being one 
individual containing two sets of genes, suggests the genes alone do not determine 
individual identity. More than one sperm can penetrate the egg fertilizing it but never 
developing, therefore that cannot be an individual human being.  Zygotes can be absorbed 
or stop developing suggesting they cannot be human beings. There is evidence that 75% 
to 80% of the early embryos die.46 With this rate of mortality, the acceptance that these 
are all human beings becomes very problematic.47 Proponents of the fourteen-day view 
hold that the zygote becomes biologically stable at about fourteen days. The cells begin 
to function and twinning can no longer occur. There is the appearance of the primitive 
streak, the development of specialized tissues and systems become distinct at this stage of 
development as well.48 Thus this group maintains that embryonic stem cells can be 
removed prior to the fourteenth day because they are not individual human beings 
constituting personhood.49 Many of this group argues that certain moral consideration and 
respect are due the early human embryo before day fourteen.50 The emergence of the 
primitive streak represents a milestone in development. As a developing form of life, the 
pre-implantation embryo deserves serious moral consideration.51 
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Potentiality. 
In the potentiality view, it is argued that the zygote is not an individual human 
being, but a potential human being. The potentiality argument contends that even though 
embryos do not possess properties now, they will potentially develop.52 If the embryo has 
potential to be a person with the right to life then that right of life should be extended to 
any stage that the embryo will go through.53 The argument is that one type of creature 
will change and has moral properties. Those moral properties pass from the first form as 
it progresses to another form. Potential is not an inherent property, but a projection on the 
future state of a current entity that may or may not come to fruition.54 Proponents of this 
view argue that the zygote (embryo) and the fetus deserve protection from destruction.55 
The zygote, by virtue of its biological constitution, has the potential to develop into an 
individual human. It maintains this potential even if the supportive environment that 
surrounds it is not sufficient to maintain life.56 Moral significance is granted to the zygote 
because it has the power to become an individual human being.57 To use it in research 
would be wrong because that would be preventing it from realizing its potential.58 In the 
group of human cells view, the early embryo is a group of cells clustered together with no 
differentiated cells or tissues. There is no complexity or integrated functioning of the 
cells. The inner cell mass is just a group of cells clustered together.59 Developmental 
potential is assigned only to entire cells and depend on the interaction of the nucleus and 
cytoplasm. Some argue totipotency is of relevance only if it is a property of a single cell 
in deference to a group of cells.60 The early embryo has not developed the primitive 
streak and thus is not a unique integrated individual. Maintaining that just because the 
early embryo has potential to become something is significantly different than being 
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something.61 Using embryos for stem cell research is no different than using any other 
sort of biological material for research. The early embryo does not warrant any more 
respect and rights because it has no capacity for suffering or consciousness is the 
consensus have most attributed to this view.62 
2. Religious View. 
 Catholic historical tradition and current views of religious traditions will be 
engaged to shed light on the controversy of personhood of early embryos. 
Catholic Tradition. 
Exodus 21:22–25 are a starting point for the view of moral significance of the 
early embryo in the Catholic historical tradition: 
When men have a fight and hurt a pregnant woman, so that she suffers a 
miscarriage, but no further injury, the guilty one shall be fined as much as 
the woman’s husband demands of him, and he shall pay in the presence of 
the judges. But if injury ensues, you shall give life for life, eye for eye, 
tooth for tooth, and hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for 
wound, stripe for stripe (Exodus 21:22-25, NAS). 63 
 
This passage supports the protection of the embryo and fetus.64 Aristotle, the first to study 
the development of the anatomy, believed that a man’s sperm reacted with a woman’s 
blood in her womb causing it to develop into a living being. He maintained that the early 
embryo was unformed until the soul enters and shapes that matter.65 Many key 
theologians in early Catholic moral tradition viewed the embryo as not formed and not 
human until it reached gender-related points. Therefore, the unformed embryo’s 
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destruction did not involve killing a human being.66 Augustine followed Aristotle in 
thinking that the progression of life in the womb started as a vegetative existence with an 
animal soul and finally the human soul with complete moral value. He did struggle with 
delayed ensoulment but chose not to delve too deeply into when this occurred67. 
Augustine thought it wrong to destroy the unformed embryo because it avoided 
procreation. In Augustine’s thought, it was sinful to destroy the unformed embryo but it 
was even a more grave sin to destroy the later formed embryo, which amounted to killing 
a human being.68 St. Thomas Aquinas did not view the destruction of the early embryo 
equivalent to homicide but that ensoulment occurred at the time the embryo resembled 
human form. Destruction of the embryo after the point of ensoulment was considered 
homicide.69 After the Protestant Reformation, Luther did consider it reprehensible to 
destroy the fetus. Calvin took more direct approach maintaining ensoulment occurred at 
conception therefore life began at that point. After the scientific revolution, ensoulment at 
conception was given greater credence supported by the Catholic Churches affirmation of 
the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. If Mary was without sin from her conception 
then ensoulment occurred at the time of conception.70 
Current Views of Religious Traditions. 
The current views of religious traditions will now be articulated to get a clear 
picture of the view of the personhood status of the early embryo. The Roman Catholic 
Tradition remains faithful to the theological and ethical conviction that the early human 
embryo is a human being.71 In the Eastern Orthodox tradition, whether in situ or in vitro 
zygote, affirms the sanctity of life at all stages of development.72 Protestant traditions 
have varying views of the moral significance the early embryos, with the Southern 
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Baptist Convention agreeing with the Roman Catholic Tradition. While others have taken 
a more liberal view in adopting the fourteen-day view and are amenable to stem cell 
research.73 The Talmud, the Koran, and other sacred scriptures offer little insight into the 
question of personhood.74 Scholars of other traditions take opposing views with regard to 
the viability and ensoulment of early embryos.75 
C. Ethical Framework. 
Third, an ethical framework has developed around the above discussions on the 
prenatal status and human personhood. This framework revolves around theological-
based frameworks and discussion on spirituality and humanity. 
1. Theologically-based Framework. 
Three competing ethical frameworks regarding stem cells will need to be 
discussed in a related manner: the embryo protection and human protection along with 
the future wholeness framework. 
Embryo Protection and Human Protection Framework. 
The bioethical principle utilized in the embryo protection ethical framework is 
non-malfeasance. Ethically framing the stem cell debate as a matter of avoiding doing 
harm.76 The first assumption against stem cell research from the embryo protection 
framework is that the embryo, from the moment of conception, has moral status. This 
applies to zygotes both in vivo and ex vivo.77 At conception our origin determines our 
individuality, our dignity, and moral protectability. At the moment of conception three 
things meet: the mothers egg, the father sperm, and a newly created soul.78 Ensoulment is 
not physical but metaphysical. When a unique genome and a unique embryonic 
individual are established then the embryo is ready for ensoulment and deserving of 
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dignity.79 Secondly, to harvest the stem cell requires the destruction of an embryo thus 
implying the destruction of the human person.80 The third assumption is moral status in 
the laboratory. The embryo, ex vivo or in vivo, has equal moral status to any human thus 
forbidding destruction.81 Human protection framework’s essence is to protect humanity 
against the forces of technology. The opponents of stem cell research utilizing this 
framework assume an elevated place for nature. They want nature accepted as it is with 
all its vulnerabilities.82 Three pillars are utilized to uphold the human protection position: 
“anti-playing God,” “wisdom of repugnance,” and “neonaturalism.” Unbridled 
technological advance and “playing God” are contrary to nature.83 Genetic techno-
science alienates us from belonging to nature and dehumanizes thus sounding a moral 
alarm to the potential harms of unnatural intervention. The fundamental concern of the 
pillar of “wisdom of repugnance” position is the potential harm. With neonaturalism, 
technology threatens to denaturalize humanity. In both religious and secular there is a 
threat to our humanity because of biotechnology.84 
Future Wholeness Framework. 
Medical benefits and the vision of what humanity can and should be is the driving 
force for the future wholeness framework. What is envisioned is not only physical 
healing but also abundant life, a transformed future.85 In this framework not pursuing 
stem cell research, with its potential for relieving suffering and enhancement of 
humanity, would be immoral.86 With the justice issue, supporters within this group agree 
that universal access is a moral imperative. A central ethical issue of distributive justice is 
the inability of most to access new research and therapies.87 Not only does this group 
utilize the ethical principle of beneficence but also from the religious perspective of a 
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response to God’s call. God’s will is affirmed by the drive for stem cell research. 
Supporting science is an act of stewardship. Humans are called to be co-creators. We 
have been called to be creative transformers and good stewards of the God-given talents 
bestowed on us.88 
2. Spirituality and Humanity. 
The Spiritual Soul and Human Dignity will be discussed to further illuminate 
what is at stake in stem cell research. 
Spiritual Soul 
 The Spiritual Soul refers to the inner most essence of an individual. The soul 
connotes who each of us is, a centered self. Our soul becomes immortal because of our 
relationship to God. Our soul is forma substantials, a spiritual and an immaterial thing.89 
The soul resides within the body but the soul itself is not a body. The soul is where our 
identity resides. The soul does not come from eternity; the soul begins when the body 
begins. A brand-new soul is created for each individual human. The soul lasts forever but 
it has a beginning.90 The soul involves concepts of great complexity going beyond 
anything that we are able to treat with adequacy or precision. The soul has a dynamic and 
developing character. As one gains new insights and memories the “real person” grows 
and develops; there is an unchanging component of the soul, the personal signature that 
guarantees identity. A portion of unchanging dimension of the soul is the individual 
genome.91 The spirit is our ability to relate with God and our fellow man. It is the 
dimension that unites us with others. The spirit reminds us that we are in relationship 
with others as well as being connected to something bigger than ourselves.92 Moral 
personhood is necessary and sufficient only after ensoulment. Ensoulment picks out the 
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moment in which the soul is first united to the body. The fetus becomes a person at the 
moment when it becomes a composite of body and soul. The soul is the seat of both self 
and agency.93 The question of ethics, intersecting with theology regarding stem cell 
research, is determined when is the moment of metaphysical ensoulment, when the 
Spiritual Soul is implanted.94 
Human Dignity. 
 Some would argue that Human Dignity requires possession of a group of 
capacities. Humans do not require a fixed number of capacities to be given dignity. They 
do need some of these capacities but not all. Even those that might be disabled or with 
limited capacities and might develop these in the future deserve protection and treated 
with dignity.95 To further exacerbate the concern of human dignity is in the mingling of 
bodily materials from differing living beings. The question is the transferring of certain 
human stem cell materials to nonhuman hosts. The concern becomes the ethical issue of 
stem cell studies that would create human-nonhuman chimeras that would question the 
necessity of deserving Human Dignity.96 
Dignity plays the role of protector. Dignity refers to our inherent value and cannot 
be reduced to ones instrumental worth. Thus we are always worth more than our 
possessions or functions. The person is never just a means; they are always an end. As 
Kant would argue from his formula of humanity, treating people as a means to an end 
rather than as an end in themselves is not acceptable. He argues that all humans must be 
treated as ends in themselves and conception is responsible for the beginning of a person 
thus deserving recognition.97 That intrinsic value is what makes up Human Dignity. The 
question is whether dignity is intrinsic or conferred. It is both. Theologically, we believe 
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that God confers human dignity and because God has treated us with dignity we can 
confer it to others.98 
II. Stem Cell Technologies and In Vitro Fertilization. 
The previous section on the personal or “ensouled” status of the human embryo 
raises significant ethical issues for human embryonic stem cells and in vitro fertilization. 
The most intense debates engage three related topics: the relevance of personhood, the 
resourcing of stem cells, and in vitro fertilization used for embryo health. 
A. Relevance of Personhood. 
First, the relevance of personhood in the debate on stem cell technology engages 
two foundational issues: the secular view and the Catholic view. 
1. Secular View. 
Within the secular view of personhood two topics need to be discussed: the 
discord in definitions and the utilitarian view. 
Discord in Definitions 
A consensus on the definition of personhood has not been achieved. Various 
criteria are debated in the literature for determining personhood, from physical 
development to mental capacities. Some hold that human personhood is synonymous 
with human DNA, which means that personhood would begin at conception. In defining 
personhood, an “identity problem” exists. Comprising this term is a number of distinct 
yet interrelated issues. What is it that makes me a single person persisting through time 
with a single identity? Is it my body or is it my mind? At what point does one begin to be 
a person, and can a fetus or severely demented individual really be described as one? 
Adopting a biological-based approach is one way to approach the identity problem. In 
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this approach, it is asserted that one persists through time as a single human individual 
due to the singularity of one's human body. Even if an individual may be said to be a 
different person over time, one’s biological identity is what is most important.99 
Utilitarian View. 
At the utilitarian end of the spectrum, personhood would begin only with one’s 
ability to value one’s own life. Many philosophers have ascribed to a performance theory 
to when personhood begins. Personhood can be described as when the fetus possesses a 
serious right to life only if it can possess the concept of self and the person must be able 
to recognize themselves as that entity over time. Some argue that an unborn child cannot 
have a desire for the continuation of life as a thinking being because the unborn does not 
know what life is therefore cannot desire life or its continuation. The unborn has no 
concept of past or future. There is no consensus on the definition of personhood and 
various criteria are utilized for determining personhood such as rationality, autonomy, 
and self-consciousness.100 
2. Catholic View. 
Beginning of life and the protection of life need to be discussed from the Catholic 
view. 
Beginning of Life. 
Semantic issues, biological issues, and philosophical and theological issues are 
taken into consideration to answer the question: When does life begin? Some argue that a 
human embryo may be considered a human being but yet not a human person. But in the 
classical meaning of person: the person is not simply a conscious being, but one with the 
power of abstract thought, concrete objects, and capable of feelings. The human person 
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has the ability to have abstract thoughts and possesses free will; these transcend the 
capabilities of any physical system and can only be explained by recognizing that the 
human mind is spiritual in nature. Thus it follows that the soul of the human person gives 
life, and is not merely an organizing principle. Assuming a material biological 
explanation of the human organism, eliminating intelligence and free moral decisions 
would be self-contradictory.101 Delayed hominization theory of St. Thomas Aquinas was 
based on limited understanding of embryology by Aristotle. With advances in 
embryology, the Church is more confident that delayed hominization is scientifically 
obsolete.102 
Protection of Life. 
Human life from the moment of conception must be respected and protected. 
Every innocent being has an inviolable right to life. Because the fertilized egg (zygote) is 
a human person, we have a moral obligation to protect it. The Church takes a 
conservative stance in protecting potential human persons even though there may be 
uncertainty about when personhood begins. Official teaching states that every human life 
should be treated as having an inalienable right to life and be defended in its integrity 
from the moment of conception. Because the zygote is spiritual entails being created by 
God. From the moment of conception, life must be protected as a spiritual being.103 
B. Resourcing Stem Cells. 
Second, the debate on personhood clarifies when stem cells can be resourced. In 
the debate on resourcing stem cells, two primary sources should be considered: 
embryonic and adult stem cells. 
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 1. Embryonic Stem Cells. 
Two subjects need to be discussed: moral status and ethical dilemmas to engage 
embryonic stem cells. 
Moral Status. 
The ethical debate on the beginning of human life and moral value raises serious 
and basic questions concerning the moral status of embryos. The analysis considers 
whether embryonic stem cell research even if it involves destruction of embryos offers 
potential benefits of new medical treatments. The argument is that a moral middle ground 
is needed between opposite positions; the goal is to find technical ways to reap the 
benefits of embryonic stem cell research without destroying the human embryo. Moral 
value exists in the zygote itself. Moral obligation to alleviate suffering is brought to light 
arguing that embryonic stem cell research is a moral enterprise.104 It is necessary to 
recognize the practical need for developing a reasonable policy that finds a morally 
correct and consistent position in dealing with human embryonic stem cell research 
therapy.105 
Ethical Dilemmas. 
The use of embryonic stem cells is an ethical dilemma facing America today. 
Increasing technology allows the ability to work with human gametes enabling us to 
experiment on developing human life from the moment of conception. The current debate 
is between the use of embryo stem cells to research possible treatments or cures for 
various diseases versus the defense of the personhood of the embryo. This debate can be 
defined in four ethical frameworks. The consequentialist ethical framework looks at the 
greatest good in a situation. Then the deontological framework looks for a guiding rule 
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that can be applied in all cases. The relativist recognizes that value can change depending 
on time and place. And finally, the virtue ethicist focuses on the personal character that is 
shaped by moral actions. Stem cells are obtained because of the desire to help people 
with no evil intent. Policies need to be refined to give guidance for future research and 
therapy.106 
2. Adult Stem Cells. 
Adult stem cells need to be discussed in light of telomeres and differential 
potential. 
Telomeres. 
In the 1980s small bits of DNA that serve as protective coverings at the end of our 
chromosomes were discovered, these are called telomeres. Our chromosomes are kept 
from unraveling by these caps. When these telomeres are healthy, cells remain healthy. 
The telomeres get shorter each time the cells divide and when they reach a critically short 
length these cells lose their ability to divide and eventually die. By adding telomerase, an 
enzyme, some cells can virtually be “immortalized.” The only cells that benefit from this 
therapy are ones that divide but not all cells in the body divide. Embryonic stem cells are 
undifferentiated resulting in the ability to develop into very specialized cells often used 
for the control of certain diseases.107 Efforts are now underway to reverse adult stem cells 
back to their original state called “induced pluripotency” which could eliminate the need 
for the utilization of highly contentious embryonic stem cells.108 
Differentiation Potential. 
Cells that self-renew and can give several differentiated cell types such as muscle, 
heart, and brain cells are defined as stem cells. Because of the increased interest in 
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regenerative medicine even more emphasis is being placed on the differentiation potential 
for a variety of tissue types, specifically tissue-specific adult stem cells. The adult stem 
cell resides in any given tissue that maintains and repairs the tissue by producing the cell 
types that make up that given tissue. Adult stem cells are found in bone marrow, skeletal 
and cardiac muscle, dental pulp, skin, liver, prostate, mammary glands, testicles, ovaries, 
and in several areas of eyes and ears. Adult stem cells have been well characterized and 
isolated to high purity from their tissue, and thus have demonstrated at the single cell 
level to be capable of giving rise to progeny of different cell types.109 
C. In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Health. 
Third, the connection between the personhood debate and resourcing stem cells 
raises significant implications for the use of in vitro fertilization for embryo health. 
Hence, it is necessary to engage each point separately: in vitro fertilization and embryo 
health. 
1. In Vitro Fertilization.  
The history of in vitro fertilization and the Catholic view need to be engaged to 
help clarify differing points of view. 
  Historical View of In Vitro Fertilization. 
Today assisted reproductive technology is available throughout most of the world. 
The refinements of technology and clinical practice have allowed in vitro fertilization to 
evolve into a medical procedure readily available. But it was not until 1978, with the 
birth of the first child, that was the culmination of decades of scientific research. Prior to 
that time, women considered infertile were without option other than adoption. In 1978, 
laparoscopic retrieval of a woman's single egg was achieved then fertilized in the 
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laboratory and transferred back into the uterus which resulted in the first live birth from 
in vitro fertilization. Further refinements of this pioneering effort have continued. The 
success of in vitro fertilization has unleashed a barrage of unprecedented social, ethical, 
and legal concerns. Debates regarding the donor anonymity, financial compensation for 
donor participation, the need for registry of births, third-party reproduction, and age 
limitations of recipients continue to stir controversy.110 
Reproductive biotechnology has developed the traditional understanding of 
biology. In vitro fertilization has dramatically expanded the scale and scope becoming a 
platform for a myriad of human and animal applications. In vitro fertilization technology 
and the model of reproduction that relies upon it are commonsensical. In vitro 
fertilization has become a new norm in family life by establishing a new method of 
sexual reproduction and a powerful new window into the mechanisms of biological 
development. Because of in vitro fertilization, a new kind of biological kinship now 
exists with technology. In vitro fertilization is playing a leading role in the establishment 
of new technologies, remaking life as a normal, familiar, and even naturalized part human 
reproduction.111 
Catholic View. 
As part of one’s baptismal and marriage vocation, we are called to cooperate with 
God in the creation of new humanity. Catholic teaching prohibits in vitro fertilization, 
stating that a child has a right to be conceived in the marital embrace of his parents. 
Human intercourse has two components, the unitive and procreative. In vitro fertilization 
separates these components making the procreative its only goal. Man on his own 
initiative cannot separate the two meanings of the conjugal act: the unitive meaning in the 
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procreative meaning. In vitro fertilization makes the child a commodity and makes the 
laboratory, doctors, and technicians part of the conception process. The Catholic Church 
views children as a gift from God not a right. Different reasons support the Church’s 
opposition to in vitro fertilization include: the compromise that the procedure brings 
against the marriage act, the possibility of the exploitation of women, and the rights of 
the future fetus to be born from natural marital intimacy.112 
The desire to have a child still is not sufficient to allow the use of any means. For 
the good of the family in the child, the child ought to be born of an action, which is itself, 
an expression of love between a man and a woman. The “divine design” of sexual 
intercourse should not be tampered with. Catholic teaching explains that procreation apart 
from intimate sexual lovemaking should not occur nor should we have intimate sexual 
lovemaking apart from a context of responsibility for procreation. The danger is that we 
will over technologize the procreative process. In vitro fertilization can pose the problem 
of positive eugenics-preferential breeding superior genotypes. Another area of concern is 
the loss of fertilized ova. The problem of embryo loss raises the evaluative question of 
how we are to assess human life at the embryo stage.113 
2. Embryo Health. 
The discussion of embryo health has two components that require discussion: 
regulation and again the Catholic view. 
Regulation. 
To help minimize errors, governments have instituted regulations of the in vitro 
fertilization industry and significant progress has been made in accreditation of in vitro 
fertilization labs as well. National and international professional societies have made 
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significant progress in the promotion of quality management, risk management, and 
safety. Quality systems implementation still has meaningful work to accomplish before 
industry understands and appreciates the need for standards. Many in vitro fertilization 
practitioners lack formal training and the clinics lack quality management. With the 
growth of this field, research and clinical practice, “corporatization” has transpired. In 
this process a loss of quality of care can occur because of the profit motive. Quality 
processes and systems cannot be applied in isolation; they must be integrated into the 
goal of “best practice.” Because of the preponderance of staff coming from academia and 
research, the concepts of process and systems management are often unfamiliar, even 
alien.114 
One of the most controversial recent developments of in vitro fertilization is using 
it to select certain genetic in embryos and, consequently, children. After sperm and eggs 
are removed from the donors, sperm is allowed to fertilize eggs; the resulting embryo can 
have one cell safely removed for genetic testing of their DNA. Preimplantation genetic 
screening allows couples to prevent implanting an embryo with any of undesirable 
genetic maladies. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis can also be used to select gender, 
hair color, and eye color, as well as complexion of an embryo. Preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis as also been approved to create “savior siblings”. These could be children 
utilized to combat varying diseases in siblings or even potentially others. There is a 
striking lack of uniformity in laws and regulations surrounding in vitro fertilization. State 
laws vary and few federal laws exist. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine 
has created guidelines to ensure safety tests are performed on donated material but 
additional requirements for donors differ from state to state.115 
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Catholic View. 
The Church does not condemn persons created by technical procedures. Those 
born following in vitro fertilization possess dignity and are made in God’s image and 
likeness. Of the over 400,000 in vitro fertilization babies born annually, the concern is for 
the human beings created in the laboratory that will die before given a chance to live. It is 
estimated that only one in six embryos created following in vitro fertilization will make it 
to birth. Some estimates are as high as 30 embryos are created for every child born by in 
vitro fertilization. In vitro fertilization treats the new human being as little more than a 
cluster of cells to be graded, selected, and discarded. The loss of life is ignored and 
accepted by the in vitro fertilization industry. These failures and fatalities are not even 
recognized for what they are by most physicians who perform in vitro fertilization. Loss 
of life has become a normal and standardized aspect of the procedure. Additionally, there 
is significant concern for the thousands, possibly millions of human embryos who are 
frozen. What will be the outcome and disposition of these cryopreserved embryos?116 
III. Prenatal Testing. 
The above discussion on the personal status of the embryo and its relevance for 
stem cell technology connects with the ethical debate on prenatal testing as a crucial 
aspect of the ethics of reproductive technology. To discuss prenatal testing requires 
examining two related topics: the availability of testing and interventions and what may 
be in store for tomorrow’s children. 
A. Availability of Testing and Interventions. 
First, the availability of testing and interventions raises two issues: options for 
prenatal testing and prenatal genetic interventions. 
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  1. Options for Prenatal Testing. 
The options for prenatal testing will be viewed from the non-invasive prenatal 
testing, the prenatal microarray analysis, and the expanded carrier screening as well. 
Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing. 
The genetics revolution has deluged parents with information to give greater 
insight into the potentiality of their children. Before discussing non-invasive prenatal 
testing, the definition of testing and screening need to be clarified. Testing is considered 
diagnostic while screening is either to screen pregnant women for specific disorders or to 
assess the likelihood that a fetus may manifest specific diagnosed conditions.117 Because 
of the identifying circulating fetal DNA, a paradigm shift occurred in the practice of 
prenatal screening/diagnosis and the understanding of the fetomaternal relationship. 
Without being influenced by previous pregnancies, the circulating fetal DNA gives a 
genetic snapshot of the present pregnancy.118 Non-invasive prenatal testing, 
commercially available in 2012, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology 
concluded that non-invasive prenatal testing should be offered to patients who may be 
high risk for fetal aneuploidy (abnormal number of chromosomes). The American 
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology stated that only after informed patient choice and 
not part of a routine prenatal lab assessment that non-invasive prenatal testing be 
performed.119 Fear exists that non-invasive prenatal testing will move from uncommon to 
routine and that it is a modern-day cover-up for eugenics.120 Being that non-invasive 
prenatal testing is easy and safe and can be performed early in pregnancy, there is fear 
that informed consent may become much more difficult.121 Testing and selective abortion 
will become normalized. There is fear that there will be a trend towards accepting and 
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utilizing testing for minor abnormalities and nonmedical traits.122 Additional fears are 
that new genomic technologies will allow for broader ranges of abnormalities thus 
causing the number of selective abortions to increase dramatically. By enlarging the 
scope of non-invasive prenatal testing, informed consent will be more difficult and 
challenge the notion of non-invasive prenatal testing serving reproductive autonomy.123 
Unsolicited knowledge of traits found by non-invasive prenatal testing would be 
considered an invasion of the autonomy of future children potentially revealing 
information about abnormalities including late onset diseases.124 Non-invasive prenatal 
testing should only be offered with education, informed consent, and with counseling 
provided by a certified genetic counselor.125 In prenatal microarray analysis, a molecular-
based technique, a sample of DNA is compared to normal genome to determine 
abnormalities. Not only as a prenatal diagnostic test, this technology has been used for 
children with delayed development, autism disorders, and other anomalies.126 Microarray 
analysis can detect genomic abnormalities that are 100 times smaller than those identified 
by karyotyping, the routine test used in the past. Microarray testing has a higher 
sensitivity to detect chromosome deletions, duplications, and unbalanced rearrangements. 
It also offers a shorter turnaround time because the DNA isolation procedures can be 
automated.127 One of the disadvantages of the microarrays is its inability to detect 
balanced chromosome rearrangements and that design of the array is crucial.128 In the 
prenatal setting, microarray analysis has been highly debated and thus primarily used in 
pregnancies that are of high risk.129 Like non-invasive prenatal testing, microarray 
analysis raises many ethical questions. Informed consent along with a detailed discussion 
about the varying degrees of severity, purpose of the testing, and other conditions that 
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may be brought to light are essential. Pre-and post genetic counseling is highly 
recommended.130 
Expanded Carrier Screening. 
Expanded carrier screening has been available and utilized for the last ten years. 
Because of next-generation sequencing methods, the screening is shifting from ancestry 
based to one that screens many disorders.131 The benefit of expanded carrier screening is 
in the decreasing of inherited genetic diseases. Practice guidelines for screening continues 
to be directed at high risk population groups such as Jewish women being screened for 
Tay-Sachs disease and African-American women for sickle cell disease.132 Additional 
screens have been put in place for cystic fibrosis and spinal muscular atrophy that are 
recommended for women of non-Hispanic European American decent.133 Concerns exist 
about the interpretations, lack of guidelines, and applicability.134 It is essential that the 
informed consent be secured from patients considering expanded carrier screening. 
Multiple challenges occur in securing those consents because the screening can include 
multi-disease screenings thus truly informed consent can be difficult to achieve.135  The 
ethical principles of prenatal testing and screening have to be considered. Questions arise 
to whom should these principles be directed: the pregnant patient, the fetus or the 
couple.136 
2. Prenatal Genetic Interventions. 
In the field of reprogenetics, we have the ability to create certain kinds of human 
beings. In this section, we will consider prenatal genetic diagnosis, prenatal genetic 
therapy, and prenatal genetic enhancement. 
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Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis. 
The testing of fetuses, embryos before implantation, and the gametes are included 
in prenatal genetic diagnosis. Thus far prenatal genetic diagnosis has mostly been used 
for negative selection: targeting genetic diseases. Moral objections to prenatal genetic 
diagnosis focuses on that negative selection. The three most salient arguments against 
prenatal genetic diagnosis are: (1) loss of support argument, (2) expressivist objection, 
and (3) disabilities are just differences thesis.137 
With the first objection, because of the widespread use of prenatal genetic 
diagnosis, the number of persons with disabilities will be diminished. The concern is the 
likely reduction of the financial, logistical, and social support to the disabled would be a 
consequence. Using prenatal genetic diagnosis for negative selection becomes morally 
troubling and possibly even morally indefensible. In the second objection, the 
expressivist, the messaging about the value of disabled persons and their contribution to 
society comes into question. In the third argument, prenatal genetic diagnosis is used to 
implement unjust discrimination and reinforces the prejudiced against the disabled, all 
morally disconcerting.138 
Prenatal Genetic Therapy. 
Prenatal genetic therapy is considered experimental and only a future prospect 
unlike prenatal genetic diagnosis, a clinical reality. With the completion of the Human 
Genome Project, accelerated advancement has occurred in all areas of reprogenetics. 
Three types of prenatal genetic testing exist, therapy on gametes prior to fertilization, on 
embryos before implantation, and the third type would be therapies on fetuses by 
injecting genetic material. To avoid transferring to later generations, the insertion of 
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genetic material will be into only differentiated somatic cells.139 Many feel that prenatal 
genetic testing is identity affecting. By affecting identity, the individual is eliminated and 
someone else is created, potentially questioning the substantial moral status of that 
individual. Another ethical issue regarding prenatal genetic testing is the effect on 
inheritability to resultant generations.140 Additionally, there is the freedom argument that 
can be understood in three different ways: (1) prenatal genetic testing prevents those 
altered from making free choices related to the modified trait, (2) the range of behavior 
and life plans can be altered, and finally (3) freedom from unrealistic parental 
expectations and demands.141 
 Prenatal Genetic Enhancement. 
Prenatal genetic enhancement poses considerable doubt when considering the best 
interest of the child-to-be, attitudes of those impacted, and concerns about the effects on 
society.142 Objections to biomedical enhancement, particularly for perspective children 
have been vehement. The ills include diminishment of authenticity, widespread social 
stratification and inequity, threat human nature and dignity, hubristic rejection of ‘the 
given’, and potentially undermine the autonomy of the individual.143 It is impossible to 
obtain informed consent from the child-to-be; the best interest standard can be the 
appropriate decision-making guide. But many doubt that prenatal genetic enhancement 
can ever be in the best interest of the child-to-be.144 Additionally, doubts about an open 
future of the child produced with enhanced traits and the safety of prenatal genetic 
enhancement warrant pause. There is appropriate concern that parents are imposing their 
will on the child by enhancing their traits thus violating the child’s best interest.145 
Imprecise vectors that can deposit desired genes leaving detrimental genes in place cause 
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much angst as to what may happen within the patient's body.146 The unanticipated and 
unintended consequences are of moral and ethical concern.147 
B. Tomorrow’s Children. 
Second, the availability of prenatal testing has significant implications for 
tomorrow’s children. Here two issues must be addressed: the selection of characteristics 
and savior babies. 
1. Selection of Characteristics. 
Selecting children with specific disabilities and selecting for a specific sex need to 
be discussed. 
Disabilities. 
Two questions are raised when discussing the correctness of selecting a child for a 
specific disability, the using of selective reproduction techniques for selection and under 
what circumstances do concerns for the welfare of the children provide reasons to 
practice selective reproduction.148 There are cases of what is termed wrongful life or life 
not worth living. These would be situations where quality of life is so difficult that they 
would be better off not existing. Normally cases where life is full of pain and indignity 
would qualify149. From a bioethical position, it would be wrong to create a child with that 
level of quality of life. In most cases though selecting for a disability would not fall into 
this category because of a potential positive quality-of-life that could be achieved by that 
resultant child.150 
Sex Selection. 
Sex selection is a bioethical example of parental choice that is technically 
achievable and easily delivered. Sex selection can raise the issue of sex or gender 
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discrimination.151 If sex selection would reflect a discrimination against women and 
systematically reinforce that bias, this could constitute a moral and legal injustice to be 
prevented.152 Bioethics, public policy, and law intersect on the topic of sex selection. 
Opinions regarding sex selection range from one extreme, saying it is always wrong and 
should be banned to the opposite end of the scale to those who prefer a free market.153 
Even though a portion of sexual selection would be driven by sexist beliefs and attitudes 
this is not enough to justify prohibition. Reproductive liberty could be deleteriously 
impacted.154 
2. Savior Babies. 
Instrumentalization and commodification of savior babies need to be discussed in 
this section. 
Instrumentalization. 
Instrumentalization (treating a child as a means to an end) can manifest itself for 
other people’s well-being or satisfaction of other’s desires. A savior baby (sibling) being 
selected so that an existing one might live is an example, although other examples do 
exist such as benefiting the parent’s health or parent’s preferences.155 Savior sibling is 
used to describe a baby that is created using in vitro fertilization that has been screened 
during that process to serve as a donor match for a child that already exists and is sick in 
some way.156 There are three compelling arguments in the anti-savior sibling controversy. 
First being, savior babies would be wrongfully instrumentalized, treated as mere means. 
This stems from Emmanuel Kant’s famous dictum “Never use people as a means but 
always treat them as an end.”157 Second, savior selection would have a negative effect on 
the moral climate and society. Claiming that society would become less fair and equal 
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and lead to the development of a genetic underclass. Also potentially leading to the 
acceptance of customized conception and designer babies.158 Finally, concerns about the 
welfare of the savior sibling and the fundamental issues relating to the welfare of that 
child. Two harms are most concerning: the physical harm directly caused by the prenatal 
genetic diagnosis and the psychological harm created by being a means to an end.159 
Commodification. 
Commodification has three essential characteristics: (1) it has a price, which a 
seller is willing to receive, and the buyer is willing to pay, (2) they are fungible, 
interchangeable with other goods, and (3) their value is instrumental not intrinsic.160 In 
the normative sense, commodification is a social practice which one gives rights over to 
the thing in question that are bought and sold. There is no moral judgment just a matter of 
fact that certain things are being treated as commodities.161 Commodification has two 
forms: complete modification (commodification with no restrictions) and incomplete 
commodification (commodification with restrictions).162 These distinctions allow us to 
focus on the moral basis for treating these body parts as commodities. In the libertarian 
political thought, bodies and body parts may be bought, sold, and rented.163 
Commodification in the moral sense is to disapprove and point out the unique kind of 
wrong: the wrong of commodification. Wrongful commodities are things that are treated 
as commodities but are really fungible or have instrumental value. When 
commodification is cited in nonmonetary context one is actually appealing to 
instrumentalization and treating things as fungible.164 
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IV. Newborn Genetic Screening. 
Closely related to the ethical debate on prenatal screening is the debate on 
newborn screening, which requires examining two related topics: screening programs and 
screening consequences. 
A. Screening Programs. 
First, to understand screening programs it is important to engage two pivotal 
issues: the national research framework and the future of genetic screening. 
1. National Research Framework. 
The current overview of genetic screening and the challenge of research for 
newborn screening will be engaged. 
Overview. 
To begin an overview of genetic screening we start in the 1960s when a simple 
blood test to detect a genetic metabolic disorder, phenylketonuria, and a genetic disorder 
that can lead to mental retardation was developed.165 To treat phenylketonuria, a special 
diet begun early in life can reduce the major symptoms.166 States over time introduced 
this test and made it mandatory. Some states began to expand newborn screening to other 
tests for other disorders.167 In spite of federal funding, newborn screening is primarily a 
state public health activity; thus states have made different decisions about the content of 
their screening, treatment protocol, follow-up, and the cost to newborns families.168 The 
goal of screening is improve the health of the child and appropriate only for medical 
conditions that have effective treatments.169 This consensus has now come under pressure 
with the calling for broadening the focus to diseases with no current treatment as well as 
to the families for screening for untreatable genetic disorders. The implication here is 
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identifying parental carrier status of genetic disorders that might later impact 
reproductive decisions.170 A salient issue has been the fairness and the inequity of cost. 
While one of the most controversial issues is that compulsory screening and its practice 
of being performed without explicit consent. Many questions are left unanswered such as 
the right to refuse, the right to confidentiality and privacy, the right to information, and 
even methods of delivery. These and others make developing sound ethical policy a 
significant challenge for screening programs.171 Finally, an issue of overarching 
importance in the discussion of newborn screening is that of race, ethnicity, and social 
economic status. Included in that discussion is the important question of targeting 
particular groups or the screening of all newborns.172 
Challenges of Research. 
Many barriers exist creating challenges of research. Especially in establishing   
value of prenatal genetic screening programs. One of the basic questions is whether 
morbidity and/or mortality are reduced as a result of screening. State health programs 
typically are underfunded thus evaluation of established programs become problematic. 
Although diseases can be detected in affected children and that interventions can be 
lifesaving, the benefits of population screening programs remain uncertain with regard to 
the long-term benefits.173 Exacerbating the challenges of research with human bio 
specimens gives rise to several ethical issues such as informed consent, privacy and 
confidentiality, ethical reviews of research proposals, access to the results, and any other 
benefits gleaned from that research.174 The obtaining of informed consent from 
participants in research does satisfy the ethical principle of respect and honors the 
individual. By obtaining informed consent there is acknowledgment that autonomous 
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decisions regarding one's body have been discussed and determined, reflecting 
transparency.175 
2. Future of Genetic Screening. 
Movements toward expanding newborn screening and the whole gene sequencing 
will impact that potential need to be engaged in this section. 
Expanding Newborn Screening. 
Newborn genetic screening was been born out of state run politics. State 
legislatures were lobbied when advocates felt the medical community was not moving 
rapidly enough in expanding newborn screening.176 Over time advocates have remained 
involved bringing pressure on states to add other disorders to the screening panel 
conceivably to avert serious disabilities and even death.177 In 1968, Wilson and Jungner 
published criteria for newborn screening: (1) the condition should be an important health 
problem, (2) treatment for the disease needs to exist, (3) diagnostic and treatment 
facilities should be available, (4) an asymptomatic stage should be recognizable, (5) 
suitable testing must exist, (6) the population must accept the test, (7) an understanding of 
the development of disease, (8) an agreeable policy on who should be treated, (9) costs 
should be balanced in relation to medical care expenditure, and finally (10) it should be a 
continuous process project.178 Gradually the focus changed with the advent of new 
technology, tandem mass spectrometry.179 Tandem mass spectrometry with its capability 
to measure potentially hundreds of metabolites at one time allows for early intervention 
in previously unknown disorders, dramatically improving health.180 Thus there was 
pressure to add numerous tests to newborn screening panel. The American College of 
Medical Genetics recommended a core of 29 conditions for newborn screening. In 
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addition, 25 additional conditions “secondary targets” were recommended. Because of 
the inability to meet the Wilson/Jungner criteria analysis relied on expert opinion and 
resulted in considerable debate.181 False-negatives, false-positives, over-diagnosis, 
findings of uncertain significance, and incidental findings all contribute to that debate.182 
With the history of the technological imperative, even with its unintended consequences, 
screening marches on. 
Whole-Genome Sequencing. 
Now the prospect of whole-genome sequencing offers the potential integration 
with newborn screening programs. Whole-genome sequencing can deliver useful 
information about poorly understood diseases and improve the prognosis of and treatment 
options for patients.183 It will inevitably lead to all kinds of unsought information as well. 
Questions of responsible use of such testing, meaningful informed consent, and the value 
and disposition of the information obtained will entail complex consideration.184 These 
population based genetic screens have both individual and collective implications, thus 
the balance of risk and benefits has to be considered not only from the perspective of 
individuals and families, but also from that of the target population and of society as a 
whole. As newborn screening programs enter the genomic era, they must focus on 
addressing issues of equality, access, and education that have plagued the new born 
screening programs since its inception.185 
B. Screening Consequences. 
Second, programs for newborn screening inevitably create concern about 
screening consequences. To discuss concerns about screening consequences, there are 
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two areas of consideration, an overview of the problem and a consideration of disease 
ontologies 
1. Overview.  
In this section, the origins and successes of newborn genetic screening needs to be 
engaged. 
Origins. 
The origins of newborn genetic screening are normally ascribed to the work of 
Robert Guthrie.186 After the birth of his own child with mental retardation and a niece 
with phenylketonuria he became involved with an organization that fights discrimination 
against children with mental retardation.187 Phenylketonuria is a genetic condition 
whereby an enzyme is deficient that is needed to break down the amino acid 
phenylalanine that can build up in the body and cause mental retardation. An 
experimental form of phenylketonuria treatment was a restrictive diet.188 Guthrie 
developed a bacterial inhibition assay that could diagnose phenylketonuria using neonatal 
blood. This discovery could identify affected children and could be used as a screening 
method. It could discover affected children before the onset of irreversible symptoms. A 
simple method was developed taking blood collected from a heel stick of the child prior 
to hospital discharge, then sent to a lab to be easily analyzed. If the levels were elevated 
then the infant’s physician was notified and the results were given to the family.189 A 
pilot study was federally funded in 1962 to screen 400,000 infants in 29 states for 
phenylketonuria. Most states continued the screening after the completion of the study.190 
Later in the 70s, the federal government supported screening for genetic diseases and 
provided limited funding. Five component guidelines were identified for newborn 
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screening, including the screening itself, follow-up, diagnosis, therapy, and evaluation.191 
Since phenylketonuria screening began, various tests have been added and screening has 
remained largely a state responsibility. Because of that autonomy, each state has chosen 
the screening targets, payments, education, and follow-up. This variability of screening 
has left a patchwork of coverage in the United States.192 
Successes. 
The successes of phenylketonuria universal screening has allowed universal 
screening to become a cornerstone public health initiative requiring collaboration of 
health care professionals and an advanced infrastructure including laboratories, hospitals, 
clinical centers, and families.193 Because of issues not always being addressed before 
implementation, critics maintain it is essential that scientific uncertainties be worked 
before developing the health care infrastructure and investing in newborn screening.194 
As a result, three points have been established in evaluating the historical consensus 
regarding population screening: (1) population screening is only permissible if it 
addresses an important health problem and there is an accepted treatment available, (2) 
mandatory genetic screening should be avoided if possible but bioethical issues such as 
informed consent, confidentiality, autonomy, knowledge, well-being, and equity must be 
addressed, and (3) technological innovation should not be the driver in the expansion of 
newborn screening but the focus should be on an infrastructure that provides follow-ups, 
treatments, and health services.195 Phenylketonuria screening has largely been a success 
story that celebrates the marriage of patient advocacy with concerned health care 
professionals to promote screening.196 In preventive medicine few things have been done 
that have been as successful as newborn screening.197 
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2. Disease Ontologies. 
In this section, a case will be made showing how disease ontology can be 
understood through newborn screening.  The understanding of medium-chain acyl-
coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency will be discussed pre-screening and post-
screening to exemplify the value of newborn screening. 
Pre-Screening. 
In the pre-screening stage of medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase 
deficiency, understanding of this condition was very limited.198 The prospect of death 
was generally the manifestation.199 It was suggested that sudden infant death syndrome 
might be as a result of undiagnosed medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase 
deficiency. What was known was that medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase 
deficiency was caused by mutations in the medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A 
dehydrogenase deficiency gene causing an enzymatic deficiency.200 This deficiency can 
impact the metabolism of certain fatty acids that accumulate in the blood manifesting 
themselves as lethargy, hypoglycemia, liver damage, and possible brain damage.201 The 
usual manifestation of medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency is 
when a primary metabolic crisis caused a prolonged period of fasting such as may occur 
during an illness. As a result of that primary crisis the secondary trigger would be 
required for medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency to manifest itself. 
When this episode occurred mortality rate was about 25% while others suffered 
significant neurological impairments or developmental delays.202 Most thought medium-
chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency was a result of a founder effect most 
commonly seen in non-Hispanic white populations of northwestern European descent. 
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The only treatment was a low-fat diet and avoidance of fasting especially when the 
patient becomes ill and stopped eating. The disease would manifest itself most often 
before age six but could possibly remain a possibility as an adult.203 With confirmation 
through biochemical testing, an abnormality was discovered that had a common genetic 
profile. By DNA sequencing, the case was made for large-scale newborn screening.204 
Post-Screening. 
Post-screening of newborns has shown several medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A 
dehydrogenase deficiency variants that were previously unknown. Additionally, medium-
chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency has been broken down into carrier like, 
intermediate, and severe by correlating 75 genetic mutations many of which had never 
been documented.205 After screening, it was determined that instead of 80% to 90% of the 
medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency patients had a particular 
mutation that only 50% actually possessed it. This mutation, along with other mutations, 
was thought to be unique to northern Europeans. Subsequently, it has been found these 
mutations are twice as prevalent throughout the world.206 The saliency of ethnicity in 
genetics is now becoming more apparent because of this screening.207 As a result of 
screening, treatment regimens have been adjusted to allow for changes in frequency of 
feeding.208 Also revealed, the severity of cases has been found to be milder then 
previously assumed. Geneticists have found more and different diseases. Diseases have 
split into variants while others have disappeared and now are being redefined as oddities 
with no clinical implications. Geneticists because of newborn screening have a better 
understanding of diseases like medium-chain acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency 
and have adjusted treatment regimens accordingly.209 The knowledge gap has been closed 
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by more information sharing by discussions, assessment, diagnostic testing, and 
appropriate management.210 
This chapter has considered major issues in reproductive technology that have 
significant applications for the Catholic ethical tradition. Catholic teaching engages each 
of them in the dynamic manner to develop its moral doctrine when appropriate. This is 
based on emerging science, but also to indicate clearly where there appears to be 
wrongdoing from individual and social perspectives. The next chapter continues this 
analysis of engaging the Catholic tradition with breakthroughs in science and medicine 
by examining emerging issues in regenerative technology. 
V. Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious Directives. 
Natural Law has two general approaches, as described in the conclusion to 
Chapter 3. The first approach focuses on the universal aspects of human nature. This 
approach is typically associated with the settled Catholic teaching on morality. The 
second approach focuses on the person, presenting a dynamic and historical view of the 
human condition as contributors to God’s creation.211  This approach is typically 
associated with using the Principle of Double Effect to apply traditional Church teaching 
in a flexible manner to changing circumstances. Arising from these two approaches to 
Natural Law, a third approach has emerged combining the nature-oriented and person-
oriented approaches to new dilemmas regarding emerging technologies that may require 
doctrinal development in Catholic teaching. 
In the conclusion of each applied chapter, (Chapter 4, 5, and 6), a critique based 
on the Ethical and Religious Directives is presented regarding the main topics in each 
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chapter. The critique adopts the above approaches to identify three distinct categories as 
follows. 
 Category A deals with settled issues in Church Teaching reflecting the Nature 
Approach to Natural Law. 
 Category B deals with controversial issues eligible for using the Principle of 
Double Effect reflecting the Personal Approach to Natural Law. 
 Category C deals with issues requiring doctrinal development in Catholic teaching 
to address new dilemmas regarding emerging technologies.  
The following analysis applies this threefold critique to the topics discussed in 
this chapter on reproductive technology. Each main section is discussed in turn.  
Section I. Embryo and Personhood. 
 This section discussed the status of the embryo regarding its personhood. From 
the perspective of the threefold critique, recognizing the status of the human embryo with 
personhood is settled teaching (Category A). 
Authoritative guidance is offered in Part Four of the Ethical and Religious 
Directives, Issues in Care for the Beginning of Life. At the moment of fertilization, the 
respect due all persons is to be accorded the human embryo.212 The Church’s Catechism 
also teaches that from the first moment of its existence the embryo must be guaranteed 
unconditional respect.213 
Section II. Stem Cells Technologies and In Vitro Fertilization. 
 This section discussed the prohibition of embryonic stem cell research that 
destroys embryos. This is settled Catholic teaching (Category A). 
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 Utilization of embryonic stem cells has been hotly debated and problematic for all 
sides of the debate regarding sourcing and using embryonic stem cells for medical 
purposes. Determining when personhood and ensoulment occur has complicated the 
debate.214 In harvesting these cells presently the human embryo is destroyed raising two 
ethical questions: one of consent and one as to ending human life by destroying the 
embryo.215 As is indicated by Directive # 39 and Directive #51: 
Those techniques of assisted conception that respect the unitive and 
procreative meanings of sexual intercourse and do not involve the 
destruction of human embryos, or their deliberate generation in such 
numbers that it is clearly envisaged that all cannot implant and some are 
simply being used to maximize the chances of others implanting, may be 
used as therapies for infertility. (Directive #39) 
 
Nontherapeutic experiments on a living embryo or fetus are not permitted, 
even with the consent of the parents. Therapeutic experiments are 
permitted for a proportionate reason with the free and informed consent of 
the parents or, if the father cannot be contacted, at least of the mother. 
Medical research that will not harm the life or physical integrity of an 
unborn child is permitted with parental consent. (Directive #51) 
 
  With the question of ending human life, it can be appropriately argued that 
harvesting stem cells by means that kills the organism with rational nature are morally 
illicit. If pluripotent cells could be procured by altered nuclear transfer, altered nuclear 
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transfer oocyte assisted reprograming, or from human embryos themselves that were not 
harmed or destroyed, then these methods could be considered potentially licit.216 
There is an imperative to find a better way to procure cells that can be utilized to 
positively impact medical science and not destroy human life. If there were a potential 
breakthrough in securing these beneficial cells, then that may raise the possibility of a 
need for a doctrinal development of the traditional Church teaching, but as of now 
embryonic stem cell research is prohibited as settled teaching (Category A). 
The second main topic in this section dealt with in vitro fertilization - the 
prohibition of this technology is also settled teaching (Category A). 
 Human Dignity is the galvanizing force for the Church’s concern for the sanctity 
of life and comparably for the dignity of marriage. The Church cannot endorse any 
medical practice that compromises this teaching.217 The Church upholds the sanctity of 
life “from the moment of conception until death.”218 Included in this teaching is the 
prohibition of in vitro fertilization as addressed in Directive #41. 
Homologous artificial fertilization (that is, any technique used to achieve 
conception using the gametes of the two spouses joined in marriage) is 
prohibited when it separates procreation from the marital act in its unitive 
significance (e.g., any technique used to achieve extracorporeal 
conception). (Directive #41) 
 
However considered from another perspective, in vitro fertilization could 
become related to Category B, permissible using the Principle of Double Effect, 
insofar as the original prohibition of in vitro fertilization related to the context of 
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marital fertility (using the nature approach to Natural Law). In a different context, 
that is the health of the embryo, the principle of double effect could be applied to 
address an embryo’s health rather than marital fertility.219 
Section III. Prenatal Testing. 
 In this section, pivotal ethical dilemmas aligned these technologies relate to 
various forms of prenatal testing and screening. 
 First, this section discussed prenatal genetic testing. This is permissible as settled 
Catholic teaching (Category A). 
Prenatal diagnosis of the unborn utilizing non-invasive prenatal screening and 
appropriate use of expanded carrier screening can certainly be ethically problematic, but 
Catholics cannot assume that prenatal genetic testing is automatically immoral.220 The 
Congregation for Doctrine of Faith has stated: “if prenatal diagnosis respects the life and 
integrity of the embryo and the human fetus and is directed toward safeguarding or 
healing that individual, then it is appropriate.”221 
 Second, this section also discussed prenatal genetic therapy. This is controversial 
but may be permissible using the principle of double effect (Category B). 
In Dignatis Personae, the Church directly addressed gene therapy: 
“For a moral evaluation the following distinctions need to be kept in mind. Procedures 
used on somatic cells for strictly therapeutic purposes are in principle morally licit.”222 
Additionally, this is addressed in Directive #51. 
Nontherapeutic experiments on a living embryo or fetus are not permitted, 
even with the consent of the parents. Therapeutic experiments are 
permitted for a proportionate reason with the free and informed consent of 
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the parents or, if the father cannot be contacted, at least of the mother. 
Medical research that will not harm the life or physical integrity of an 
unborn child is permitted with parental consent. (Directive #51) 
 
The allowing therapeutic experimentation is an indication that the Church 
is keeping pace with technological breakthroughs while maintaining the dignity of 
the human person.  
Third, this section also discussed prenatal genetic enhancement. This topic likely 
requires (depending on the what the enhancement involves) doctrinal development  
(Category C). 
Genetic enhancement is quite different from gene therapy. Genetic modifications 
risk germ cells transmission to potential offspring. The ethical critique of this topic can 
be described as follows: “In the present state of research, it is not morally permissible to 
act in a way that may cause possible harm to the resulting progeny… The question of 
using genetic engineering for purposes of medical treatment also calls for 
consideration.”223 
 Fourth, this section also discussed the impact of a variety of reproductive 
technologies that will shape tomorrow’s children. Generally, these technologies that 
involve sex selection or commodification are ethically controversial and would need 
doctrinal development to permit them (Category C). 
For example, prenatal genetic diagnosis can be used to acquire an embryo that the 
genetically matches a sibling who has a malady needing a transplant (the so-called savior 
sibling debate). In this case, prenatal genetic diagnosis is used to screen for certain 
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genetic traits and against genetic defects. The chosen embryos are implanted and brought 
to term with the express purpose of becoming a tissue donor for their older sibling, while 
other embryos are discarded. Here prenatal genetic diagnosis is used to create human 
beings in a manner of selective reproduction that is very problematic for Catholic 
teaching.224 
 In contrast, prenatal diagnosis of the unborn utilizing non-invasive prenatal 
screening and appropriate use of expanded carrier screening can be ethically problematic 
but not automatically immoral.225 The Congregation for Doctrine of Faith has stated: “if 
prenatal diagnosis respects the life and integrity of the embryo and the human fetus and is 
directed toward safeguarding or healing that individual, then it is appropriate.”226 
 The next and last major section addresses newborn genetic screening. 
Section IV. Newborn Genetic Screening. 
 In this section, the pivotal ethical dilemma relates to newborn genetic screening. 
This is permissible when used simply for screening purposes. However, this is not 
permissible for illicit purposes such as screening for abortion or enhancement (Category 
A). 
 Genetic testing and newborn screening provide information. The ethical issue 
arises regarding what is done with the information. If the information is used to 
discriminate, then it is morally illicit.227 If these are done to learn more about the fetus 
and help the parents and doctors prepare for any complications, then they would not be 
morally problematic. Using these tests to come to an acceptance of a child with a 
disability would be considered licit.228 
  224 
 In sum, the threefold ethical critique based on the Ethical Religious Directives has 
been applied to the topics discussed in the main sections of the chapter. This threefold 
critique is applied at the end of the next two applied chapters. 
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Chapter 5. Regenerative Technology. 
Regenerative technology raises fundamental questions about the normative 
framework of genetics. To adequately discuss regenerative technology requires 
examining four related topics: genetic enhancement, germline genetic modification, 
mitochondrial DNA, and gene editing with clustered-interspaced short palindromic 
repeats (CRISPR). 
I. Genetic Enhancement. 
To discuss the ethics of genetic enhancement, the pivotal ethical topics are 
organized into two categories: influences on human progress (here the ethical discussion 
examines human development and human nature) and influences on future generations 
(here the ethical discussions examines identity and perfection). 
 A. Human Progress. 
First, a consideration of the significance of genetic enhancement for human 
progress engages two foundational issues: human development and human nature. 
1. Human Development. 
The concept of human development in this context raises two related ethical 
dilemmas to deal with ethical dilemma and historical enhancements. 
Ethical Dilemmas. 
First, discourse on well-being revolves around the meaning of good. A basic 
benefit perceived in any genetic alteration deals with personal goods, the advantages for 
the individual that arise from being genetically altered.1 This is called a Personal Goods 
Assumption that focuses on the risks that could harm the individual or society.2 Another 
form of this basic benefit is called the Market Goods Assumption for which genetic 
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alterations would be market driven.3 In these approaches, the key focus is eliminating any 
social harm that could arise from the enhancements.4 Secondly, human development 
focuses on enhancing personal well-being:5 cognitive capabilities, the extension of life, 
decreasing morbidity and disability, and advancing the immune system all could be 
benefits of genetic alterations.6 
Historical Enhancements. 
There is no doubt that the well-being of society has benefitted from historical 
enhancements such as literacy, the agrarian revolution, computer technology, and health 
care.7 However, there are significant reasons to be cautious about genetic alterations that 
seek to achieve these human developments.8 This caution arises out of respect for human 
nature. 
2. Human Nature and the Precautionary Principle. 
The concept of human nature raises significant ethical problems that are discussed 
in terms of the metaphor of playing God and the ethical principle of precaution. 
Common Characteristics. 
The metaphor of playing God deals with the legitimacy of humans interfering 
with human nature. Human nature can be described as a set of characteristics common to 
human beings, delineating the core difference between humans and other creatures.9 The 
metaphor of playing God highlights the consequences of germline genetic modification 
as a major ethical concern,10 focusing on what are specifically human characteristics,11 
and highlighting the significance of our genetic makeup as a barometer for biological 
limits.12 The metaphor suggests that with germline genetic modification humanity may be 
usurping God’s design.13 
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Precautionary Principle. 
In light of this concern of humanity over-reaching its legitimate moral authority, 
there is an ethical responsibility to honor what is referred to as the precautionary 
principle. The precautionary principle specifically focuses on risk reduction in any 
germline genetic modification.14 This principle places the burden of proof on those 
engaging in germline genetic modification to justify change to individuals, society, or the 
species.15 They should prove that the changes would not cause unacceptable harm.16  That 
is, the principle encourages the use of risk reduction principles.17 Some critics of using 
this principle argue that precaution can lead to paralysis,18 focusing too much on potential 
calamity without sufficient consideration of benefit.19 Moreover, critics claim that for 
practical reasons the principle is unworkable.20 
B. Future Generations. 
Second, the impact of germline genetic modification on human progress raises the 
question of influencing future generations focusing upon the significance of identity and 
perfection. 
1. Identity. 
The concept of moral identity raises two critical issues: enhancements that are 
supernormal and enhancements that deal with disease avoidance.21 Enhancements would 
be for individuals and as well as species.22 
Supernormal Enhancements. 
In particular, risks to biological development and their psychological impact are 
especially important.23 Three moral arguments against supernormal enhancement emerge: 
the goals of medicine and enhancement are incompatible, the Positional Goods Argument 
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(giving one person an advantage over another), and the argument that enhancement 
generates inequality,24 especially insofar as benefits of enhancement typically will accrue 
to individuals.25 The issue of authenticity is especially significant for discussions of 
identity,26 not least because of the link with character.27 In addition to the obvious 
concerns about accumulated long-term effects, 28 the meaning of an individual’s moral 
status is central to the ethical debate on identity.29  
Disease Avoidance Enhancements. 
In addition to addressing enhancements that are supernormal, the debate over 
identity also deals with enhancements related to disease avoidance based on the resulting 
impact on human traits.30 Here the ethical debate revolves around therapy (healing a 
pathology), functionality (improving the human functioning), and transhumanism 
(changing human nature).31 While advancement in therapy would be generally 
welcomed,32 transhumanism elicits much concern in part because of the ambiguous 
meaning of a projected superiority among some humans,33 and in part because of the 
point made previously about the moral status of human individuals.34 In this regard, one 
response from transhumanism advocates is ethically disconcerting: that future 
generations have no moral claim or rights in current considerations because they do not 
exist now.35 Not surprisingly, this discourse on identity raises the issue of seeking 
perfection. 
2. Perfection. 
The concept of seeking perfection via genetic enhancement raises two critical 
issues: stewardship and naturalism versus transhumanism. 
  
  240 
Stewardship. 
Engaging the debate on stewardship in the context of enhancement is 
challenging.36 Typically, we make moral assumptions such as the obligation of non-
malfeasance to future generations.37 Stewardship entails an obligation about many inter-
related issues: the use of natural resources, culture and technology, preservation of the 
environment, natural resources, and oversight of the human gene pool.38 Hence, 
stewardship obligations inevitably extend to future generations, both in a personal 
manner (impacting humanity) and in an impersonal manner (impacting the 
environment).39 Additionally, the debate on seeking perfection via genetic enhancements 
involves justice, regarding human capabilities and the human life span.40   Our current 
obligations towards future generations must be construed as a crucial matter of justice, 41 
especially from the perspective of respecting human dignity.42    
Naturalism versus Transhumanism. 
The quest for perfection is not new to the human species. The core debate is over 
the distinction between naturalism and transhumanism. Naturalism can be construed as a 
legitimate form of human progress from the perspective of natural immanence and from 
the perspective of natural defects. The first point that clarifies the meaning of naturalism 
has to do with its relation to the concept of immanence. 43 This refers to an inherent 
dynamic within the human condition that considers human dignity to flourish by leaving 
human nature alone.44 This means that the inner dynamism (immanence) of nature must 
be respected.45 The second point that clarifies the meaning of naturalism is the capacity to 
improve on human defects. The dignity inherent in Naturalism does not prevent 
overcoming human defects.46 One of the greatest difficulties for human nature is facing 
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up to it inherent defects.47 Naturalism permits using technologies for prevention and 
treatment to overcome these inherent defects.48  
In contrast, transhumanism seeks radical alterations of the human capacity to 
overcome human limitations. As mentioned previously, respecting the inner dynamism of 
nature to realize our human potential can change human nature.49 However, 
transhumanism seeks to overcome all human limitations, disease, and frailties.50 The 
hallmarks of transhumanism include enhancing appearance, increasing the capacities of 
human senses, advancing intelligence, increasing lifespan and alleviating the 
vulnerabilities of harm.51 Additionally pursuing the excessive desires and wants of 
humanity,52 all through enhancing the human capacity.53 Transhumanism typically is 
associated with what is called post-humanity, emphasizing the radical change in a new 
form of humanity.54 Inevitably, the agenda of transhumanism will have a significant 
impact on the idea of what is good,55 correlating it with radical improvements of the 
human capacity.56 Transhumanism contends that an improved world with superior human 
conditions can be achieved by not only enhancing the human capacity but also by 
radically overcoming human limitations.57 In other words, human life in its current form 
is construed to be in the early phase of development,58 with major achievements in 
human development to be achieved.59 
Critics fear that the main consequences of transhumanism will lead to different 
reality of humanity called post-human.60 The consequence exposes a dramatic inequality 
between current humanity and post-humanity.61 The new being that is free from disease.62 
As a result, the argument against Transhumanism is that, in addition to compromising the 
meaning of human dignity, progress would be better targeted towards diminishing current 
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problems in humanity such as violent aggression.63 A critical platform to advance the 
debate on enhancement and transhumanism is the technologies that are emerging with 
regard to germline modification, as discussed in the next major section. 
II. Germline Genetic Modification. 
The ethical debate on genetic enhancement in general leads to the more specific 
focus on genetic germline modification that requires examining two related perspectives, 
the religious and secular perspectives. 
A. Religious Perspectives. 
First, two mainstream religious perspectives of germline genetic modifications are 
represented in the views of the Roman Catholic Church and traditional Protestant 
Christianity. 
1. Roman Catholicism. 
The Roman Catholic views of germline genetic modification can be evaluated by 
what is permissible and prohibited. 
Permissible. 
The possibilities for germline modification will occur often in the context of 
prenatal diagnosis. The morality of prenatal diagnosis is permissible as long as there is 
adequate informed consent of the parents and appropriate precautions are taken to protect 
life and integrity of the embryo and mother. Additionally, the embryo and the mother 
should not be subjected to undue risk.64 These conditions contain the core elements 
involved in research ethics.65  Catholic theology is compatible with science, not in 
conflict with it. Where conflict exists science and theology must be reconsidered and 
evaluated.66 
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Two theological points need to be stressed. First, God as creator has imbued 
human beings with intelligence to share in his creative power. God, in giving humans that 
intelligence, expects humanity to improve the universe he has given us. Second, God has 
given us the mandate to be co-workers and exercise real creativity. We are not to be mere 
workers who execute his demands but true participants in bringing the world to 
completion. Catholic theology can constructively engage the evolutionary process.67 In 
this context, modifying human genetics is directly tied to the person’s good.68 The 
Roman Catholic faith sets ethical limits to what humans can achieve, emphasizing that 
knowledge has consequences and thus may be problematic.69 In other words, there are 
ethical limits for the action of human beings in pursuit of that knowledge.70 
Prohibited. 
Three components delineate a moral framework for prohibited areas regarding 
prenatal germline modification. First, because embryos are living human beings, any 
experimentation that is not therapeutic is illicit. Second, every individual human body has 
dignity thus it is not allowed to engage in cloning. And thirdly, personal dignity must be 
maintained, hence attempting to alter human chromosomes or genetic inheritance must 
not be allowed.71 The central point in the Catholic Tradition is that human dignity must 
be protected.72 Many other concerns must be addressed when discussing prenatal 
germline modification, such as privacy, justice, harm, long-term impact, and respect for 
the disabled.73 From the Catholic perspective to be considered morally licit, germline 
genetic modification, even with a therapeutic goal, has disproportionate risks. These 
include significant loss of embryos and the potential for mishaps.74 
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2. Protestant Christianity. 
Within traditional Protestant Christianity there are constraints and positive results 
in responding to questions regarding germline modification. 
Permissible. 
First, despite the constraints of traditional Protestant Christianity on germline 
genetic modification, there can be positive perspectives too. There is agreement that 
human nature was not created in its present form.75 For example, germline modification 
can have a legitimate therapeutic goal or provide a possibility of restoring the human 
body.76 Yet, while it can be permissible in general to implement curative medical 
interventions aimed at curing human disease, germline modifications go beyond this goal 
by impacting future generations.77 One interesting possibility for germline modification is 
when it is adopted to increase resistance to deadly disease that impacts the human 
species.78 Those diseases could be diagnosed and appropriate therapy implemented to 
forestall or even eliminate them.79 In this scenario, it appears potentially acceptable 
insofar as it seeks to alleviate human suffering of current and future generations.80 
These Catholic and Protestant perspectives share a sense of the paradox that 
science presents for religion. The theology of St. Paul in the Christian Scriptures 
identifies the paradox when he speaks of the “old self” being put to death and the “new 
self” coming into existence without the disappearance of the old body.81 This paradox of 
transformation and improvement is nothing new for Christians.82 Since the early 
Christian Church there has been virtually no dispute about the need for human 
improvement.83 Rather, the debates have centered on how far humanity can be 
improved,84 considering whether it is possible for us to improve ourselves or whether our 
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improvement is a result of grace.85 The core Christian understandings of dignity and 
justice have guided engagement with technology and progress.86 This sense of paradox 
between the “old self” and the “new self” that we should seek applies much more broadly 
than to technology, encompassing natural disasters and violence etc.87 Also, the 
theologian Thomas Aquinas highlighted this paradox between the old and new, 
explaining that by the gift of grace human capacities be extended beyond their natural 
capability.88 He understood human nature as being divided into first nature and second 
nature. The first nature is the part of us that we share with all mankind. Something we 
have little control over. Second nature varies and encapsulates various cultures as 
context-dependent. In this context, we can understand technology as enabling our natures 
to change, develop and improve.89 
Prohibited. 
Second, germline genetic modification has a number of constraints placed upon 
it.90 Protestant Christianity is replete with cautionary tales limiting the embrace of acts 
that seem to defy natural limits.91 Germline genetic modification cannot be used if it 
becomes a distraction from the primary goal of humans: union with God.92 The use of 
germline modification cannot be used even if it is to benefit one’s children through 
technology.93 The alteration of human character as male and female is especially 
unacceptable.94 Also, germline genetic modification is especially prohibited when it 
involves destroying embryos.95 Furthermore, the view of the moral significance of early 
embryos by Protestantism has created different opinions about their moral status as 
persons.96 
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B. Secular Perspectives. 
Second, the secular debate on germline genetic modification revolves around 
discussions on justice and the common good, and also implications for risk and safety. 
1. Justice and Common Good. 
Germline genetic modification raises significant concerns about social concerns 
and long- term impact. 
Social Concerns. 
Justice addresses social concerns related to germline modification.97 If germline 
genetic modification could make medical and technological modifications to solve 
potential problems, those modifications could be justified.98 But justice would require 
these solutions and improvements be made widely available.99 Each must be given their 
due is the essence of justice.100 There are different approaches to the discourse on justice, 
such as distributive, commutative, and rectificatory justice.101 These stand separate from 
market pressures that can exacerbate the existing inequalities of society.102 Across these 
different approaches to justice, a variety of strategies are adopted, such as the prohibition 
of innovations that would exacerbate injustices, the creation of innovations that would 
alleviate existing injustices, and the diffusion of innovations to avert unjust advantages. 
103 Whatever approach to justice, or strategy to implement justice is adopted, they require 
that all of society should participate because of their communal impact.104 The common 
good must prevail when addressing new genetic technologies. Equitable distribution of 
benefits is crucial for the common good,105 and having solidarity with those most 
marginalized is indispensable.106 The principle of solidarity describes social cohesion, 
respecting human rights and a communal commitment to order and responsibility.107 This 
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notion of solidarity must pertain to individual, communities, and internationally.108 
Furthermore, the common good inevitably deals with global society,109 especially when 
dealing with breakthroughs in germline genetic modification. Above all, there must be 
robust moral pressure against genetic advantages for only the wealthy.110 
Long-term Impact. 
The implications that germline genetic modifications have for justice and the 
common good highlight the long-term impact upon society in general. Germline genetic 
modification is fundamentally different from other genetic technology insofar as it will 
have a long-term impact. The potential for good and evil is great.111 When medical and 
scientific communities tout genetic modification as a revolutionary tool to cure or 
eliminate disease or disabilities some may hear a paternalistic song that strikes fear and 
concern. A single-track focus on the so-called “technological imperative” can be 
disconcerting for many.112 For example, human reproductive cloning would be highly 
controversial.113 The embryo can become a means to an end when there is cloning of 
another human being.114 A crucial question discussed earlier is whether this technology 
will exacerbate the injustices that already exist.115 Insofar as the human system is a 
product of evolution, we must proceed extremely cautiously to avoid unpredictable 
consequences.116 Future generations have to be given consideration; our social 
obligations are extensive.117 
To address these long-term impacts that affect our common interests, regulation 
of germline genetic modification is indispensable. Because the genome is common 
property to all human beings, there is common heritage.118 Germline modification should 
be regulated by international conventions on human rights. With regard to mobility and 
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migration, the whole species is at risk.119 Minimum standards need to be provided to 
protect present and future generations. In consideration of common interest, transnational 
guidelines would have to support human dignity.120 These regulations must especially 
focus upon avoiding harm.121 The recommendations of The President’s Council on 
Bioethics on Reproduction and Responsibility would command the respect and assent of 
most people. These recommendations include the need for the following: federal studies 
regarding the effects of these technologies, studies on the impact on health and well-
being of women, studies on the use of reproductive genetic technologies and their effects 
on the children born utilizing these technologies, and strengthening the Fertility Clinic 
Success Rate and Certification Act.122 Additionally, we must augment the oversight of 
societies and professional organizations, increase enforcement, and develop new ethical 
boundaries.123 Finally, we need to implement legislation that would achieve the 
following: prohibit transferring embryos to nonhuman species, prohibit producing 
human-nonhuman embryos, prohibit the transfer of embryos for any purpose other than 
producing children, prohibit buying and selling embryos, and prevent the issuance of 
patents on human embryos or fetuses.124 Citizen participation is paramount and would 
add to the social good in developing regulations of germline genetic modification 
technology.125 An interdisciplinary approach is needed because of the complex 
interaction between genetics and ethics.126  
However, in addition to the issue of justice and the common that focus upon the 
long-term impact on society, the extraordinary implications of germline modification for 
enhancement require close scrutiny of issues concerning risk and safety.127 
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2. Risks and Safety. 
The risks involved in germline genetic modification raise two related ethical 
concerns: differing approaches and human-nonhuman chimera. 
Differing Approaches. 
The most dangerous aspects in genetic enhancement are the unintentional results 
that affect the germline. Being restricted to a limited scale can diminish risks.128 
Containment of genetic modification is easier in mammals than it has proven to be in the 
modification of plants.129 In some cases, risks of unintentional genetic modification can 
be mitigated depending upon the genetic alteration.130 However, unintentional genetic 
modification may not be reversible and may radically change the biology of what has 
been modified.131 Different approaches to the risk reduction of unintentional germline 
modification are discussed in the literature, including total prohibition, implementing a 
risk reducing principle, or using cautionary heuristics.132  
A cost-benefit calculation is a valuable tool in the debate over risk,133 providing a 
way to articulate the considerations that need to be made in the evaluation of 
enhancements.134 It has become increasingly helpful to apply principals of economic 
evaluation to effectively compare and analyze costs and outcomes of these genetic 
technologies.135 Cost-benefit calculation can be used to help determine magnitude and 
probability in the identification of risk.136 Only by determining the moral acceptability, 
affordability, and effectiveness of risk-reduction measures, can there be an evaluation of 
acceptable risk.137 The ultimate goal is the reduction of risk to acceptable levels, even 
though eliminating them totally is not feasible. Evaluating the cost includes the benefits 
that would be lost and the costs we bear in trying to mitigate risk.138 
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Related to risk is the ethical concern of safety. The technology of germline 
genetic engineering makes safety a critical concern with regard to procreation. Germline 
engineering should pose no more risk than the ordinary process of conception and natural 
birth. Experiments in animals must assure the techniques implemented in humans do not 
cause any more problems than would a natural birth.139 There must be a reasonable 
expectation that the human embryo would have a better chance of being free from the 
treated disease.140 Also, at the time of implantation measures to minimize the dangers to 
the mother need to be resolved.141 Hence, before embarking on germline engineering, 
long-term experience with somatic cell gene therapy needs to occur.142 The support of 
women’s reproductive rights are ethically relevant because of the significant 
consequences that could occur with process of genetically modified embryos.143 The 
main focus must be upon safety to avoid untested and harmful therapies that could 
potentially compromise the mother.144 In general, respect for individual and familial 
autonomy as well as reproductive rights of individuals and couples need to be kept in 
balance.145 However, more specifically, the safety of the mother must be protected, 
especially regarding drugs and protocols used to stimulate ovulation and egg retrieval.146 
Human-Nonhuman Chimera. 
The religious and secular concerns of germline genetic modification can be 
illustrated in the discussion over the creation of and experiments on human-nonhuman 
chimeras. Core ethical concerns are shared in both religious and secular critiques. These 
can be categorized as concerns about the biological development of embryos for the 
purpose of creating chimeras.147 This technology raises serious concerns regarding the 
moral status of those embryos, all of which are eventually destroyed.148 Respect for the 
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moral status of embryos cannot be foregone even for the noble cause of investigating the 
potential for disease crossing species barriers.149 In addition, animal welfare and animal 
rights need to be considered in the enterprise of creating these chimeras.150 It can be 
argued that all living things have interests predicated in biology and to circumvent those 
interests is morally wrong.151 In this regard, there needs to be a middle ground regarding 
care for and utilization of animals in research, most especially in cross-species 
experiments.152 These are fundamental concerns that need to be explored in depth.153 By 
combining human and nonhuman tissue, the potential to hinder both from fulfilling their 
purpose would be wrong.154 
Above all, the denigration of human dignity would result from creating human-
nonhuman chimera;155 the concept of human dignity is crucial for evaluating the morality 
of these new genetic technologies.156 The dignity of personhood is widely recognized as 
an individual of rational nature: whether that definition could pertain to chimeras is of 
crucial concern.157 To natural law theorists (such as adopted in religious traditions like 
Catholicism), the order of nature has a standardizing force, thereby making it morally 
wrong to alter a human being’s nature (such as embryo development),158 including its 
basic functioning and capacities.159  
The previous sections on genetic enhancement and germline genetic modification 
delineate the ethical landscape for evaluating new genetic technologies that will impact 
future generations. Two recent technologies have emerged that are now considered in 
further detail: mitochondrial DNA technology and gene editing technology with CRISPR. 
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III. Mitochondrial DNA. 
The previous sections on genetic enhancement, and germline genetic modification 
delineate the ethical landscape for evaluating new genetic technologies that will impact 
future generations. Two recent technologies have emerged that are now considered in 
further detail: mitochondrial DNA and gene editing technology with CRISPR. 
To discuss the ethics of mitochondrial DNA, the pivotal ethical topics require 
examining two related topics: the science of mitochondrial DNA and the ethical, social, 
and policy considerations. 
A. Science of Mitochondrial DNA. 
First, to understand the ethical debate on mitochondrial DNA, a discussion must 
address human reproduction as well as mitochondrial DNA biology and the 
mitochondrial DNA diseases and research. 
1. Human Reproduction and Mitochondrial DNA Biology. 
Basic fundamentals of human reproduction and mitochondrial DNA science need 
to be discussed. 
Reproduction Basics. 
Some fundamental concepts of human reproduction are the foundational cells 
involved in human reproduction are gametes. Fusion of an egg and a sperm cell creating a 
zygote is the first step in human reproduction.160 At this early stage, the zygote is made 
up of both male and female pronuclei. The first replication of the pronuclear genetic 
material occurs prior to the nuclear membrane  dissolving. The two-cell embryo is formed 
after the male and female genetic materials are fused forming the two-cell embryo each 
cell having equal complements of genetic and cytoplasmic material.161 Two distinct cells 
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(somatic and germline cells) are derived from the embryo. Somatic cells form all the cell 
and tissue types while germline cells develop into either male spermatozoa or female 
oocytes. Germline cells make up the germ cell lineages.162 
Mitochondrial Science. 
Mitochondria are in nearly all cell types. The general role is in regulating cellular 
energy. The role includes production of cellular energy, regulating cellular metabolism, 
and assisting in subordination of programed cell death.163 Mitochondria were once free-
swimming bacteria that took up residence in another cell. They were very efficient at 
harvesting energy by burning oxygen.164 The mitochondria are constantly swimming 
within cells in the body retaining their own genome; these are the vestiges of years of 
their evolution.165 The mitochondria’s primary function is in the production of the 
majority of energy needed to fuel cellular processes. They are often referred to as the 
powerhouse cells. Mitochondria are critically important by providing energy 
requirements for muscle and brain cells, users of high-energy demands. The mitochondria 
serve as regulators of many cellular metabolic functions and help maintain proper 
intercellular balance.166 Mitochondria also contain the ability to convert fats, proteins, 
and carbohydrates into intermediates that directly impact the respiratory chain. 
Mitochondria have their own genome containing mitochondrial DNA that in turn 
has some commonalities with nuclear DNA but differ in many ways.167 They differ in 
their genome structure, mitochondrial are circular while the nuclear are linear. The 
mitochondrial has over 100,000 copies of the genome in each mature cell, while the 
nuclear has only two. In the number of DNA base pairs, mitochondrial has over 16,000 
while nuclear has over three billion.168 Another unique feature of mitochondrial genetics 
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is each cell, tissue, and person contains more than one mitochondrial DNA. While it is 
agreed-upon that mitochondrial DNA is essential in cellular energy production, it is 
generally agreed that nuclear DNA’s predominant function is in the characteristics of 
anatomy, physiology, and personality. In humans, mitochondrial DNA is inherited solely 
from the mother and only females pass their mitochondrial DNA to offspring both male 
and female. However, male mitochondrial DNA does not pass on to future generations. 
169 
2. Mitochondrial DNA Diseases and Research. 
Mitochondrial maladies and various techniques of research of mitochondrial DNA 
will be discussed in this section. 
Mitochondrial Maladies. 
The diseases of mitochondrial DNA are very similar, manifesting themselves in 
the respiratory chain activity. Because of reduced cellular energy production they 
manifest themselves in the organs of the highest energy demand. To date, there is no 
approved treatment or cure only supportive and palliative care. These resultant diseases 
are because of the defects in nuclear DNA or mitochondrial DNA.170 Because of dual 
genomic control the respiratory chain diseases are result of nuclear DNA or 
mitochondrial DNA mutations.171 Some of the maternally inherited mitochondrial DNA 
diseases are Leigh syndrome; mitochondrial encephalomyopathy, lactic acidosis, and 
stroke-like episodes; myoclonic epilepsy with ragged-red fibers; neuropathy, ataxia, and 
retinitis pigmentosa; maternally inherited diabetes and deafness; maternally inherited 
Leigh syndrome; and Leber hereditary optic neuropathy.172 These diseases range from 
very mild to severely debilitating or fatal. Their onset can be in early life or manifest 
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themselves in adulthood. Generally the mitochondrial diseases tend to have later onset 
and milder symptoms compared to nuclear DNA diseases that typically are earlier in life 
and often more severe.173 It is estimated that 1 in 5000 people have a pathogenic 
mitochondrial mutation.174 Further extrapolation estimates that 778 children are born per 
year in the US from women at risk of transmitting mitochondrial DNA disease.175 
Treatment of the diseases is very difficult, because of (1) the heterogeneity and (2) the 
lack of success of delivering treatments into the mitochondria.176 
Various Techniques 
Research of mitochondrial DNA diseases has led to gene editing of somatic cells 
and while having great promise also has had limited success in humans.177 By using an 
investigational technique, heteroplasmy shift, which selectively targets and degrades 
pathogenic mitochondrial DNA mutations has seemed to offer efficacy in animal studies 
but has not yet been utilized in humans.178 The real advantage with this technique, it 
would not require the use of genetic material from a second woman.179 Another powerful 
technique is preimplantation genetic diagnosis, even though it has had limited studies it 
does show significant potential. Its limitation is that the technique involves selection of 
an embryo with the least amount of detectable heteroplasmy but does not eliminate the 
risk of transmitting the disease to offspring.180 
To date, none of these options give prospective mothers peace of mind that their 
children may not develop mitochondrial DNA diseases.181 Mitochondrial replacement 
techniques are being investigated for their benefits. Two of these techniques are maternal 
spindle transfer and pro-nuclear transfer. Both of these techniques involve the 
restructuring of the oocyte by replacing the mutated mitochondrial DNA with a donors 
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nonpathogenic mitochondrial DNA.182 There is an important difference between these 
two techniques. Maternal spindle transfer entails removal of the nuclear DNA from the 
mother’s oocyte, which is then infused with a donor’s nonpathogenic mitochondrial DNA 
oocyte. The newly reconstructed oocyte is then fertilized and cultured in vitro to the 
blastocyst stage.183 The combined embryo would then be tested for abnormalities, 
heteroplasmy levels, and sex selection.184 With pro-nuclear transfer, the nuclear DNA is 
transferred between fertilized oocytes prior to fusion of the pronuclei. The pronuclei of 
the male and female are removed from the zygote and fused to the enucleated zygote of 
the sperm providers’ sperm and an oocyte of provided by an unintended mother. Again, 
the newly constructed oocyte would be cultured to blastocyst stage, and then would 
undergo genetic testing.185 
A third technique, polar body transfer, has been proposed but there has been only 
limited investigation regarding its ability to prevent mitochondrial DNA disease 
transmission; hence it was not included in the Institute of Medicine’s Report. Similarly 
other methods of preventing the transmission of mitochondrial diseases that are not under 
United States Food and Drug Administration consideration (cytoplasm transfer, somatic 
cell nuclear transfer, and embryo cell nuclear transfer, and germinal vesicle transfer) were 
not included in the Institute of Medicine’s Report.186  
B. Ethical, Social, and Policy Considerations. 
Second, an understanding of the science of mitochondrial DNA sets the stage for 
addressing ethical, social, and policy considerations. These considerations are in large 
part addressed in discussions of unintended consequences and the recommendations of 
the Institute of Medicine. 
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1. Unintended Consequences 
Heteroplasmy, mitochondrial DNA bottleneck, and mitochondrial evolution will 
be discussed in evaluating unknowns and predicting impact. 
Evaluating Unknowns 
Three unique considerations have to be made in mitochondrial genetics to 
effectively evaluate unknowns and unintended consequences in research. They are 
heteroplasmy, mitochondrial DNA bottleneck, and mitochondrial evolutionary theory.187 
Because of these complexities there is an unpredictable nature about mitochondrial 
genetics that make the ability to predict preclinical studies with certainty and safety very 
difficult.188 
Heteroplasmy is a state where more than one type of mitochondrial DNA 
genotype is contained in a cell, tissue, or individual. When a threshold effect occurs, cells 
containing mutations display dysfunction only when a certain level mitochondrial DNA 
transmission is reached.189 Heteroplasmy levels can fluctuate at different rates because of 
the shifts in proportion of pathogenic mitochondrial DNA transmission. The pathogenic 
mitochondrial DNA molecules can be distributed unequally into daughter cells shifting 
heteroplasmy levels.190 Mitochondrial DNA bottleneck can occur during oocyte 
development. Then only a fraction of the original pool of the mitochondrial DNA 
molecules is divided into daughter oocytes.191 Because of this bottleneck, the number of 
mitochondrial DNA molecules can be reduced from nearly 100,000 to as few as 10.192 
Predicting Impact 
Rapid changes in the level of mitochondrial DNA mutations can occur from one 
generation to the next thus impacting the mitochondrial DNA evolution. All these factors 
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add to the complexity of determining risks.193 Potential incompatibility of artificially 
combined nuclear and mitochondrial genomes are of major concern.194 Studies have 
shown that certain genome backgrounds are often only compatible with each other and 
incompatible pairings are often selected unknowingly.195 Another problem is the 
mitochondrial DNA could accumulate mutations that could have a negative impact on 
males and a positive impact on females.196 A potential uncertainty is inadvertent physical 
damage to the reconstructed oocyte or zygote.197  The complexity of mitochondrial 
genetics makes predicting behavior of the mitochondrial DNA challenging and filled with 
uncertainty. Thus predicting the efficacy and safety because of uncertainties and 
unknowns is challenging. To assess the benefit and risk a thorough understanding of the 
unknowns is paramount.198 
2. Institute of Medicine Recommendations. 
In this section, impact considerations and criteria for expansion will be delineated. 
Impact Considerations. 
The Institute of Medicine’s Report concluded that with adherence to sets of 
conditions, the clinical investigation of mitochondrial replacement techniques should be 
allowed to move forward. The following ethical, social, and policy recommendations 
were made in the Institute of Medicine’s Report that has significant ethical implications 
for discussions about the ethics of germline modification upon which this essay is 
focused. 
Mitochondrial replacement techniques should be considered if the following 
conditions are met: (1) safety must be established and risks to all parties must be 
minimized, especially to future children; (2) the likelihood of success must be evident; 
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(3) investigations must be limited to women who are risk of transmitting severe 
mitochondrial DNA diseases; (4) risk should be minimized to alleviate adverse health for 
pregnant mother and fetus; (5) investigators and centers have to have demonstrated 
expertise for this technology; (6) investigations should be limited to male embryos for 
intrauterine transfer; and (7) every possible risk of mitochondrial DNA-nuclear DNA 
incompatibility needs to be mitigated.199 
Ethical standards developed by the United States National Academies of Science, 
Engineering, and Medicine, the United States National Institute of Health, and the 
International Society for Stem Cell Research must be adhered to with regard to human 
embryos. Nonviable embryos must not be used in the preclinical research.200 Also, 
clinical investigations must follow these principles and practices: (1) the future well-
being as a result of mitochondrial replacement techniques must be given priority in 
balancing benefits and risks; (2) standardization of protocols must be of highest priority 
to the minimize the number of variables and accommodate pooling of information; (3) 
data from all research must be incorporated to improve the quality of assessment; and (4) 
long-term studies regarding psychological and social effects on children born as a result 
of mitochondrial replacement techniques have to be collected.201 
Criteria for Expansion. 
If success in transferring male embryos is demonstrated then consideration should 
be given to include the transfer of female embryos if: safety and efficacy using male 
cohorts has to be demonstrated, regardless of the time to collect this evidence; animal 
research has had to demonstrate intergenerational safety and efficacy; and there is a 
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predicated consistency of decisions that are compatible with public and scientific 
deliberations.202 
Due to the unusual aspects of mitochondrial replacement techniques research, 
special attention must be given to communicating to research participants. Participants 
who provide gametes, the informed consent process must include: (1) the procedures 
anticipated in any ethical, social, and policy considerations; (2) appropriate 
compensation; (3) management of unused eggs; (4) the embryos; and (5) provisions for 
contact of those who provided gametes and children born as a result. For the parents, the 
informed consent process must include: (1) focus on the health and well-being of children 
born of the research protocol; (2) alternative means of begetting children that avoid 
transmittal of mitochondrial DNA disease; (3) discussion of restrictions on access to 
embryos created; (4) incorporating prenatal genetic testing; (5) the insistence on long-
term follow-up regarding any child born as a result of these protocols; and (6) 
maintaining patient privacy. For the children born, assent and eventual consent must be 
gleaned for monitoring and research procedures.203 
The United States Food and Drug Administration’s review, approval, and 
subsequent marketing of mitochondrial replacement techniques must incorporate the 
following elements: (1) transparency that maximizes public sharing of information; (2) 
public engagement through the involvement of relevant stakeholders; (3) partnership with 
other regulatory authorities in aiding the assessment of benefits and risks; (4) 
maximization of data quality through cross-referencing and pooling; (5) circumscribed 
use by limiting the use of the technology to individuals and settings for which it is 
approved; and (6) long-term follow-up with periodic review must be a requirement.204 
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IV. Gene Editing with Clustered-Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR).  
Closely related to the mitochondrial DNA ethical discussion is the debate on 
CRISPR. This is gene editing technique targeting and modifying DNA. The pivotal 
ethical discussions on CRISPR address two related topics, the science of genome editing 
and the ethical, social, and religious concerns. 
A. Science of Gene Editing with CRISPR.  
First, to appreciate the science of genome editing with CRISPR requires 
understanding of its history and its methodology. 
1. History. 
An historical overview of CRISPR from its original roots to current status will be 
discussed. 
Historical Overview. 
The history of CRISPR has its original roots in the new era for biology with the 
development of recombinant DNA technology in 1970s. The manipulation of DNA 
molecules was first accomplished thus gaining the ability to study and develop genes. 
The genes were harnessed to develop novel medicine and biotechnology.205 Genome 
engineering is very broad term referring to the process of making specific modifications 
to the genome. Innovative techniques have been developed for altering genetic 
sequences.206 Early gene therapy trials were very successful in the curing of 17 children 
with severe immunodeficiencies.207 Unfortunately, four children died of leukemia-like 
symptoms attributed to gene delivery, inserting into an unpredictable location within the 
chromosome. Misplaced insertion can occur in the human genome that regulates cell 
growth and division resulting in uncontrolled growth of cells.208 In another gene therapy 
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trial, a patient died as a result of an immunological response of the material used to 
deliver the corrected gene. In both these cases, the role of the delivery method 
contributed significantly to the adverse outcomes.209 CRISPR itself was discovered in 
Japan where they were the first to observe clustered-interspaced short palindromic 
repeats in the DNA of bacteria in 1987.210 In an attempt to study a protein-encoding gene 
in Escherichia coli, researchers observed short, repeating, palindromic DNA sequences 
separated by short, nonrepeating, spacer DNA sequences.211 
Current Status 
Current development began in 2010 when the intricate detail of the mechanism 
where bacteria are infected by other microorganisms, called bacteriophages or phages 
were explained by two research groups of the University of California Berkeley and 
Umea University in Sweden.212 The CRISPR system recognizes specific patterns of DNA 
from the foreign invaders and decapitates them by cutting the invaders DNA into pieces. 
The way that the bacteria targets specific DNA and cleaves it gave scientists a hint of its 
potential in other applications.213 In 2013, two research groups from Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology and Harvard University successfully modified this basic 
mechanism and turned it into a powerful tool that can now cut human genomic DNA at 
any desired location.214 For example, in Summer 2016, China pioneered the first human 
CRISPR clinical trials.215 
2. Methodology. 
Tools for genome editing and the potential for CRISPR technology will be 
engaged in this section. 
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Tools for Genome Editing. 
The methodology for genome editing was by targeted molecular machines. These 
machines have been used as tools for many years.216 Researchers have developed many 
innovative techniques for altering genes since the first modifications were made. 
Recently, breakthroughs using Zinc finger nucleases and transcriptional activator-like 
effector nucleases have significantly reduced cost and complexity in targeting changes in 
living cells but CRISPR is by far the easiest to use. 217  Experts believe these advances 
could have wide-ranging clinical applications with the potential to prevent or cure a 
variety of diseases.218 The newest of the gene editing technology is CRISPR. It was 
adapted from an immune system found in prokaryotes.219 It has been established that 
bacteria have evolved with a defense mechanism against viruses. When bacteria 
encounter an invading source of DNA, segments of the foreign DNA can be copied and 
incorporated into their genome as spacers between the short DNA repeats in CRISPR.220 
With a piece of the invading DNA it can be copied into the host genome, which serves as 
a genomic memory of invading pathogens. These spacers enhance the bacteria’s immune 
response by providing a template for RNA molecules to quickly identify and target the 
same DNA sequence in the event of future viral infections.221 If the RNA molecules 
recognize the incoming sequence of foreign DNA, they guide the CRISPR complex to 
that sequence. At that point the bacteria’s Cas proteins, which are specialized for cutting 
DNA, splice and disable the invading gene.222 The CRISPR system is unique from other 
technologies requiring no protein engineering, only synthesis. The simplicity of this 
technology drastically reduces the time for conducting genome experiments.223  
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Potential. 
Since the first recorded use of CRISPR technology in January 2013, it has shown 
significant progress in demonstrating therapeutic potential.224 Because of the simplicity 
and affordability of the system it makes itself accessible to researchers. In recent in vivo 
studies in primate embryos, it has shown compelling progress that will expedite rapid 
advancement toward clinical trials.225 This technology has shown great promise in several 
monogenetic disorders such as sickle cell, cystic fibrosis, and even showing potential in 
the prevention of coronary heart disease.226 Additionally, researchers have explored many 
different applications including genetically modified crops, eradicating viruses, screening 
for cancer genes, and genome engineering.227 
B. Ethical, Social, and Religious Concerns. 
Second, the concerns about CRISPR technology need to be discussed from the 
perspective of social and ethical dimensions as well as from the religious perspective. 
1. Ethical and Social Concerns. 
In this section, the concerns about CRISPR technology’s impact will be discussed 
from the perspective of social and ethical dimensions and possible regulation of the 
technology. 
Impact. 
The concerns regarding the social and ethical implications of CRISPR 
“reprogramming DNA” have similar concerns to those of genetic manipulation. Most 
notable of the concerns are passing on to subsequent generations deleterious impacts to 
the human genome.228 Clinical trials of CRISPR gene editing system have not been 
implemented on the human somatic genes but it has been used to create genetically 
  265 
engineered mosquitoes. These genetically engineered mosquitoes are no longer capable 
of transmitting malaria thus possibly eliminating the disease. To increase the efficiency 
and improved targeting, significant work remains to prove safety and efficiency.229 Two 
applications, both alluded to, that are most concerning about the CRISPR applications are 
the edits of human reproductive tissue and the generation of and release in the wild of 
transgenic organisms that are capable of continuing these edits.230 Any edits made would 
be made without consent of the any individual who carries them in the editing of the 
genomes of other species is fraught with concern regarding irreversible ecological 
alterations. CRISPR needs three things to work: DNA encoding the genome cutting 
enzyme, DNA encoding the guide RNA, and DNA that serves as a repairable template.231 
Gene editing for targeting somatic genes is imminent for application in embryos and 
gametes but the technology is most likely useful in treating monogenic diseases rather 
than polygenic ones. Before this technology can be utilized for germline modification, 
significant knowledge needs to be gained regarding human genetic interaction and the 
interplay between diseases.232 
Regulations. 
Regulation  of this technology is looming because of the potential for exploitation 
in non-therapeutic uses, off target modifications, and embryonic screening.233 Because of 
the potential of permanent changes in the human genome, changes from intellect to 
physical qualities, there has been growing support for a ban on germline modification for 
reproductive purposes.234 Due to the lack of societal consensus and safety concerns it 
would be irresponsible to try to produce human pregnancy from the modified germ cells 
or embryos.235 This takes on new urgency especially in light of Chinese work in 
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nonviable human embryos using the CRISPR technology.236 Three phases of regulation 
are being proposed: preclinical research, clinical trials, and post approval distribution. To 
ensure safety and ethical guidelines, financial and regulatory checkpoints would be 
developed.237 Prior to research a complete internal review board approval would be 
mandatory.  Transitioning from research, the clinical to commercialization, government 
agencies such as United States Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines 
Agency would ensure safety, and quality. Sufficient guidelines would need to be in 
place.238 
2. Religious Issues. 
Discussed in this section are some of the religious concerns such as dignity and 
the unitive procreative connection. 
Dignity. 
The dignity imputed to human beings is the major religious concern in the context 
of genetically editing the human genome with the CRISPR technology. With human 
genome editing a distinction must be made between editing for therapeutic purposes and 
enhancement to augment human capacities. The intervention must be effective and 
reasonably safe. The benefit must outweigh any possible risks.239 The effort to alter the 
germline therapeutically could be acceptable if respect for human dignity offspring is 
maintained.240 
Unitive and Procreative Connection. 
Also, the unitive and procreative aspects of the marital act must be maintained.241 
In the Catholic Church’s Apostolic Exhortation “Familiaris Consortio,” it is stated that 
the conjugal act is a sign and language. If the internal commitment to conjugal love is 
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revoked, the act itself is counterfeited and lacks moral dignity.242 In principle, the 
Catholic Church supports research insofar as God has entrusted nature to our 
stewardship. This research within reasonable limits is permissible especially when it has 
the potential for saving human lives.243 
The ethics of enhancement via germline genetic modification delineates the 
general ethical landscape for assessing specific technologies that emerge, such as 
mitochondrial DNA and CRISPR techniques. First, the pivotal ethical issues related to 
genetic enhancement are influencing human progress that includes human development 
and human nature. Additionally, in a discussion of influencing future generations, moral 
identity and perfection must be included. Second, the pivotal ethical issues related to 
germline genetic modification dealt with concerns that engage religious and secular 
discourse. Roman Catholicism and traditional Protestant Christianity’s concerns were 
explored. The major secular concerns, justice, common good, risk and safety (with 
human-nonhuman chimeras being an illustration of the debate), have been considered. 
Then two emerging technologies were examined to illustrate how the general 
ethical argument on germline enhancement can be applied to particular techniques: 
mitochondrial DNA technology and gene editing technology with CRISPR. To discuss 
the ethics of mitochondrial DNA technology, the pivotal ethical topics were organized 
into two categories, the science of mitochondrial DNA and the accompanying ethical, 
social, and policy considerations: the discussion of mitochondrial DNA science 
considered human reproduction and the biology of mitochondrial DNA as well as the 
diseases and research potential of mitochondrial DNA; the ethical, social, and policy 
considerations focused upon unintended consequences and the expert recommendations 
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of the Institute of Medicine. To discuss CRISPR gene editing technique that modifies 
DNA, the pivotal ethical topics were organized into two categories, the science of 
genome editing and the accompanying ethical, social, and religious concerns: the science 
of CRISPR was explained from the perspectives of its history and methodology; and the 
ethical and social concerns were connected with religious concerns about clustered-
interspaced short palindromic repeats technology. 
This chapter has explored the ethical debates on the emerging regenerative 
technologies. The next chapter moves to address technological issues that arise at the end 
of life. 
V. Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious Directives. 
As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, the Catholic Tradition’s use of Natural Law 
has two general approaches. The first approach focuses on the universal aspect of human 
nature. This approach is typically associated with the settled Catholic teaching on 
morality. The second approach focuses on the person, presenting a dynamic and historical 
view of the human condition as contributors to God’s creation.244  This approach is 
typically associated with the Principle of Double Effect to apply traditional Church 
teaching in a flexible manner to changing circumstances. Arising from these two 
approaches to Natural Law, a third approach has emerged combining the nature-oriented 
and person-oriented approaches to new dilemmas regarding emerging technologies that 
may require doctrinal development in Catholic teaching. 
In the conclusion of each applied chapter, a critique based on the Ethical and 
Religious Directives is presented regarding the main topics of the chapter. The critique 
adopts the above approaches to identify three distinct categories as follows. Category A 
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deals with settled issues in Church Teaching reflecting the Nature Approach to Natural 
Law. Category B deals with the controversial issues eligible for using the Principle of 
Double Effect reflecting the Personal Approach to Natural Law. Category C deals with 
issues requiring doctrinal development in Catholic teaching to address new dilemmas 
regarding emerging technologies. 
The following analysis applies this threefold critique to the topics discussed in 
this chapter on regenerative technology. Each main section is discussed in turn. 
Section I. Genetic Enhancement. 
This section discussed ethical meaning of human nature and this is settled 
Catholic teaching in a manner that opposes genetic enhancement (Category A). Catholic 
teaching opposes genetic enhancement based on the nature approach to Natural Law. 
This argument resists the so-called temptation to seek perfection.245 
 The manipulation of the human genome is not new to Catholic teaching. Whether 
it is Francis Galton’s concept of biometry or Gregor Mendel’s study of the gene, the 
Church has been in dialogue to garner the good of genomic science and avoiding any 
harm.246 Notably, the Catholic Church led opposition to eugenic efforts in the United 
States during the early 1900s. In spite of the history of eugenics, there is renewed interest 
in new technologies that could impact the human species in a eugenics manner.247 
Another topic in this section dealt specifically with genetic interventions that deal 
with disease. There is settled Catholic teaching that permits any medical intervention 
(including genetic intervention) to overcome disease in individual patients (Category A). 
 However, a crucial distinction must be made between therapeutic genetic changes 
and genetic enhancement. Therapeutic changes are ones that aid a person to return to 
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“normal functioning” status.248 Here, increasing our health could lead to increased 
longevity. The goal here is not perfection but overcoming disease that contributes to 
fulfilling human capacity.249 
 Another topic in this section deals with supernormal enhancements to seek 
perfection, especially occurring via genetic manipulation of the germline. This is 
forbidden now, and would require doctrinal development to examine future species 
related genetic enhancements (Category C). The reason for this Catholic stance is that 
germline genetic enhancement would be deleterious to humanity because of the unknown 
factors being passed on to future generations and the potential abuse of the most 
vulnerable in our societies.250 Manipulation for enhancement could promote a eugenic 
mentality. This enhancement could attach social stigma to people who lack certain 
qualities while giving advantages to others who enjoy qualities that are appreciated by 
certain cultures. Impact upon the common good would be expected because of the 
favoring the will of some over the freedom of others.251 
Section II. Germline Genetic Modification. 
 Continuing this theme of genetic enhancement, the section discussed germline 
genetic modification as being prohibited in Catholic teaching. Future developments here 
would require doctrinal development (Category C). 
 Two perspectives contribute to this Catholic prohibition of genetic modification. 
First, the embryo has inherent dignity; hence any genetic experimentation that is not 
therapeutic is illicit. Second, every individual human being has dignity; hence any 
germline genetic modification that could compromise this dignity is not allowed. That is, 
personal dignity must be maintained hence attempting to alter genetic inheritance is 
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forbidden.252 Within the Catholic Tradition, the main objective when considering 
germline genetic modification is the protection of human dignity of individuals and the 
species.253  
 In this section, human-nonhuman chimeras were also discussed. These are 
forbidden and future technologies arising from them would require doctrinal development 
in Catholic teaching (Category C). 
 The basic ethical concern here deals with the ethical status of a chimera. Because 
of unique human dignity, moral limits need to be discussed. With a potential benefit to 
humanity, the Catholic Church in principle does not object to the respectful use of 
animals in research. However, research in human/animal chimeras raises significant 
ethical and legal concerns around the compromise of the human embryo and the resulting 
ethical status of a human/animal chimera for research purposes (even if the chimera is 
destroyed after the development of primitive streak as required by regulation).254 
Although, the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith has not addressed the 
creation of chimeras that can be used for ‘hybrid cloning’ directly, the basic issue of 
identity makes the research morally and ethically unacceptable.255 
Section III. Mitochondrial DNA. 
This section discussed mitochondria (the structures within cells that convert the 
energy from food into a form that cells can use). Mitochondrial DNA diseases have no 
cure, and are progressive and often life-threatening.256 The basic concern with 
mitochondrial DNA transplants to avoid transmitting disease is that the technology 
involves a third parent’s DNA. This is construed in Catholic teaching as compromising 
the unitive/procreative bond of marriage and is forbidden; to accept any new technologies 
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based on this to the would require doctrinal development in Catholic teaching (Category 
C). 
These types of intervention and mitochondrial DNA transplants are ethically 
problematic and are addressed in the Ethical and Religious Directives when Directives 
#50 and #51 discuss prenatal diagnosis and non-therapeutic experiments.257 
Prenatal diagnosis is permitted when the procedure does not threaten the 
life or physical integrity of the unborn child or the mother and does not 
subject them to disproportionate risks; when the diagnosis can provide 
information to guide preventative care for the mother or pre- or postnatal 
care for the child; and when the parents, or at least the mother, give free 
and informed consent. Prenatal diagnosis is not permitted when 
undertaken with the intention of aborting an unborn child with a serious 
defect. (Directive #50) 
 
Nontherapeutic experiments on a living embryo or fetus are not permitted, 
even with the consent of the parents. Therapeutic experiments are 
permitted for a proportionate reason with the free and informed consent of 
the parents or, if the father cannot be contacted, at least of the mother. 
Medical research that will not harm the life or physical integrity of an 
unborn child is permitted with parental consent. (Directive #51) 
 
The complicated nature of mitochondrial genetics makes anticipating 
behavior of the mitochondrial DNA filled with uncertainty. Thus predicting the 
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efficacy and safety is challenging. To assess the benefit and risk, a thorough 
understanding of the unknowns is paramount before any technology is 
implemented.258  
Section IV. Gene Editing with CRISPR. 
  This section discussed gene editing with CRISPR. This fast developing 
technology could be permissible in Catholic teaching when applied to somatic cell (not 
germline) therapies using the Principle of Double Effect (Category B). 
 Studies have shown that it may be possible to delete or disable genes in an 
embryo that may be carrying life-limiting abnormalities.259 Many consider CRISPR 
research as experimental and not therapeutic, arguing that a moratorium is needed.260 
There are multiple moral quandaries created by this technology, which has been endorsed 
by the Institute of Medicine.261  
 Furthermore, the distinction between therapy and enhancement is being 
recalibrated by some as a distinction between therapy and non-therapy. Based on burden-
benefit analysis using the Principle of Double Effect, CRISPR technology could be 
justified to overcome disease in individual patients. However, Catholic teaching requires 
that we need “reasonable boundaries to distinguish genetic interventions that preserve 
and promote human dignity from those that may endanger and marginalize it.”262 
Germline genetic modifications that impact the germline or inheritable change at 
the level of the egg or sperm that could be passed to future generations is currently 
problematic in Catholic teaching. Procedures used at the somatic cell level for therapeutic 
purposes can be morally licit. The moral evaluation of the germline cell therapy is 
different. The risks connected to any genetic manipulation are considerable and yet not 
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fully controllable. Currently, Catholic teaching holds that it is not morally permissible to 
act in any way that could cause harm to the resulting progeny. The Church refers to this 
manipulation as “the human genetic patrimony.”263 That is, to the extent that CRISPR 
technology could change the human germline (as typically will occur with embryos) it is 
forbidden, and approval of developments of this technology would require doctrinal 
development in Catholic teaching (Category C). 
In sum, the threefold ethical critique based on the Ethical and Religious 
Directives has been applied to the topics discussed in the main sections of the chapter. 
This threefold critique is applied at the end of the next applied chapter. 
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Chapter 6. On Death and Dying. 
Throughout history, the attitudes of death and dying have transformed gradually, 
shifting focus from the dying and their families to the role of the physician and the health 
care team. As a result, the dying process has become rife with ethical dilemmas. To 
adequately discuss death and dying requires examining three related topics: changing 
attitudes to death and dying, the meaning of medical futility, and the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment. 
I. Changing Attitudes towards Death and Dying.  
Death is the final journey all must take. To discuss the changing attitudes towards 
death and dying, two areas elicit attention, the contemporary characteristics of death and 
dying and related philosophical approaches. 
A. Characteristics. 
First, contemporary characteristics of death and dying can be revealed in 
discussions about the locus of control and about accompanying rituals. 
1. Locus of Control 
Throughout history, the locus of control (the sense of authority over a situation or 
experience) gradually shifts from the dying and his family to a physician and health care 
team. To adequately engage the locus of control, a tame death and prolonging life must 
be discussed. 
Tame Death 
Death is a final journey all must take. Like an unwanted visitor, death is 
sometimes a kind act of nature. At other times, death is not kind when it is the result of 
violence. Even though death can be one of the most painful encounters one can 
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experience, all remain morbidly curious about it. Society had moved from the time when 
individuals were able to listen to their inner voices about impending death accordingly 
death was not a struggle, and people usually passed away without fear. Death was a part 
of life. Aries refers to this perspective as “tamed death,” or one that comes with natural 
warning signs.1 A long lingering death was very unusual. People typically died of disease 
with rapid onset and a quick end. People were usually forewarned, and that forewarning 
came through natural signs and inner convictions.2 
Unfortunately, the current mandate is one in which individuals (including family 
members and doctors) make every effort to prolong the death process under the guise of 
prolonging life. No longer do individuals allow themselves to hear the voice of death, to 
acknowledge the voice of death, nor to accept the voice of death. Every conceivable tool, 
technological advancement, and chemical medication to prolong life is provided. In 
reality, death is merely being postponed. This change in attitude towards death over the 
millennia is unfortunate and deplorable. This dissertation examines various health care 
philosophical tenets and their loci of control: physician-centered paternalism and 
beneficence as well as autonomy, which are patient-centered. Additionally, the moral 
tradition of the sanctity of life within a historical context of changing attitudes towards 
death and dying will be discussed. 
Prolonging Life. 
Before the 12th century, there was a familiar resignation that all would die. At that 
point, things began to change: the awareness of self and death took on a new meaning: 
“one’s own death.”3 Subtly over time, death became very personal and was viewed as a 
natural event. By the 1800s, the locus of control shifted from the dying person to the 
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survivors of the dying. Now the survivors of the dead found it difficult to deal with the 
death of another person. Death of self was not as feared as much as a death of another.4 
By the 1900s, a different sentiment emerged about death: it must be avoided at all 
cost. In the midst of a happy life, there was no room for death because life is always 
happy or should always seem so. This pall of death and the sadness associated with it was 
viewed as unacceptable to family members and the greater society as a whole.5 
The locus of control shifted once again in the 1930s to the 1950s to physicians 
and the health care team. Once considered a shelter for the poor, the hospital became the 
place for everyone to receive care that could no longer be provided at home. The 
technology of the day, even rudimentary devices, was available only in hospitals and they 
logically became the place where one would struggle against death. In this period, if one 
died in the hospital, the physician failed in healing rather than death being seen as a part 
of nature. Death became a technical phenomenon.6 For centuries, death was the 
jurisdiction of the dying individual and his survivors. Only recently and still somewhat 
today, the locus of control is the physician and the hospital team, who are the masters of 
death. 
2. Rituals. 
The locus of control of death regarding the use of medical technology needs to be 
situated within a broader context that respects rituals around death. To appreciate these 
rituals it can help to be attentive to the history and evolution of rituals around death. 
Historical Overview. 
As the locus of control shifted over the centuries, so too did the rituals of death. 
The death occurred typically in bed. The pre-death rituals were organized by and presided 
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over by the dying person himself. Everyone knew the protocol. Ceremonially, simplicity 
of the rituals of dying was accepted and carried out.7 The “tamed death” came to an end 
due to a combination of both cultural and religious changes and the rise of scientific 
medicine. In the 1700s, life expectancy had begun to shift and the view of death as well. 
By the 1800s, the rituals of mourning and loved ones being taken away became known as 
a communal evil. At that time, death became a more segregated personal event. By the 
late 1900s, death was taken out of the hands of families and put in the hands of doctors 
and medical institutions. This marked the beginning of the ‘big lie’ or the hiding of 
imminent death. Most believed that technology could change nature giving birth to the 
belief that death had been eliminated. Technology had replaced nature and the 
elimination of death. A resigned acceptance of death was lost in favor of the medical 
management of death.8 
Evolution. 
Other noticeable changes were the custom of mourning and the purpose of a will. 
From the end of the Middle Ages to the 1700s, mourning took on a double purpose. It 
served as a period of sorrow out of respect for the family who experienced the death of a 
loved one. However, mourning allowed for the dissipation of grief.9 Once when too much 
emotion was displayed by mourners and viewed as mental instability or bad manners, 
grief soon became more reserved. Outward signs and customs for death likewise evolved 
over the centuries. The wearing of dark clothes by family members and mourners gave 
way to daily attire; no one dressed any differently because of the death of a family 
member. Another notable change was that children used to be allowed around the 
deathbed, in full participation with the dying process. Now, children are kept from the 
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dying process. Death has been moved to the closet where sex used to be. Death has 
become taboo.10 
Another change in dying rituals was the wishes expressed by the dying to be 
considered after burial. Before the 1700s, death was a concern only to the person 
threatened. Only a legal document for the disposal of property was a concern for family 
members. 11 After the 1700s, a will became a document that laid out religious services 
and the legacy the dying wanted to pass on. This document for five centuries was merely 
a means by which each person could express his thoughts, his faith, and his attachments 
to possessions and God. Decisions were centered on how to assure the salvation of his 
soul and the disposition of his body.12 
B. Philosophical Approaches. 
Second, the changing characteristics of dying over time have been accompanied 
by different philosophical tenets about death. Throughout history, as attitudes and 
customs towards death and dying changed, two philosophical approaches emerged to 
guide the dying process, one being physician-centered, the other being patient-centered 
care. 
1. Physician-Centered. 
For the philosophical approach that is physician-centered, two interrelated issues 
are important: the meaning of the Hippocratic tradition and the role of paternalism and 
beneficence. 
Hippocratic Tradition. 
The Hippocratic Oath, one of the best-known Greek texts, is one tradition that is 
still practiced today. With the advent of this oath in 5 BCE, physicians promise to act for 
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the good and to keep patients from harm. This oath requires physicians to use their skills 
not as they would prefer but for human benefit. In that pursuit, they are charged to “do no 
harm.” Physicians are also expected to improve their knowledge and skills, increase their 
competence, and to care about their patients or to be “troubled by another’s trouble.” The 
physician has a responsibility to aid and care for a patient even if no cure is available.13 
The Hippocratic tradition is also one of the basic tenants of both Eastern and Western 
medicine. Physicians must always treat a person in need. The Hindu code asserts that all 
people are to be treated as if they were relatives. The Chinese code emphasizes all are to 
be treated equally.14 
Early on during the Hippocratic tradition, medicine was viewed as a “moral 
enterprise.”15 Physicians were expected to swear to the god's certain loyalties. The 
Hippocratic Oath also binds the physician to his teacher and the greater community of 
physicians with specific responsibilities laid out in a code of proper behavior. Part of this 
code is to demonstrate the beneficial nature of any moral enterprise, the use of medical 
skills for human benefit. The Hippocratic tradition takes a strong stand against abortion, 
euthanasia, and suicide. This stance was an opinion of a small segment of Greek 
philosophy, rather than the prevailing view of most Greeks. Despite this opinion, no 
disgrace was attached to suicide. Likewise, Greek or Roman law did not protect the 
unborn child either because these societies, which were pre-Judeo-Christian, did not hold 
the view that eternal punishment awaited for those who ended their lives or the lives of 
the unborn. 
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Paternalism and Beneficence. 
Throughout history, the physician lived in a world that made multiple claims on 
him: demands of his family as well as the state. All expected his loyalty.16 The church too 
made claims on the physician; life was to be respected. The church would demand 
absolute honesty by the physician toward a dying patient who needed to be told 
everything so that he could prepare himself appropriately and get his house in order.17 
Along with these expectations, paternalism became the norm in the early 20th century. In 
this philosophy, the physician always knows best.18 With medical paternalism, a 
physician ignores the patient’s viewpoint and assumes that any disease can be cured. The 
greatest failure of paternalism is the assumption that medical good is the highest good. 
An example might be when a physician fails to appreciate the personal values of the 
patient, which might result in a lengthy treatment regimen that ignores the patient’s 
values.  Until modern times, the physician was not looked upon as failing if he were not 
successful in keeping someone alive. Death was inevitable and thus tolerated by the 
community and accepted without agonizing fear. Because death hit every age group, it 
was a routine part of life. People took death calmly, and it had a public character to it. 
There was no secrecy, no trying to hide it. Death took place amid a circle of family, 
friends, and children.19 Because of medical management of death, people now live longer 
lives but have worse health, experience longer illnesses but slower death, are faced with 
longer aging and increased dementia.20 The distorted view, that all diseases are curable 
and that the sanctity of life can best be maintained through medical science and 
technology used aggressively against death, is commonplace.21 
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Beginning with the Greeks, paternalism was not as dubious ethically as it is today. 
The United States culture has grown in the area of individual rights. Medical treatment of 
old depended heavily upon faith in the physician more so than on therapies or any 
technology. The social status of a physician, which could lend itself to irresponsible use 
of power and feelings of superiority, were just some of the problems with paternalism.22 
Paternalism evolved into beneficence. Beneficence means, “do no harm,” which 
resembles passive non-malfeasance. Prevention of harm follows closely. To further move 
down the order of the beneficence would be to interpret the physician’s duty as binding 
even if it causes discomfort, risk, or pain to the patient. The physician must act in the 
patient’s interest even if it costs to comfort, power, prestige, or fiscal benefit to the 
physician.23 
2. Patient-Centered.  
For the philosophical approach that is patient-centered, the focus is on patient 
autonomy and the accompanying conflict that can arise. 
Autonomy. 
The tidal wave of changes happened in medical ethics starting in 1965, most 
crucially, the shift from physician to the patient in decision-making. The dignity of the 
human person is where the model autonomy is grounded. This shift in the locus of control 
also promoted an unprecedented expansion of medical technology. Similarly, the 
economic considerations changed as to how physicians viewed their patients.24 With the 
expansion of political democracy, the general improvement of education and the 
increasing moral pluralism in our society have been major forces in the significant 
growth of autonomy. While paternalism may be appropriate in some situations (such as 
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treating children or treating patients who are incapable of making autonomous decisions), 
autonomy is a better option. In emergency rooms, where uncertain prognosis may be the 
norm, to forgo autonomy, however, may be appropriate at times. These situations would 
all fall into the “variability context” and require careful assessment in each case.25 
Conflicts. 
In general medicine, medical technologies history is a confluence of three 
distinctive historical streams: biological research, clinical practice, and the healthcare 
industry.26 With the development of the microscope, the germ theory of disease was 
finally accepted. This led the way for the development of vaccines, public sanitation 
improvement, and aseptic surgery became a norm. More than any other tool, the 
microscope may have contributed the most to medical science.27 With the discovery of x-
rays, the ability to see inside the body, which previously had only been a dream, spawned 
additional tools for mapping and even repairing internal organs.28 Radioactivity properly 
harnessed became a powerful diagnostic and therapeutic tool that has led to positron 
emission tomography scanners, the Gamma Knife, and protein accelerators.29 Harnessing 
sound waves were the precursor to the development of stethoscope and the blood 
pressure monitor. Ultrasound first developed detecting icebergs, and enemy submarines 
detect flaws in the human body that became clinically useful and an extremely valuable 
diagnostic tool.30 With the ability of physicians to repair, replace, and assist failing 
organs, the need for accurate record keeping and analysis of data became apparent and 
thus the standard of care. Additionally implanted devices have evolved with the 
development of integrated circuits and microprocessors and the transition from analog to 
digital electronics has offered significant benefit.31 The Internet is now offering 
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unprecedented access to medical information and treatment options. Health care has 
embraced the wireless age and telemedicine is now in its infancy with the use of cellular 
telephone technology that will conceivably change health care forever.32 
Medical technology has worked wonders although modern medicine is far from 
perfect. Success often breeds complacency, and potentially an overreliance on medical 
technology can have a very deleterious impact on the relationship between physician and 
patient.33 
Additionally, a conflict has been exacerbated by medical technology, which 
revolves around the ubiquitous computer.34 High-tech medicine is now moving to the 
next level because of enhancement of communications. Physicians have immediate 
access to medical records, digital scans, x-rays, medical resonance imaging, a whole 
plethora of needed information.35 The operating skills of surgeons can be enhanced by 
video cameras, robotic surgery, and even speech recognition.36 Some advocates say that 
the most exciting changes that have happened in healthcare are now the interaction with 
patients and physicians.37  Physicians are now being able to expand their portfolio of 
diagnostic tests and therapies by providing these services to patients in the comfort of 
their own home. Phone lines or cell signals can be used to monitor, reconfigure, or update 
medical devices along with medical emergencies that can be reported and responded to 
immediately.38 
Unprecedented access to information about medical conditions and treatments are 
now available through Internet resources.39 People need access to information to aid in 
their quest to be good informed consumers of health care and its delivery.40 Telemedicine 
has expanded from accessing expert physicians consulting with doctors in rural and 
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developing areas. The progression of telemedicine medicine now includes radiology 
services with a remote interpretation of scans and the utilization of robotic tools used by 
the surgeon. Additionally, telemedicine is now being utilized to more easily communicate 
and aid the physicians, hospitals, and pharmacies to better manage the patient’s medical 
condition.41 Smart phone applications have been developed to track patient’s medical 
care, read blood samples and transmit results, remotely monitoring patients in critical 
care intensive care units, and aiding physicians themselves to be better informed of 
current technological advances.42 Ultimately, consumers will be able to effectively 
monitor their health in consultation with their physician detecting potential problems. 
Concerns still exist regarding the personal relationship being deleteriously impacted 
between physician and patient.43 
II. Medical Futility. 
The discussion above on changing attitudes on death and dying offer insight into 
the ethical debate surrounding medical futility. The discussion over medical futility is 
fraught with controversy. To discuss medical futility requires examining two related 
topics: the debate about the meaning of futility and the goals of medicine. 
A. Futility Polemic. 
First, to clarify the meaning of medical futility, the ethical debate revolves around 
the definition of futility and the definition of rationing. 
1. Defining Futility. 
The definition of medical futility can be clarified by considering the purpose of 
treatment and by looking at an example of a futility policy, specifically the Texas 
Advance Directives Act. 
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Purpose of Treatment. 
The concept of medical futility is an ancient concept dating back to the time of 
Hippocrates (d. 375 BCE) when he stated that physicians should not treat those who are 
overmastered by their disease. Hippocrates realized that in many cases medicine is 
powerless. Medical futility is a clinical action serving no useful purpose in attaining a 
goal in the care of a patient. Scholar Griffin Trotter maintains medical futility occurs 
when: (1) there is a goal, (2) achieving this goal has an action and activity, and (3) 
achieving that goal will fail with virtual certainty. For the physician to discuss futility 
with patients and family, three concepts are essential for the discussion. First, treatments 
that are ineffective or harmful to patients are not obligatory. Second, physicians must 
engage in dialogue concerning futile treatments. Thirdly, physicians must convey concern 
even if there is no cure. Providing ongoing care for patients is never futile.44 
Futility Policy-Texas Advance Directives Act. 
On September 1, 1999, the Texas Advance Directives Act became law regulating 
end-of-life futility. Several provisions are included in this law: addressing the living will, 
terminal and irreversible illnesses, and witnessing requirements. To take advantage of the 
law and to create a legal safe haven for institutions and physician, certain provisions must 
be followed: (1) families must be given written information about hospital policy, (2) 
families are to be given 48 hours notice and be invited to become involved in ethics 
consultation process, (3) the family must be provided a written report of the findings of 
the ethics review process, (4) if the consultation process fails to resolve the issue, the 
hospital in concert with family will try to arrange transfer of the patient to another 
physician and institution willing to give treatment that is being refused by the current 
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team, (5) after 10 days, if no providers can be found, the hospital and physician may 
withhold or withdraw the treatment determined to be futile, (6) the party who disagrees 
may appeal and ask a court to grant an extension only if there is a likelihood of finding a 
willing provider, and (7) if no extension is granted, then the futile treatment can be 
withdrawn with immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. This is a regulation that 
mandates the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if deemed futile even if it is against 
patient and family wishes. In theses cases, it needs to be critically reviewed from the 
perspective of the Catholic Tradition.45  The Texas Advance Directives Act raises 
questions from the Catholic perspective of medical futility in light of the observance of 
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. Directives #57, 
#58, and #60 address the withholding of medically appropriate treatment, artificial 
nutrition and hydration, and the prohibition of euthanasia. 
A person may forgo extraordinary or disproportionate means of preserving 
life. Disproportionate means are those that in the patient’s judgment do not 
offer a reasonable hope of benefit or entail an excessive burden, or impose 
excessive expense on the family or the community. (Directive #57) 
 
In principle, there is an obligation to provide patients with food and water, 
including medically assisted nutrition and hydration for those who cannot 
take food orally. This obligation extends to patients in chronic and 
presumably irreversible conditions (e.g., the “persistent vegetative state”) 
who can reasonably be expected to live indefinitely if given such care they 
cannot reasonably be expected to prolong life or when they would be 
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“excessively burdensome for the patient or [would] cause significant 
physical discomfort, instance, as a patient draws close to inevitable death 
from an underlying progressive and fatal condition, certain measures to 
provide nutrition and hydration may become excessively burdensome and 
therefore not obligatory in light of their very limited ability to prolong life 
or provide comfort. (Directive #58) 
 
Euthanasia is an action or omission that of itself or by intention causes 
death in order to alleviate suffering. Catholic health care institutions may 
never condone or participate in euthanasia or assisted suicide in any way. 
Dying patients who request euthanasia should receive loving care, 
psychological and spiritual support, and appropriate remedies for pain and 
other symptoms so that they can live with dignity until the time of natural 
death. (Directive #60) 
 
Tradition teaches that individuals must preserve life, but not by all means. If 
measures cause a grave burden for oneself or another, then the use of extraordinary 
efforts should be avoided. Directive #57 morally justifies the patient’s decision to refuse 
treatment, but it does not authorize a patient to request a treatment that is either ordinary 
or extraordinary. Additionally, Catholic Tradition supports the physician’s ability to 
conscientiously object or to offer treatment. Directive #58 establishes that medically 
assisted nutrition and hydration is not an absolute necessity if their administration would 
be harmful to the patient. Therefore, this directive would not be applicable in futile cases. 
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Directive #60, the forbidding of euthanasia, has to be viewed regarding the intent. 
Withholding treatment from futile patients is not to end their life. The intent is to remove 
inappropriate and harmful medical treatments and thus to relieve suffering.46   
The main concern of the Texas Advance Directives Act from the Catholic 
perspective is that this law could enable physicians to bypass communicating with 
families making decisions about end-of-life. Consequently, physicians might go directly 
to the review committee without any meaningful interaction with family. Granted this 
could occur, but the data support otherwise. Catholic health care facilities should and 
often do support use of Texas Advance Directives Act as a model. The law allows the 
physicians to practice according to their conscience and the law seeks the good of the 
patient by preventing a prolonged process. The law also tends to improve the quality of 
end-of-life care in the most difficult circumstances by improving communications 
between family and staff.47 Texas is one of only two states with a specific timetable for 
terminating a patient’s life-sustaining treatment. The technology involved in such 
treatments can be inhumane by causing significant pain and suffering to patients. When 
patients reach this point, they typically suffer from multiple organ failure and 
continuation of patient care is imprudent. Additionally, life-sustaining treatment can be 
very disturbing and distressing to physicians and healthcare providers when witnessing 
patients’ unnecessary suffering.48  
2. Rationing. 
The definition of rationing needs to be separated from futility because they are 
very different ethical concepts. Defining and the purpose of rationing will be engaged. 
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Defining Rationing. 
Futility at times is confused with rationing, but they are very different ethical 
concepts. Futility deals with continuing a treatment that has no benefit; rationing deals 
with withholding a treatment that does have a benefit. This does not mean that rationing 
is wrong: it can be justified especially from a policy perspective. 
  Rationing of health care is limiting the availability of beneficial health care. In the 
United States, few restrictions exist on the use of health care technology regardless of 
cost or clinical effectiveness. Rationing care by eligibility for insurance coverage is 
where ethical issues emerge. Health care resources are both explicitly or implicitly 
rationed and thus limiting access to beneficial health care services. The key question is 
not whether health care is rationed but how, by whom, and to what degree. Additionally 
balancing autonomy, beneficence, and distributive justice can create ethical dilemmas. 
The “rule of rescue” is accomplished in medical care when providing services to the most 
needy or the most identifiable. Therapeutic services are often given priority over 
preventive services regardless of goals or cost-effectiveness.49 
Purpose of Rationing. 
The basic purpose of rationing to have a policy that fosters stewardship limited 
resources and health care. Health care in the United States accounts for the largest 
percentage of gross domestic product of any other industrialized nation on earth. Only by 
rationing or setting limits can health care costs be kept from spiraling out of control. 
These costs are unsustainable for this country as long as there is an increasing demand for 
expensive technology, fueled by new research discoveries, patient demands for curative 
therapies, and the tremendous profits that are gleaned from health care. People have 
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difficulty comprehending the arguments that exist for curtailing health care; arguments 
are emotionally charged when talking about human pain and suffering. Even though 
many private insurance companies, Medicare, and Medicaid have placed many 
restrictions on the ability of doctors to prescribe, operate, and implement, the physician 
retains significant leverage over what gets offered to the patient. When combining this 
system with the traditional fee-for-service system, a significant increase in costs occurs.50 
Hence, rationing can be justified from a policy perspective as a function of stewardship 
of limited resources in health care. This is where rationing and futility achieve similar 
goals in this sense. Just as rationing from a policy perspective seeks to steward the 
resources of health care, similarly futility emphasizes the need to withdraw ineffective 
treatment not only out of respect for the patient but also to steward limited health care 
resources.51 
B. Compassionate Goals of Medicine and Health Care. 
Second, the debate on medical futility connects the meaning of futility with the 
goals of medicine. To understand the goals of medicine when facing situations of medical 
futility, two issues must be addressed: the meaning of compassionate succor and how to 
deal with end-of-life dilemmas. 
1. Compassionate Succor. 
The meaning of compassionate succor refers to situations that deal with the 
prevention of disease and prevention of untimely death. Both will be brought to light. 
Prevention of Disease. 
Compassion is manifest in the prevention of disease as a goal of medicine. The 
prevention of disease has three core medical values. First, it is better to avoid disease 
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when possible. A physician’s duty is to help patients stay well. Some contend that the 
physician who helps the patient remain healthy does them as great a service as caring for 
them after their disease has occurred. Secondly, there can be a beneficial economic 
consequence by helping to reduce chronic disease and offering cost-effective health care 
as well as alleviating dependence on technology. Thirdly, the public at large as well as 
the medical community needs to be aware that preventive health care has significant 
benefits and needs additional emphasis.52 
Society has to begin to develop true compassion. Instead of succumbing to the 
temptation of self-preservation, humans cannot turn away from the suffering of their 
fellow man or the suffering children. True compassion must be developed to the point 
that it promotes the very willingness to help.53 Ultimately, these facts cannot be ignored: 
death can only be postponed and the disease itself cannot be overcome. Disease 
prevention cannot be an absolute priority over other goals of medicine. Illness and death 
will eventually impact everyone.54 
Compassion is also indispensable for the alleviation of pain and suffering as a 
goal of medicine. One of the ancient duties of the physician has always been the relief of 
pain and suffering. Pain and suffering are not experienced in the same way. Pain often 
refers to physical distress: throbbing, piercing or burning, whereas suffering usually has a 
psychological aspect such as fear, dread, or anxiety. Pain, the unrelenting kind, can be a 
source of suffering but does not always lead to it. Conversely, suffering does not always 
involve pain.55 Compassion must always be part of the professional duty of physicians 
because of their self-image held by the public. Without a doubt, compassion as a duty lies 
in the connection to other duties (e.g., fiduciary responsibility to the patients, the duty of 
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due care, and the duty to maintain confidentiality). All of these duties have a powerful 
relationship to compassion.56 
The suffering that comes with a disease can be understood and responded to; 
additionally, it can cause fear, despair, anxiety, futility and even helplessness. These 
feelings need to be responded to by the physician with compassion. The compassionate 
physician will put the patient's interest first. Two key elements of compassion include: 
(1) the capability and eagerness to join deeply enough to gain insight into the experience 
of an individual suffering; and (2) a virtue personified by the eagerness to ease the 
person's suffering, or at the very least, to be the medium to help the patient lives through 
the pain.57 
In the fiduciary responsibility, a patient’s interest is linked to compassion in two 
ways. First, a physician is best able to interpret where the patient’s interests lie. There is 
important evidence gleaned. A compassionate physician, one who feels the patient’s 
suffering, is best at relieving that suffering. Secondly, alleviation of suffering is usually 
the patient’s main interest. Because compassion means the desire to alleviate suffering, 
the compassionate physician will facilitate putting the patient’s interest first.58 A 
compassionate physician also must provide due care. The physician is required to 
maintain a reasonable range of professional skills and to use them appropriately. Patients 
have so many varied needs, and there are so many medical specialties having different 
and evolving standards, the duties of care can vary. The truly compassionate physician 
will more likely act with due care as circumstances evolve.59 
In addition to due care, confidentiality is required of the compassionate physician. 
He encounters a vulnerable patient who may reveal sources of a patient’s suffering, 
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secrets about an undisclosed lifestyle, guilt, emptiness, and even rejection. The 
compassionate physician will see this duty of confidentiality as a protection of the 
vulnerable.60 These duties have a much better chance of fulfillment when a physician 
brings compassion into the patient encounter. Without compassion, the physician is 
unlikely to provide the same level of care and much less likely to protect the patient’s 
vulnerability. A transformation has occurred away from the compassionate doctor-patient 
relationship. This transformation has been a very complex process.61 
Medicine has been profoundly affected by the embracing of science. Science uses 
methods that are value free. First, a hierarchy of values in medicine has existed: the 
patient is first, the doctor must do no harm, and the patient’s good is paramount. Science 
deals in generalities, not specifics.62 Secondly, technology has impacted the character of 
the physician. Science and technology have mistakenly been construed to be the same 
about the thinking and behavior of the physician. Thirdly, a new model of a physician has 
emerged that is academically minded and differs from the physician’s role of the past. 
There has been a general mistrust of science resulting in a redefinition of patient-hood. 
The patient has become so knowledgeable that the physician can no longer advance the 
idea that he is the sole owner of medical knowledge.63 
The outcome of this new model could be an avoidance of pain and suffering in the 
patient. Pushing acknowledgment out of the physician's conscious awareness has 
occurred when emotional expression by the patient has been distressing, disconsolate, 
fearful or even despairing. When the physician’s presence is called for, he still may avoid 
direct contact by employing excuses. Avoiding unpleasantness can be described as 
normal; but actually, it may suggest the physician’s emotional issues.64 Helplessness and 
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role inadequacy are other reasons that a physician may avoid pain and suffering. Studies 
have suggested that the health of the physician may be compromised if he does not 
acknowledge his own emotions. As a result, the quality of medical care can be 
compromised. When patients feel abandoned or rejected by the physician, the call “to do 
no harm” and to benefit patients can be ignored. When patients are avoided, the physician 
misses opportunities to appreciate the patient's experience and may not adequately 
address symptoms.65 
Prevention of Untimely Death. 
Another goal of medicine is the prevention of premature death for which 
compassion is central. Many challenges are going to be encountered if medicine chooses 
to move toward compassion. The essential challenges are that of mindfulness and self-
awareness of the physician. Tremendous opportunities exist for medical education to 
establish a foundation for the physician’s well-being and quality care of the patient.66 An 
important goal of medicine has always been the struggle against death. Medicine’s duty 
to accept death as the destiny of all humans must remain in healthy tension. In medicine 
today, its first aim should be to reduce premature death. The secondary purpose is proper 
care for those whose death is not premature. These people too can benefit from medical 
treatment.67  A premature death is one that occurs without a person having an opportunity 
to experience a complete human lifecycle. Death may be premature if it could have been 
prolonged without great torment to the individual or society. The extension of life for its 
sake should not be an appropriate medical goal.68 
Finally, compassion is indispensable in attaining a central goal of medicine: the 
support for a peaceful death. A peaceful death is one with diminished pain and suffering 
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yet the patient never feels like he has not been abandoned nor has not received an 
appropriate end of life care. A death such as this can never be guaranteed by medicine, 
but medicine can avoid treating death as medical failure. To help facilitate a peaceful 
death, a physician must act compassionately at every opportunity.69 A peaceful death 
should be provided by medical treatment that is appropriate. Today in medicine, death is 
often treated as the supreme enemy. In its effort to banish death, however, medicine has 
come to believe it has the power to change, to control, and to eradicate a disease. 
Medicine has dissolved the line between human power and nature's power. Initially, 
death was understood as a natural event, something that happens to everyone and 
everything. Death had been experienced as evil; not a moral evil, but an evil of religion or 
something in the abstract. As medicine’s effectiveness changed, the view of death has 
taken on a moral dimension and fatalism has been eliminated. But with this moral view 
comes a moral obligation to use every means possible to ward off death.70 
Under the moral view, if the patient dies the physician has failed. The more 
control over death that medicine has exercised, the more the demand on morality has 
increased. The metamorphosis of death from a biological evil to a moral evil has 
occurred. The tension has now been created between what one can do medically and what 
one ought to do morally. The emphasis has been placed on medical advocacy rather than 
what is morally correct.71 In this transformation of death, one of the by-products that have 
been lost is compassion. The behavior of a kind and caring physician is desirable because 
that attitude not only reveals consideration for the patient, but also an authentic attitude of 
compassion that fosters trust in the patient which is rarely found. The caring and 
compassionate physician who manifests the recognition of suffering and the desire to 
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help is often missing. Compassion does not cost extra time or resources but offers 
confidence that can improve the patient’s well-being.72 
As medical technology advances, the line between living and dying is hard to 
determine. Medicine has changed the focus from death being a biological fact to focusing 
on the single-mindedness of the causes of death. Society and medicine have come to 
accept that human agency has replaced the power of nature. A fusion of technology and 
the sanctity of life have created tremendous pressure against the acknowledgment of 
death.73 An overwhelming temptation exists to take control over life and death; this is a 
result of technology. More options in health care do not mean better health care. 
Compassion comprehends the dignity of the sick and honors that patients are full 
participants in their healing, partnering patients and physicians, especially at the end of 
life when technology gives all tremendous power. Often technology substitutes for 
compassionate care. Compassion can be defined as neither under treatment nor 
overtreatment.74 
The Human Genome Sciences Chief Executive Officer, William Haseltine (b. 
1944) articulates the epitome of the attitude of death avoidance: “Death is nothing but a 
series of preventable diseases.” Cures would be the result of finding the genetic source of 
disease. This, in fact, has not proved to be the case. Nevertheless there is an optimistic 
push to continue in that vein. Countering that way of thinking is the palliative movement, 
trying to bring the “tame death” back into reality.75 “Tame death” is the concept coined 
by the French scientist Phillipe Aries (d. 1984) referencing the acceptance of death as 
part of nature.76 
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Technologies have extended dying but have not cured diseases as promised. The 
use of technology has been driven by overpowering incentives that include fee-for-
service medicine, excessive medical training in the use of technology, the fear of 
litigation, patient demands, and consumer advertising. All of these incentives cause 
physicians to be even less compassionate.77 Medical technology is one of the greatest 
enemies of a good death. The myth of the utopian concept against mortality has spilled 
over into the culture expecting medical miracles. The public has been duped, expecting 
that life should not end.78 Physicians who have been taught to push patients not to give up 
have exacerbated hope in technology. A moral obligation “to push on” regardless of the 
potential for positive outcomes has become an accepted norm.79 
An illustration of this phenomenon: An elderly female patient with multiple 
comorbidities on ventilator support as well as extensive medical interventions was 
unconscious and deemed unable to make her own decisions. She did have medical power 
of attorney but no advance directives. After a significant conversation with the niece, the 
surrogate decided to withdraw life-sustaining therapies. She advised the critical care 
physician of her intent to withdraw. The physician went to the unconscious patient and 
shook her and said: “You don't want to die, do you? You can't give up!” Not only was 
this behavior unprofessional, but also revealed his lack of compassion. Although this was 
blatantly unprofessional, it has been observed that often the exact opposite situation 
occurs. The patient or his surrogate demands all treatment possible regardless of its 
benefit, even to the point of medical futility. In those cases, the compassionate physician 
faces a significant dilemma. 
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Society and the physicians exhibit compassion in different ways while pursuing 
the goals of medicine. Preventing disease and suffering while fostering a peaceful death 
are explained. Compassion must be given a greater prominence in society and health 
care. A greater concern for one’s fellow man is paramount. Society needs to change so 
the patient and physician can have compassionate, healthy discussions without the 
pressure from society to do everything and where doing nothing does not seem morally 
wrong. Humans must realize their obligation to take better care of themselves and take 
responsibility for their health care. 
To this end, health care is now moving more into the community with less 
emphasis on bricks and mortar. The idea of preventive health is being promulgated by the 
health care industry. With the advancement of technology, there are virtual emergency 
departments with real-time diagnosis, cause, treatment, and prognosis all being done in 
the patient's home. The goal is to improve the community’s health and to alleviate the 
need for hospitalization. Ultimately, these changes will have a significant impact on 
distributive justice, limited resources, and the common good of all. Additionally, 
compassion needs to be reinserted into the physician’s capacity to serve his fellow man. 
Medical schools and medical training must be reinvigorated with compassion for the 
patient. In this systematic change in the delivery of health care, compassion needs to be 
recognized not only as an additional benefit but also as a crucial duty of all physicians. 
 2. End-of-Life Dilemmas.  
The end-of-life dilemmas raise ethical issues about balancing criteria of burden 
versus benefit and about the sanctity of life. Both will be discussed. 
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Balancing Criteria. 
Modern medicine has postponed the natural course of dying. Patients are now 
subjected to prolonged lives and acute complications thus forced to make decisions about 
how vigorously to treat and when it is morally permissible to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining measures. The most judicious in helping to resolve these moral difficulties is 
to develop a combination of subjective and objective criteria. Striking a balance between 
three criteria: effectiveness, benefit, and the burden are the moral calculation being used. 
Effectiveness estimates the capacity to alter the disease or symptom positively. Benefit 
refers to what is valuable to the patient centering on the patient's assessment of his own 
goals. Burden refers to the physical, emotional, fiscal, or social cost imposed on the 
patient. If the assessment of these criteria is favorable to the treatment then it is morally 
justifiable; when it is unfavorable, then it is not morally justifiable. Clinically these 
criteria give some clarification to what is ordinary and what is extraordinary.80 Finally, a 
fundamental distinction needs to be highlighted between ordinary and extraordinary 
means in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. The 
distinction refers to the use of the prepositions “and” highlighted in the Ethical and 
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services quotation above. Patients must 
use means that are ordinary. This means when there is both a benefit and no excessive 
burden or expense. In contrast, patients have no obligation to use means that are 
extraordinary (this means when there is either no benefit or an excessive burden or 
expense). In other words, there is a much lower ethical bar to establish treatments as 
being extraordinary and hence morally optional. 
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Sanctity of Life. 
A major moral tradition in healthcare is the sanctity of life. The term has a 
relatively modern usage. The concept of the preservation of life is as old as life itself. 
When used in a restrictive sense, it connotes the dominion of God. In a universal sense, it 
emphasizes stewardship to help determine obligations faced regarding health care and 
other quandaries. When the sanctity of life is used as stewardship, then stewardship 
becomes a task rather than a boundary line.81 Respect for life and sanctity of life can be 
used interchangeably. In the biological sense, both respect the existence of a living 
human organism for human individuality and the personhood.82 
Historically, there seems to be a reverence for life, making the deliberate killing 
of another person a punishable offense. Aversion to murder in all societies is the most 
universal of all moral attitudes. Abortion, euthanasia, and suicide have not shared that 
commonality. In Greek and Roman society, there was some disapproval of abortions and 
even some legal prohibition.83 Some Greek philosophers even looked at abortion, as a 
way to control population and it was essential for a well-ordered community. The Judeo-
Christian tradition significantly impacted the evolution of the belief that abortion and 
suicide were morally wrong. Most people in the West regard life as something sacred and 
hold that no one can dispose of it whether by murder, abortion, or suicide. The reason 
that killing is forbidden is based on Divine prerogative and divine rights.84 
The term “sanctity of life” has become an all-encompassing term to include all 
life regardless of quality, even to prolong dying. Invoking the term “sanctity of life” may 
be going too far when it is used in the argument against abortion. The term can be an all-
  315 
inclusive term with no limitations. The use of this term can be problematic because there 
are times when an abortion may be morally allowed.85 
When the universality of the term “sanctity of life” is used it gains a very positive 
orientation rather than emphasizing the things one cannot do. At that point, the sanctity of 
life can help guard against the erosion of the respect for life; even in protecting gravely ill 
patients who are vulnerable.86  Sustaining life reflects the doctrine of the sanctity of life. 
But to what limits are we to prolong life? Roman Catholic ethics prohibits the termination 
of life intentionally, but it does permit withdrawing futile treatments to let patients die. 
Given that life can be prolonged by medical intervention there is a temptation to consider 
that it should be continued at all cost. However, the Catholic Traditions doctrine on the 
sanctity of life is so robust as to respect life by withdrawing futile life-sustaining 
treatment. Naturally, there are both philosophical and practical uncertainties about went 
to withdraw futile treatment to let a patient die. The traditional doctrine about the sanctity 
of life is consistent with the view that there is an important distinction between ordinary 
and extraordinary means of preserving life.87 
III. Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment. 
Related to the above discussion regarding attitudes to death and medical futility, 
is the ethical debate around the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. This discussion 
requires consideration of two related topics: artificial nutrition and hydration and the 
relief of suffering at the end-of-life. 
A. Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration. 
First, assisted nutrition and hydration is especially significant as a medical 
intervention at end-of-life and for patients in a persistent vegetative state. 
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1. Role at End-of-Life. 
In this section, the end-of-life ethical debate on medically assisted nutrition and 
hydration revolve around clarifying its medical purpose and how these encounter cultural 
pressures. 
Medical Purpose. 
Two main reasons are cited for using technology to initiate assisted nutrition: to 
improve fatigue and to avoid “starving to death.” Sometimes clinicians and families 
believe the reason the patient is weak is that they are not eating. No evidence exists that 
supports assisted nutrition improves energy level or survival except patients who are for 
mechanical reasons not able to eat. The data suggest that an increased risk of aspiration 
and other complications-infection, obstruction, edema, and pneumonia are more likely to 
occur when patients are supported with assisted nutrition. Often the conversation around 
nutrition and hydration has to do with the patient and family’s acceptance of dying than it 
does about intervention. Assisted nutrition and hydration is now a medical therapy rather 
than providing sustenance. All stakeholders (physicians, patients, and caregivers) need to 
understand what the likely outcome is in each situation. In prolonging life, medically 
assisted nutrition and hydration can be invaluable. At the end of one’s life, its usefulness 
comes into question. The decision to administer medically assisted nutrition and 
hydration has to be individualized in light of the goals of care of the patient.88 
Cultural Pressures. 
Family members often feel helpless in the face of disease progression. Their 
common concern is, “Will our loved one endure more pain and suffering without food 
and fluids?” Studies have shown that feelings of hunger are absent from patients who are 
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nearing end-of-life. Thirst can be a major discomfort, but there seems to be no correlation 
between the intake of actual fluid and the sensation of thirst. Dehydration may have 
benefits at the end-of-life by aiding in the release of endorphins that offer natural pain 
control as the body shuts down. Releasing endorphins can also aid in the improved 
quality of life due to the elevation the patient’s mood. If fluids are increased, there may 
be increased urinary output and thus the need for a urinary catheter. Food and fluids also 
increase gastrointestinal activity potentially causing the patient discomfort due to 
abdominal distention, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. With the addition of fluids, an 
increase of oral and airway secretions will develop allowing for potential aspiration 
pneumonia, coughing, congestion, and or difficulty in breathing.89 Two main reasons are 
cited for using technology to initiate artificial nutrition: to improve fatigue and to avoid 
“starving to death.” Sometimes clinicians and families believe the reason the patient is 
weak is that they are not eating. No evidence exists that supports medically assisted 
nutrition and hydration improving energy level or survival except patients who for 
mechanical reasons are not able to eat. The data suggest that an increased risk of 
aspiration and other complications (infection, obstruction, edema, and pneumonia) are 
likely to occur.90  Often the conversation around nutrition and hydration has more to do 
with the patient and families’ acceptance of dying than it does about intervention.91 
Assisted nutrition and hydration is now a medical therapy rather than providing 
sustenance. All stakeholders (physicians, patients, and caregivers) need to understand 
what the outcome is in each situation. In prolonging life for some, medically assisted 
nutrition and hydration can be invaluable; but to relieve pain and to suffer at life’s end, its 
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usefulness comes into question.92 The decision to administer medically assisted nutrition 
and hydration has to be individualized in light of the goals of care of the patient.93  
The Catholic Church addresses medically assisted nutrition and hydration in 
Directive #58 of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. 
“Certain measures to provide nutrition and hydration may become excessively 
burdensome and therefore not obligatory in light of their very limited ability to prolong 
life or provide comfort.”94  The issue of medically assisted artificial nutrition and 
hydration, however, is being co-opted by the right-to-life and sanctity-of-life arguments 
with no consideration of the data that supports withholding medically assisted artificial 
nutrition hydration. The medical data is not given credence. Potential pain and suffering 
and the prolongation of death that are not ordinary. 
2. Persistent Vegetative State Patients.  
Medically assisted nutrition and hydration is used for patients in a persistent 
vegetative state. The ethical debate here needs to have a clear definition and moral 
direction. 
  Definition. 
The persistent vegetative state is a clinical condition of complete unawareness of 
self and the environment, accompanied by sleep-wake cycles, with either complete or 
partial preservation of the brain and brainstem function. Patients in a persistent vegetative 
state show no evidence of sustained, reproducible, purposeful, voluntary behavioral 
responses to visual, auditory, tactile, or noxious stimuli. Persistent vegetative state 
patients show no evidence of language comprehension or expression, have bowel and 
bladder incontinence, and have variably preserved cranial nerve and spinal reflexes. A 
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vegetative state is present one month after acute traumatic or non-traumatic brain injury 
or lasting for at least one month in patients with degenerative or metabolic disorders or 
developmental malformations. The recovery of consciousness is unlikely after 12 months 
period.95 
Moral Direction. 
In the papal allocution March 20, 2004, the Pope John Paul II (d. 2005) stated that 
hydration and nutrition are a morally ordinary treatment for persistent vegetative state 
patients and that foregoing would be considered “euthanasia by omission.” Even though 
this allocution has been judged by some theologians not to be consistent with the balance 
of Catholic teaching on forgoing treatment, it was a papal address given much attention 
and thus has led to significant debate about persistent vegetative state patients. One of the 
impacts of the allocution has been the rewriting Directive #58. 
In principle, there is an obligation to provide patients with food and water, 
including medically assisted nutrition and hydration for those who cannot 
take food orally. This obligation extends to patients in chronic and 
presumably irreversible conditions (e.g., the “persistent vegetative state”) 
who can reasonably be expected to live indefinitely if given such care they 
cannot reasonably be expected to prolong life or when they would be 
“excessively burdensome for the patient or [would] cause significant 
physical discomfort, instance, as a patient draws close to inevitable death 
from an underlying progressive and fatal condition, certain measures to 
provide nutrition and hydration may become excessively burdensome and 
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therefore not obligatory in light of their very limited ability to prolong life 
or provide comfort. (Directive #58)96 
 
An extensive survey of relevant medical literature dealing with this issue and different 
positions taken by moral theologians has been conducted. In the review of the theological 
opinions, there was not found persuasive rationale by some theologians that since persons 
in persistent vegetative state conditions can no longer pursue the spiritual goal of life, 
feeding them artificially would be considered futile. Medically, life expectancy usually 
ranges from only two to five years thus arguing persistent vegetative state patients are in 
a terminal condition.97 The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services implement the teaching of the Papal Allocution: “in principle, there is an 
obligation to provide patients with food and water, including medically assisted hydration 
and nutrition” even for patients in the “persistent vegetative state.” However, there is a 
crucial qualification of this “in principle” doctrine when applied to specific cases in 
which the “obligation” becomes “morally optional.” The Bishops explain: “medically 
assisted hydration and nutrition become morally optional when they cannot reasonably be 
expected to prolong life or when they would be excessively burdensome for the patient.” 
The Bishops further clarify, “certain measures to provide nutrition and hydration may 
become excessively burdensome and therefore not obligatory.” 98 
B. Relief of Suffering. 
Second, the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is designed to address the 
relief of suffering at the end of life. This raises specific ethical concerns regarding 
palliative care and assisted suicide. 
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1. Palliative Care.  
In addressing palliative care, two interrelated concepts need consideration, care at 
end-of-life and palliative sedation. 
Care at End-of-Life. 
The fear of killing patients by excessive use of medications, particularly opioids, 
spurred the debate about palliative care. It received its initial place as a viable service to 
health care from the time when the pain was often badly managed, and health care 
professionals were poorly trained. Palliative care has broadened its scope of service to 
include all acute patients, not just end-of-life. In caring for the dying, it has been 
determined that there was a need to address both pain and suffering to accomplish a 
good death. Not all patients come to acceptance of a good death, thus a source of 
suffering. Careful management of this group of dying patients is what palliative care is 
called to do. Both doctors and families sometimes find it difficult to accept that a patient 
is dying, because of the difficulty of determining a clear line between living and dying. 
Person-centered, family-oriented, and evidence-based care at the end-of-life is the 
ultimate goal of palliative care.99 Palliative care provides relief from pain and other 
symptoms and supports quality of life while focusing on the patient and families. 
Palliative care should be introduced early in the course of an illness and can be provided 
throughout the continuum of care whether in home, hospital, nursing home or assisted 
living facilities. Palliative care is care provided by an interdisciplinary team. These 
palliative care teams include physicians, specialty advanced practice nurses, registered 
nurses, social workers, and chaplains.100  
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To enhance palliative care’s progress, two important deficiencies exist that need 
addressing. First, clinicians caring for the patients have deficiencies in their knowledge 
of caring for people with serious illnesses and nearing end-of-life. Secondly, shortages 
of palliative care specialist exist, and thus the caring for end-of-life patients often falls to 
the primary care physicians who have limited skills in this specialized area of health 
care. Palliative care training and education need to be implemented in medical and 
nursing schools and encouraged in undergraduate and graduate programs, as well as 
emphasized in continuing education.101 
Patients near the end-of-life often have multiple transitions; these transitions can 
cause medication errors, poor care planning, lack of coordination of care, and the 
expertise and continuity of care become even more critical. Often patients are so 
confused and overwhelmed that they struggle with meeting basic needs. Thus, the 
follow-up care and medication lapses are not outside the norm. Programs to reduce 
readmission rates and improve primary care have been initiated. Palliative care 
programs, often in clinics or homes, provide an umbrella that encompasses a spectrum 
of approaches for bringing care to people with serious illnesses.102  
Quality of life improvement for both patient and family is a palliative goal. 
Palliative care provides pain control as well as providing relief from other distressing 
symptoms; and in doing so, intends to neither prolong life nor hasten death. Palliative 
integrates psychosocial and spiritual aspects and offers a support system for families and 
patients with one of its goals being that patients can live as actively as possible until 
death. Palliative care uses a team approach to address the needs of patients and 
families.103 
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Twelve key core components have been proposed for the care the patients at the 
end-of-life. These core components require flexibility and individual tailoring. 
Management of pain and emotional distress, counseling, family support, frequent 
assessment, access to coordinated care are just some of the major components that can 
bring better care to the patient that is nearing death.104  Palliative care affirms life by 
supporting the patient and their families’ goals including their hopes for life 
prolongation, as well as their hopes for peace and dignity throughout the disease 
process, the dying process, and to death.105 
Performing the skills and applying the knowledge of palliative care initially can 
be learned and replicated. What is more important is the need to go deeper into the 
culture of Catholic health care ministry. The Catholic Church has been relatively quiet 
and lacks leadership in palliative care although the Pope recently spoke out about its 
value and needed for expansion. In his speech to the Pontifical Academy for Life, he 
shared the view that “palliative care expresses the typically human attitude of caring for 
each other especially for those who are suffering.”106  
The Church has taken a more active role in advocating for palliative care because 
it exemplifies the best of what the Catholic faith has consistently believed and 
emphasized about one’s relationship to God and each other and the meaning and 
purpose of one’s existence. When one reaches out to heal and care for the sick, the poor, 
the vulnerable, and the dying, one touches God. Fundamental features of the gospel 
distinguish Catholic health care: (1) Jesus’ healing ministry is incarnational. When one 
cares for others, one is reaching out to Christ himself, (2) Jesus’ healing ministry is the 
work of evangelization. The healing ministry of Jesus brings about the “Reign of God” 
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restoring people to their communities, (3) Jesus’ healing ministry is the work of 
compassion. Compassion means, “to suffer with” but it is much more than that: it goes 
beyond sympathy or pity. Compassion is a call to action: to serve the marginalized, the 
most vulnerable, the forgotten or abandoned, or those suffering. Compassion is an 
antidote to despair felt by people who believe they have no control or have been 
abandoned or left to languish, (4) Jesus’ healing ministry is the work of restoration of a 
person to the relationship with God, to their families, to their loved ones, and to their 
communities. When one offers comfort even when there is no cure, one is ultimately 
restoring people to their community. Therefore, palliative care is a genuine hallmark of 
Catholic health care.107  
   Palliative Sedation. 
Symptom control (pain, dyspnea or shortness of breath, restlessness, and 
nausea/vomiting) is one of the cardinal reasons for a good death not being achieved. 
When symptoms are not controlled, patients often request an alternative means of dying. 
Physicians often hesitate to give dying patients adequate symptom control for fear that 
high doses of medication can suppress breathing and cause death. Inadequate training of 
physicians in symptom control has led to this fear. Causing death by overmedicating is 
based on false assumptions. Even oncologists, who deal with patients’ most in need of 
symptom control, have insufficient knowledge in the appropriate medical use of analgesic 
drugs. Large doses of morphine may well cause death if given to a healthy person who is 
not in pain and has not received morphine before the administration. If administered for 
pain, the patients’ pain receptors will take up such drugs first. Patients whom regularly 
receive morphine for pain quickly build up resistance to the side effects. Because of this 
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resistance, patients can tolerate higher doses that would normally be fatal to a healthy 
person. Additionally, tolerance is built up to the side effects far more quickly than to the 
analgesic effects. Physicians, therefore, should not hesitate to increase dosages to 
accomplish pain relief. The dosage needed to relieve pain for patients who are awake and 
in pain is one that is adequate to relieve the pain. That dosage can be administered 
without reservation. The risk of increasing the dose to a point where it would cause death 
is virtually zero.108 
Palliative sedation has been approved and endorsed by the American Medical 
Association, the American Nurses Association, the American Academy of Pain 
Medicine, and the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine.109 These 
organizations agree that rarely is it necessary to sedate patients to the point of sleep to 
accomplish symptom control. Sedation for the control of intractable suffering in an 
imminently dying patient is humane, appropriate, and medically acceptable. Patients will 
not die from the sedation; but it can make the suffering bearable, allowing time for 
medical teams to reassess patients’ further needs. Sedatives can be withdrawn, and 
patients will be brought back to consciousness to assess symptom control. If symptoms 
are not controlled, patients can be returned to a sleep state where alternative modalities 
can be utilized.110 Palliative Sedation Therapy is the use of specific sedative medications 
to relieve intractable suffering from refractory symptoms. Refractory symptoms are 
symptoms that physicians determine cannot safely be relieved by other interventions. 
Such symptoms requiring sedation include (in descending order of frequency) delirium 
(55%-65%), dyspnea (26%-27%), pain (14%-18%), and vomiting (4%).111 The relief of 
refractory pain can be accomplished by the reduction in patients’ consciousness. The 
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medications used include benzodiazepines, phenobarbital, or propofol. Opioids such as 
morphine should not be used for Palliative Sedation Therapy because even in high doses, 
sedation may not be accomplished. Relief of refractory symptoms is the goal. Therefore, 
care must be taken in choosing doses of sedatives to reduce patients’ level of 
consciousness. Sedation can vary, but initially, the doses should allow for patients’ ability 
to communicate.112 
Palliative sedation should not be entered into without serious consideration. 
Ample conversations with the physician, the interdisciplinary team, the patient, and the 
family need to occur before beginning palliative sedation. These conversations can aid in 
helping to assuage the concern and answering the questions of right time, right 
circumstances, and correct intentions.113 Families often are dubious initially about 
Palliative Sedation Therapy. Research has revealed that families overwhelmingly (88%) 
agree that palliative sedation helped to decrease symptom distress. Families disagree, 
however, that palliative sedation was not dignified and that no meaning was found in 
being with sedated patients. The families in the research believe that palliative sedation is 
beneficial, yet they needed to be reassured that no alternative solutions were available.  
Families need clear explanations and ample time to say good-bye.114  
Varying degrees of unconsciousness in dying patients can occur with palliative 
sedation. Due to the concerns about sedation and the inadvertent hastening of death, there 
may be a need to establish ethical justification using the principle of double effect.115 The 
principle of double effect helps to answer the question: Can it be right to have an action 
that may have two or more effects: some which are good, the intended; and some that are 
bad, but not intended? The principle of double effect is justified when all the following 
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conditions are met: (1) the action cannot be morally wrong, (2) the bad effect must not 
cause the good, (3) the intention must not be for the bad effect, and (4) the bad must not 
outweigh the good.116 
In evaluating the sedation of patients with intractable symptoms at the end-of-life 
is by definition a good action and could be considered a moral obligation by the principle 
of double effect conditions. To the second condition, the distinction between means and 
the effects, patients do not have to suffer until the end-of-life. The third criterion 
regarding intent is to relieve patients’ intractable symptoms rather than to hasten death. 
The final condition questions proportionality. Symptom relief at the end of life does 
justify the action of palliative sedation. Studies have shown that once intractable 
symptoms are relieved, patients may live longer. Furthermore, many health care 
professionals agree that palliative sedation is ethically justifiable. Providing relief, not 
hastening death, by targeting symptoms while minimizing the potential harm is the 
goal.117  
2. Assisted Suicide. 
Assisted suicide raises issues related to symptom control and patient autonomy. 
These, in turn, will be engaged. 
Symptom Control. 
Physician-assisted suicide can be of real interest to people as they near death 
because of their fears of an inability of medical technology to control symptoms. The 
predominant reason for requesting physician-assisted suicide is symptom control. The 
most common argument in favor of physician-assisted suicide is that death offers the only 
means of attaining comfort or dignity for the patient in extreme duress. Advocates for 
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Physician-assisted suicide supplement their argument with data showing that inadequate 
symptom control is the main reason to request physician-assisted suicide. With physician 
assistance, expertise is provided to increase the likelihood of a successful suicide attempt. 
It is argued that with a physician-assisted suicide; such assistance prevents a greater harm 
than it causes. Advocates for physician-assisted suicide also argue that the immediate 
death is preferable to suffering from pain.118 
Paradoxes have surfaced in the argument about physician-assisted suicide. The 
first paradox is the result of the polemic relationship between autonomy and the principle 
of beneficence, the relief of suffering. Both autonomy and beneficence are the two major 
justifications for euthanasia. Physician-assisted suicide ultimately gives individual 
patients control over their dying, but the result is an increase in the medical power. The 
second paradox, one of the stated goals of physician-assisted suicide’s advocates is to 
bring about a good death. The good death has been threatened because of the lack of 
range of options to accomplish it.119  
One of the important tenants in the debate on physician-assisted suicide is the 
respect the principle of autonomy. Determining one’s life direction is the foundation for 
autonomy. If in seeking assistance in dying from a physician, then it can be brought into 
question whether autonomy of the patient is truly respected. In spite of many theories 
about autonomy, there is agreement on three conditions. The first condition is 
independence from influences that would be considered controlling. The second is the 
capacity for action; and finally, the comprehension of the information given. If physician-
assisted suicide is requested from patients in extreme suffering, their autonomy is 
constrained because there is no independence. Respecting patient autonomy does not 
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involve doing everything patient request. A positive obligation to grant the patients’ 
request only can be granted if there is enhancement or restoration of autonomy. Killing 
the patient would not restore autonomy; in fact, it would eliminate it.120 
Beneficence can play a key role in discussions about physician-assisted suicide. In 
the traditional argument for mercy, no one should have to endure terminal suffering. If 
the patients’ symptoms cannot be controlled because technology cannot offer relief, then 
the argument goes that the physician should be allowed to bring about death.121 Utilizing 
palliative sedation, this argument has less validity. Additionally, when considering 
beneficence, a capacity to recognize the relief of suffering is required. With physician-
assisted suicide, the end of suffering is brought about by the elimination of the suffering 
patient who no longer can notice the diminished suffering.122 Proper symptom control 
does reduce the need for helping patients kill themselves.123  
The Church is clear about its stand on physician-assisted suicide /euthanasia. 
“Euthanasia is an action or omission that of itself or by intention causes death to alleviate 
suffering. Catholic health care institutions may never condone or participate in euthanasia 
or assisted suicide in any way. Dying patients who request euthanasia should receive 
loving care, psychological and spiritual support, and appropriate remedies for pain and 
other symptoms so they can live with dignity until the time of their natural death.”124 
Autonomy. 
Loss of autonomy and a diminished quality of life are also offered to justify 
Physician-assisted suicide. One of the most important tenants in the debate on physician-
assisted suicide is the respect for the principal of autonomy. Determining one’s life 
direction is the foundation for autonomy. In seeking assistance in dying from a physician, 
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it can be brought into question whether autonomy of the patient is truly respected. In spite 
of many theories about autonomy, there is agreement on three conditions. The first 
condition is independence from influences that would be considered controlling. The 
second is the capacity for action; and finally, the comprehension of the information 
given. If physician-assisted suicide is requested from patients in extreme suffering, 
autonomy is constrained because there is no independence. Respecting patient autonomy 
does not involve doing everything the patient requests.125 
This chapter has extended the discussion of medical technology from the start of 
life to address end of life dilemmas. The contribution of the Catholic Tradition is to be 
highly attuned to protecting the dignity of the patients, especially at the end of life and 
even when they request medical technology for assisted suicide. The Catholic Tradition 
urges the use of medical technology to alleviate patient suffering without intending their 
death. 
IV. Critique Based on the Ethical and Religious Directives. 
As mentioned in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, the Catholic Tradition’s use of Natural Law 
has two general approaches. The first approach focuses on the universal aspect of human 
nature. This approach is typically associated with the settled Catholic teaching on 
morality. The second approach focuses on the person, presenting a dynamic and historical 
view of the human condition as contributors to God’s creation.126 This approach is 
typically associated with the Principle of Double Effect to apply traditional Church 
teaching in a flexible manner to changing circumstances. Arising from these two 
approaches to Natural Law, a third approach has emerged combining the nature-oriented 
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and person-oriented approaches to new dilemmas regarding emerging technologies that 
may require doctrinal development in Catholic teaching. 
In the conclusion of each applied chapter, a critique based on the Ethical and 
Religious Directives is presented regarding the main topics of the chapter. The critique 
adopts the above approaches to identify three distinct categories as follows. Category A 
deals with settled issues in Church Teaching reflecting the Nature Approach to Natural 
Law. Category B deals with the controversial issues eligible for using the Principle of 
Double Effect reflecting the Personal Approach to Natural Law. Category C deals with 
issues requiring doctrinal development in Catholic teaching to address new dilemmas 
regarding emerging technologies.  
The following analysis applies this threefold critique to the topics discussed in 
this chapter on death and dying technology. Each main section is discussed in turn.  
Section I: Changing Attitudes towards Death and Dying. 
This section discussed how even with changing attitudes towards death and dying, 
the Catholic Church has settled teaching on two pivotal points on this issue: first is the 
legitimacy of interventions to prolong life; secondly, life is not absolute hence there is no 
obligation to prolong it at any cost. These points are settled Catholic teaching (Category 
A). 
The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services give us 
the moral guidance regarding care for the seriously ill and dying. Directive #56 and #57 
address these concerns. 
A person has a moral obligation to use ordinary or proportionate means of 
preserving his or her life. Proportionate means are those that in the 
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judgment of the patient offer a reasonable hope of benefit and do not entail 
an excessive burden or impose excessive expense on the family or the 
community. (Directive #56) 
 
A person may forgo extraordinary or disproportionate means of preserving 
life. Disproportionate means are those that in the patient’s judgment do not 
offer a reasonable hope of benefit or entail an excessive burden, or impose 
excessive expense on the family or the community. (Directive #57) 
 
Recognizing that ordinary and extraordinary treatments are moral distinctions and 
not medical distinctions are most critical. The life we have present is a treasure but 
extending that life by extraordinary means is not obligatory in Catholic teaching.127 We 
are not the masters of our lives, we are custodians of it. Ultimately we are to be in union 
with God, thus if the patient deems treatment excessively burdensome then prolonging 
life is not mandatory. We are not to desire a long life but a good life.128 
Section II: Medical Futility. 
  The next section discussed the ethical issues around medical futility. There is no 
obligation to continue futile treatment- that is settled Catholic teaching (Category A). 
 Futility is appropriately addressed in Directive #56 and #57. Treatment after the 
determination of medical futility is contrary to standards of care and a compromise of 
human dignity. Often, continued treatment in these cases is a result of the technological 
imperative.129 
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It is important to distinguish the withdrawal of futile treatment from 
rationing. Rationing deals with refusing treatments (due to scarce resources) that 
have a beneficial effect. In contrast, futility deals with providing a treatment that 
has no beneficial effect.130 
Another topic in this section deals with the compassionate goals of medicine and 
health care. Naturally, seeking these goals as a moral obligation is settled Catholic 
teaching (Category A). 
People often think of compassion as an individual virtue or practice, done by one 
person to help another. Compassionate goals, sympathy with or feeling for the plights of 
a particular person is what should motivate our actions. Personal compassion is a key 
element the Catholic teaching to bring healing and relief to people. Also, compassion has 
a critical medical dimension: the prevention of disease and the alleviation of pain and 
suffering. Compassion must always be part of the professional duty of physicians. 
Compassion as a duty lies in the connection to other duties (e.g., fiduciary responsibility 
to the patients, the duty of due care, and the duty to maintain confidentiality).131 
Section III: Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment. 
  The next section discussed the withdrawal of medically assisted nutrition and 
hydration when circumstances justify doing so. Justification for doing so is based on 
there being no moral obligation to use extraordinary treatment, as discussed above. This 
is settled Catholic teaching (Category A). 
 However, removing life-support from patients in a persistent vegetative state can 
be controversial but can be justified as “morally optional.” The Ethical and Religious 
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Directives explain how this is justifiable, adopting the Principle of Double Effect 
(Category B). 
In principle, there is an obligation to provide patients with food and water, 
including medically assisted nutrition and hydration for those who cannot 
take food orally. This obligation extends to patients in chronic and 
presumably irreversible conditions (e.g., the “persistent vegetative state”) 
who can reasonably be expected to live indefinitely if given such care they 
cannot reasonably be expected to prolong life or when they would be 
“excessively burdensome for the patient or [would] cause significant 
physical discomfort, instance, as a patient draws close to inevitable death 
from an underlying progressive and fatal condition, certain measures to 
provide nutrition and hydration may become excessively burdensome and 
therefore not obligatory in light of their very limited ability to prolong life 
or provide comfort. (Directive #58) 
 
As a result of the case of Terri Schiavo, Pope John Paul II published a Papal 
Allocution in 2004.132 The focus was on the question of medically assisted nutrition and 
hydration, which is especially complex for patients who have cognitive impairments.133 
The Papal Allocution led to the revision of the Ethical and Religious Directives. That 
revision included Directive #58 that accepts the justification of withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment from patients in the persistent vegetative state (that is, such 
treatment can become morally optional).  
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 Furthermore, there is continuing data that utilization of medically assisted 
nutrition and hydration for many patients may not be as beneficial as anticipated.134 For 
example, the American Geriatrics Society has explained in its statement on Feeding 
Tubes in Advanced Dementia: 
1. Percutaneous feeding tubes are not recommended for older adults with 
advanced dementia. Careful hand feeding should be offered; for persons 
with advanced dementia, hand feeding is at least as good as tube feeding 
for the outcomes of death, aspiration pneumonia, functional status and 
patient comfort. Tube feeding is associated with agitation, increased use of 
physical and chemical restraints, and worsening pressure ulcers. 
 
2. Efforts to enhance oral feeding by altering the environment and creating 
patient-centered approaches to feeding should be part of usual care for 
older adults with advanced dementia.135 
  
Another topic in this section on withdrawing life-sustaining treatment deals with 
palliative sedation. Two points can be made with regard to Catholic teaching.  
First, in exceptional cases, while controversial, palliative sedation can be justified 
using the Principle of Double Effect in Catholic teaching (Category B). In other words, 
the use of palliative sedation can be justified using the Principle of Double Effect.136 
Second, the routine use of palliative sedation for terminally ill patients whose pain may 
otherwise be manageable would require doctrinal development in Catholic teaching 
(Category C).137 
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Also in this section, there was a discussion of assisted suicide.  The prohibition of 
assisted suicide is settled Catholic teaching (Category A). Church teaching regarding 
assisted suicide is explained in Directive #60: 
Euthanasia is an action or omission that of itself or by intention causes 
death in order to alleviate suffering. Catholic health care institutions may 
never condone or participate in euthanasia or assisted suicide in any way. 
Dying patients who request euthanasia should receive loving care, 
psychological and spiritual support, and appropriate remedies for pain and 
other symptoms so that they can live with dignity until the time of natural 
death. (Directive #60) 
 
  In sum, the threefold ethical critique based on the Ethical and Religious 
Directives has been applied to the topics discussed in the main sections of the chapter. 
The significance of this threefold critique as explained at the end of Chapter 3 and 
applied at the end of the applied Chapters 4, 5, and 6 is further discussed in the 
concluding chapter of the dissertation. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion. 
This dissertation has discussed the contribution that the normative approach of the 
Catholic teaching can provide for resolving ethical dilemmas regarding medical 
technology. 
The technology discussed ranged from what is currently available to what lies 
ahead for the future. First-class health care would not exist were it not for continual 
progress and innovation. Medical technology draws and adopts technology from many 
fields. Without technology, modern medicine would not have been able to accomplish the 
successful methods that are a blessing to mankind. The basics of medical technology that 
has made health care so proficient and quality oriented encompass a wide range of 
sophisticated systems. 
The range of technology also promises a robust future for medicine. Technology 
continues to accelerate. The combinations of varying disciplines are converging to 
fundamentally change health care. The health care environment is changing at an 
unprecedented rate that challenges all to stay current with the “disruptive technologies.” 
The technologies seem to reverse fundamental approaches existing previously. 
Revolutionary changes are occurring, forcing all to adapt. 
With the rapid advancement in medical technology, significant ethical dilemmas 
emerge that challenge the established norms. Due to accelerated medical technology 
advancements, ethics is pressured to keep pace. This seems to be borne by the lack of 
research literature in the areas of reproductive, regenerative, and end-of-life medical 
advancement. This dissertation addressed the gap by considering ethical dilemmas in 
these aforementioned areas. 
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The dissertation analyzed the normative approach of the Catholic Tradition for 
resolving ethical dilemmas regarding medical technology. Specifically, the normative 
approach focused upon the Ethical and Religious Directives. The Directives maintain we 
have a human mandate that transcends all faith traditions and belief systems. The 
Directives state we have a social, pastoral, and professional responsibility to our fellow 
man. Thus, it is incumbent on us to aid in the correct formation of one’s conscience in 
these areas of new and expanding medical technologies. 
The significance of this dissertation pertains to the ever-accelerating pace of new 
medical technology and its impact on patient care. The Ethical Religious Directives 
provide a normative approach for resolving ethical dilemmas regarding pivotal 
breakthroughs in medical technology. The normative ethical approach has two 
components: a normative framework for Catholic health care ethics that adopts practical 
ethical principles as enunciated in the Ethical and Religious Directives (Chapter 2); and 
secular decision-making models in organizational and clinical ethics that are consistent 
the Catholic Tradition (Chapter 3). 
Chapter 2 discussed the Normative Framework of Catholic Health Care Ethics. 
The Ethical Religious Directives are grounded on three leading concepts. These concepts 
of social, pastoral, and professional responsibility led the Ethical Religious Directives to 
develop several practical ethical principles for Catholic health care. First, the practical 
principle deals with the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means. The 
second principle deals with the principle of double effect. The third principle deals with 
the principle of cooperation to address issues of complicity. 
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Chapter 3 discussed Ethical Decision-making Models Consistent with Catholic 
Ethics. This discussion engaged three related topics. To understand the significance of 
moral agency in organizational ethics, its characteristics and their connection with moral 
theories were examined. Ethical theories looked at the impact on health care 
organizations. This topic focused on clinical ethics and competency by examining the 
competency of the patient and advance directives. The fundamental concept in bringing 
decision-making of the patient to fruition is that of determining competency. These 
challenges reveal the crucial need for advance directives. The third topic dealt with 
clinical ethics consultation. An inherent relationship exists between clinical and 
organizational ethics. Thus an ethics infrastructure is an essential component of an 
organization's ethics integration and strategy. The ethics infrastructure links fundamental 
processes in clinical practice to the mission and core values of the organization. 
Accomplishing quality and professionalism is a key to success of the ethics consultation. 
Finally, an integral part of an ethics consultation is the creation of a patient case analysis. 
Chapter 4 then applied the Ethical Religious Directives to consider Reproductive 
Technology. The first topic explored the embryo and personhood status. The prenatal 
status of the embryo, personhood, and the ethical framework were discussed. This 
discussion on the personal or “ensouled” status of the human embryo raises significant 
ethical issues for stem cells technologies and in vitro fertilization. The relevance of 
personhood, the issue of resourcing of stem cells, and the issue of using in vitro 
fertilization for the embryo’s health were reviewed. The discussion on the personal status 
of the embryo and its relevance for stem cell technology connected with the ethical 
debate on prenatal testing. This is a crucial aspect of the ethics of reproductive 
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technology that involves scrutiny of the availability of testing and interventions and the 
implications for tomorrow's children. The final topic focused the pivotal ethical debate on 
prenatal screening and concerns about screening consequences. 
Chapter 5 then applied the Ethical Religious Directives to the area of 
Regenerative Technology to raise the crucial issues of genetic enhancement, germline 
modification, mitochondrial DNA, and gene editing with CRISPR. First, on genetic 
enhancement, two core concerns were explored: the significance of genetic enhancement 
for human progress, and the impact on future generations. Second, the ethical debate on 
genetic enhancement in general leads to the more specific focus on genetic germline 
modification that requires examining mainstream religious perspectives and also secular 
perspectives. Next, two recent technologies have emerged that were considered in further 
detail: mitochondrial DNA and gene editing with CRISPR. The science and the ethical, 
social, and policy consideration or religious concerns of these amazing technological 
breakthroughs were discussed. 
Chapter 6 then applied the Ethical Religious Directives to technological concerns 
on death and dying by examining three related topics: changing attitudes towards death 
and dying, medical futility, and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. First, there 
was a discussion of the changing attitudes towards death and dying, the characteristics 
and philosophical approaches. Second, this discussion offered insight into the ethical 
debate surrounding medical futility by examining the debate regarding the meaning of 
futility and the compassionate goals of medicine. Third, there was a discussion of the 
ethical debate around the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment by engaging two related 
topics: medically assisted nutrition and hydration the relief of suffering at the end-of-life. 
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The applied Chapters 4, 5, and 6 dealt with practical topics that integrated an 
ethical critique based on the Ethical and Religious Directives that was explained at the 
end of Chapter 3. The conclusion to Chapter 3 explained how the Ethical and Religious 
Directives are based on different approaches to Natural Law. The first approach focuses 
on the universal aspects of human nature. This approach is typically associated with 
settled Catholic teaching on morality. The second approach focuses on the person, 
presenting a dynamic and historical view of the human condition as contributors to God’s 
creation. This approach is typically associated with using the Principle of Double Effect 
to apply traditional Church teaching in a flexible manner to changing circumstances. 
Arising from these two approaches to Natural Law, a third approach has emerged, 
combining the nature-oriented and person-oriented approaches to new dilemmas 
regarding emerging technologies that may require doctrinal development in Catholic 
teaching. 
The ethical critique in the applied Chapters 4, 5, and 6, based on the Ethical and 
Religious Directives, was applied to the main topics of each chapter. The critique adopts 
the above approaches to identify three distinct categories. Category A dealt with settled 
issues in Church Teaching reflecting the Nature Approach to Natural Law. Category B 
dealt with controversial issues eligible for using the Principle of Double Effect reflecting 
the Personal Approach to Natural Law. Category C dealt with issues requiring doctrinal 
development in Catholic teaching to address new dilemmas regarding emerging 
technologies. This threefold critique based on the Ethical and Religious Directives can 
provide guidance for Catholic health care to address emerging technologies in medicine. 
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In other words, the theoretical analysis in the dissertation is aligned with a practical 
ethical critique to guide ethical analysis in Catholic health care. 
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